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My dissertation “Who Lobbies and When: Analyzing Patterns of Foreign Lobbying Ac-
tivities” studies (a) who lobbies, (b) for what purposes, and (c) when. Foreign lobbying
involves a wide set of actions that foreign governments, firms, interest groups, and individ-
uals take to pursue their interests and interact with diverse actors in other states. Like
diplomacy, foreign lobbying aims to facilitate interstate interaction and help actors achieve
their international goals. Yet, since not only governments but also firms and interest groups
can engage in lobbying and choose lobbying topics and tactics, I suggest foreign lobbying as a
more versatile, alternative form of diplomacy. The United States, as the global superpower,
has experienced nearly 53,000 lobbying incidents conducted by foreign actors from about 250
countries since 1971. However, despite the prevalence and persistence of foreign lobbying
activities, we have scant knowledge about the basics of foreign lobbying. The lack of theo-
retical and empirical understanding of foreign lobbying activities motivated my dissertation.
What is foreign lobbying? What are the patterns of foreign lobbying activities?
The dissertation provides systematic information on foreign lobbying activities and ex-
amines the conditions that affect lobbying patterns. Chapter 1 discusses the dissertation’s
research questions, findings, and contributions. Chapter 2 introduces my original Foreign
Lobbying Dataset (FOLD), which records the number of lobbying activities between 1971-
2017 classified by principal type, topic, and tactic at the country-year level. Chapters 3 and
4 examine how international institutions influence foreign actors’ incentives for lobbying.
By showing the positive and significant association between a country’s lobbying activities
and its linkages with the United States through international institutions, Chapter 3 finds
that foreign actors resort to lobbying as a complement to facilitate institutions’ objectives.
Chapter 4 examines the relationship between Free Trade Agreement negotiation process and
the timing of foreign lobbying activities. The significant increase in foreign lobbying activi-
ties, particularly by foreign governments, from two years before FTA signing and until entry
iv
into force implies that actors utilize lobbying to influence the design and implementation of
FTAs. Both empirical chapters highlight the value of foreign lobbying as a complementary
diplomatic instrument compatible with formal international institutions.
v
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1.0 Introduction
How do different international actors achieve their goals in international politics? This
is the central question that drives my research interested in foreign lobbying activities. Lob-
bying is an extensively used strategy by foreign governments, firms, interest groups, and
individuals to interact with diverse actors - such as government officials, politicians, media,
and public - of other, more powerful countries and pursue their interests. A wide array of
activities constitute foreign lobbying, such as researching the target government’s policies
relevant to foreign principals (i.e., foreign actors who engage in lobbying activities), run-
ning public relations campaign to improve foreign principals’ image in the target country,
and arranging meetings with the members of Congress and government officials. As foreign
lobbying aims to facilitate interstate interaction and assist different actors in attaining their
international goals, it is similar to diplomacy. However, unlike diplomacy, not only govern-
mental actors but also private actors like firms and interest groups are eligible to participate
in lobbying activities and flexibly choose lobbying topics and tactics. Thus, I suggest foreign
lobbying as a more versatile, alternative tool of diplomacy.
The United States, as the global hegemon in contemporary international relations, has
experienced intense lobbying activities conducted by actors from more than 200 countries for
nearly eighty years. Numerous foreign actors have resorted to foreign lobbying activities to
engage with the United States and further their interests. To trace the activities of foreign
actors who anticipate influencing American policies transcending the border, the United
States enacted the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) in 1938. FARA has permitted
foreign entities, both public and private, residing outside the United States to legitimately
participate in lobbying activities by hiring American agents representing their interests.
Although FARA banned foreign entities from making campaign contributions in American
elections since 1966, diverse foreign actors are allowed to partake in lobbying activities as
U.S. interest groups.
However, despite the prevalence and persistence of foreign lobbying activities, we know
little about the fundamentals of lobbying. Scholars have concentrated on examining foreign
1
lobbying’s effectiveness without uncovering what foreign lobbying is (Gawande, Krishna and
Robbins, 2006; Gawande, Maloney and Montes-Rojas, 2009; Kee, Olarreaga and Silva, 2007;
You, 2016; Pevehouse and Vabulas, 2019). At the same time, the media has been reporting
the outliers, the illegal cases of foreign lobbying such as Robert Mueller’s prosecution of
Paul Manafort due to the alleged Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election
(Mazzetti and Benner, 2018). Such media coverage imposed negative connotations to foreign
lobbying despite its legality. The lack of theoretical and empirical understanding of foreign
lobbying motivated my research. Who lobbies? For what kind of purposes and when?
Providing answers to these simple questions is the goal of my dissertation.
My dissertation consists of three essays that look at patterns of foreign lobbying activ-
ities. In the dissertation, I attempt to provide systematic information on foreign lobbying
activities and examine predictors that affect the patterns. While the first essay concentrates
on studying who lobbies and for what reasons, the following two essays focus on examining
under which conditions foreign actors engage in lobbying activities.
The first essay (Chapter 2) “Learning Patterns of Foreign Lobbying: The Foreign Lobby-
ing Dataset (FOLD) Version 1.0” introduces my original dataset on foreign lobbying activi-
ties. The Foreign Lobbying Dataset (FOLD) provides systematic information on the lobbying
activities of foreign governments, firms, interest groups, and individuals in the United States
between 1971 and 2017. FARA has obligated any American agents lobbying on behalf of
foreign entities to register with the Department of Justice and disclose information about
them, foreign principals, and the lobbying activities since 1942. My FOLD dataset is com-
piled using archival FARA reports and records the number of lobbying activities and the
amount of lobbying expenses at the country-year level. For the count of lobbying incidents,
the FOLD classifies lobbying activities by topic (e.g., trade, security, etc.), principal type
(e.g., government, private), and tactic. Approximately 53,000 incidents of foreign lobbying
took place in the United States between 1971-2017. By tracing patterns of foreign lobby-
ing activities, my data provides answers on who lobbies and for what issues. The new and
systematic information on foreign lobbying activities will help us better understand actors’s
preferences and the interactions among actors in international relations. The FOLD dataset
will also be a resource to scholars who empirically study how foreign actors attain their goals
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in international relations using lobbying activities. After introducing the new data, I briefly
review the patterns of foreign lobbying activities that have been conducted in the United
States for 44 years.
In the second essay (Chapter 3) “Foreign Lobbying as a Complement to International
Institutions,” I study how the institutional linkages actors have with the United States affect
their lobbying patterns. The salient influence of the United States has rendered interactions
with the United States critical for foreign actors to pursue their goals in international re-
lations. On the one hand, foreign actors have been locking in cooperation with the United
States through international institutions. At the same time, however, actors have been
participating in foreign lobbying activities to approach and influence the U.S. government.
Why do different actors engage in informal, costly lobbying activities when they have inter-
national institutions that formally perform similar functions as foreign lobbying? Why do
actors split their efforts between institutions and lobbying? I argue that foreign actors use
lobbying as a complement to international institutions. Lobbying may support international
institutions to work the way they are supposed to work and help foreign actors achieve what
they expect from institutions. Foreign lobbying may allow actors to address misunderstand-
ings and disputes with the United States when institutions are incapable of doing so. Also,
foreign actors may use lobbying to facilitate information exchange with institutions through
the United States. Moreover, foreign actors may indirectly influence U.S. decisions within
and regarding institutions by lobbying United States’ domestic actors. However, the rela-
tionship between international institutions and foreign lobbying activities may vary by time
and institutional type. I argue that while an alliance is likely to be associated with a higher
level of foreign lobbying activities in the Cold War era, layering of institutional linkages is
likely to increase lobbying in the Post-Cold War era. By analyzing foreign lobbying activities
conducted in the United States from 1971 to 2014, I find a positive and significant effect of
institutional linkages in increasing foreign lobbying activities. The more joint memberships
in intergovernmental organizations states have with the United States, the more likely they
are to participate in lobbying activities proactively in the Post-Cold War era. In contrast,
U.S. allies have a higher likelihood of lobbying in the Cold War era, but not after the Cold
War. These findings imply that while institutional linkages provide actors with an incen-
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tive for foreign lobbying, the institution that matters to actors’ choices varies according to
changes in the international system.
The third essay (Chapter 4) “The Effects of Trade Institutions on Patterns of Foreign
Lobbying: When Do Actors Lobby?” focuses on trade-related lobbying and examines how
the negotiation of Free Trade Agreements influence lobbying patterns. Promoting liberal
trade with large, advanced economies has been an essential goal of governments, firms, and
interest groups around the world. On the one hand, to achieve this objective, actors have
been pursuing international institutions such as bilateral and regional trade agreements. On
the other hand, foreign governments, businesses, and interest groups have participated in
lobbying activities to gain greater access to overseas markets. This paper introduces foreign
lobbying as an instrument that foreign actors employ to acquire trade institutions. I argue
that foreign actors use lobbying to prevail in bargaining over Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)
and ensure successful enforcement of FTAs. Lobbying allows foreign actors to transmit
and collect information, such as the preferences of different actors or the state of domestic
political arenas, facilitating the establishment of FTAs. I examine the effects of FTAs on
foreign lobbying patterns in the context of the United States, which has been a target of
prolific lobbying activities as the world’s largest economy. For empirical analyses, I use
original data on trade-related lobbying activities, classified by type of foreign principal from
the FOLD dataset. I find that the number of lobbying activities, particularly those of foreign
governmental entities, robustly and significantly increases at the final stage of negotiations
and during the interval between the signing and enforcement of FTAs. Lobbying activities
then return to a more normal level after the FTA comes into force. The results suggest
that foreign actors view lobbying as a complementary instrument that facilitates bilateral
exchange of information and assists them in bargaining and establishing FTAs - but not as
reliable substitutes to an international trade institution.
The overall contributions of my dissertation are as follows. First, the Foreign Lobbying
Dataset (FOLD), which provides new and systematic information on foreign lobbying activ-
ities, is a significant empirical contribution. The objective information on foreign lobbying
activities helps us better conceptualize what foreign lobbying is. Also, the extensive and
detailed data further our understanding of which actors engage in lobbying activities for
4
what purposes. By analyzing foreign lobbying patterns, we can learn what different actors
prioritize in relation to the United States and how the global preference has changed (or has
not changed) over time. The FOLD dataset has a high potential to be utilized by scholars
and policymakers. My dataset can be useful for International Relations scholars interested in
how different actors pursue their interests and American Politics scholars who study interest
group politics. American and foreign policymakers may keep track of foreign influence in
the United States and plan optimal lobbying strategies using the FOLD dataset.
The second contribution of my dissertation is conceptualizing foreign lobbying as an
alternative form of diplomacy. As scholars in the field of Economics have led research on
foreign lobbying, the topic is a pioneer research subject in the field of Political Science and
International Relations. Although foreign lobbying is a materialistic strategy actors choose
to advance their gains, I highlight how foreign lobbying resembles diplomacy - rather than
focusing merely on the image of foreign lobbying as money politics. I identify foreign lob-
bying as an alternative channel of diplomacy viable for diverse actors to facilitate interstate
interaction and advance their international relations goals. Such conceptualization helps me
introduce foreign lobbying as a topic that can blend well with many lines of literature in
Political Science and International Relations. More importantly, the findings of Chapters 3
and 4 support my conceptualization of foreign lobbying as a form of diplomacy by demon-
strating that international institutions and foreign lobbying activities are two distinct but
closely related strategies.
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2.0 Learning Patterns of Foreign Lobbying:
The Foreign Lobbying Dataset (FOLD) Version 1.0
2.1 Introduction
How do different actors achieve their goals in international politics? Lobbying is an
extensively used strategy for foreign governments, firms, interest groups, and individuals to
project influence on other, more powerful governments to further their benefits. A wide
array of activities constitute foreign lobbying, such as researching the target government’s
policies relevant to foreign principals, distributing informational materials for publicity, and
arranging meetings with Members of Congress and government officials. Foreign entities
aim to gain greater access to the government and the public of another country and push
the target country’s policy decisions toward the preferences they advocate by engaging in
lobbying activities. Foreign lobbying dilutes the limits of geographical borders, facilitates
interaction among international actors, and intertwines domestic and international politics,
for better or worse.
Scholarly interest in foreign lobbying has been growing, particularly regarding the ef-
fectiveness of lobbying for trade, tourism, and human rights issues (Gawande, Krishna and
Robbins, 2006; Gawande, Maloney and Montes-Rojas, 2009; Kee, Olarreaga and Silva, 2007;
You, 2016; Pevehouse and Vabulas, 2019). At the same time, Robert Mueller’s prosecu-
tion of Paul Manafort regarding Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election,
followed by a series of investigations against politicians and government officials who al-
legedly worked for Russian, Ukrainian, and Turkish interests (Mazzetti and Benner, 2018),
has triggered unprecedentedly high attention of the media and the public to foreign lobby-
ing. However, many empirical questions about foreign lobbying, such as who lobbies, when,
and for what issues, have yet to be answered. The lack of systematic information on foreign
lobbying, exacerbated by extreme examples of foreign interference covered in the media,
has caused public anxiety and contaminated the image of foreign lobbying. Nonetheless,
I argue that we tend to have a skewed, negative perspective on foreign lobbying, because
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we do not know about conventional and legitimate foreign lobbying activities. Not only do
foreign lobbying activities serve as an important channel of interactions among international
actors, they may also have positive effects on target countries. For instance, pro-free trade
foreign lobbying benefits the target state’s general public as consumers, by countering the
influence of protectionist domestic interest groups (Gawande, Krishna and Robbins, 2006).
The shortage of accessible information restricts objective perspectives and diverse research
on foreign lobbying.
This article introduces a new and systematic dataset on the patterns of foreign lobbying
activities into the United States to address the empirical challenges in the study of foreign
lobbying. The Foreign Lobbying Dataset (FOLD) provides information on the lobbying
activities of foreign entities between 1971 and 2017, in the context of the United States, which
has been experiencing intense lobbying activities due to its hegemonic power in international
relations. Between 1971 and 2017, foreign entities from more than 200 countries engaged
in approximately 53,000 lobbying incidents.1 The Foreign Lobbying Dataset records the
number of lobbying incidents at the country-year level and classifies the lobbying activities
by topic, type of foreign principal, and tactic used in lobbying. Information on the amount
of expenses for lobbying activities by country-year, and principal type-country-year is also
available. The data will be a useful resource to capture overall patterns of foreign lobbying
and retrieve granular information on lobbying activities. It will help researchers answer
both broad and specific questions such as: Do lobbying activities increase or decrease over
time? Who are the top lobbying countries and for what issues do they lobby? Comparing
the governments of Canada and Mexico, which lobbied more frequently for advertising their
tourist destinations in 2017? Since few datasets on foreign lobbying activities do not take
into account the topics and the type of principal simultaneously - and since those tend to
have a shorter observation period, the Foreign Lobbying Dataset is a highly comprehensive
resource that can embrace a wide range of users with diverse research interests.
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, the paper describes the Foreign Lobbying
1Actors from political/geographical entities not fully recognized as sovereign states, such as Bermuda (a
British overseas territory), Hong Kong (a former British colony and special administrative region in China
currently), and Nagorno-Karabakh (a disputed region between Armenia and Azerbaijan), are also considered
independent countries of origin of lobbying principals. The years 1992, 1993, and 1994 are not included in
the observation period due to missing data on lobbying activities.
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Dataset. Second, the paper analyzes some important patterns found in lobbying activities
between 1971-2017 to demonstrate how the dataset can be used. The paper proceeds as
follows. I first discuss the potential contribution of the Foreign Lobbying Dataset. Next, I
summarize the data and methodology. The following section analyzes patterns of lobbying
activities, focusing on identifying the top lobbying countries and lobbying topics. The paper
concludes with a brief review of the data and patterns of foreign lobbying activities.
2.2 Why a New Dataset?
Why is a new and systematic dataset on patterns of foreign lobbying necessary? Lob-
bying patterns reflect the lobbying country’s preferences, its relationship with the United
States, and dynamics of international politics. Lobbying is costly, and rational foreign ac-
tors will allocate their resource to the most critical and imminent issues. If a country lobbies
frequently on some issues, we can infer that these issues are central to the country’s strategic
interests and priorities in relation to the United States. Also, if multiple countries lobby for
a specific agenda simultaneously, the agenda is likely to be a globally pressing issue of the
time. Thus, analysis of foreign lobbying activities will help us deepen our understanding of
the interests of actors and the interactions among actors in international relations.
Foreign lobbying is an activity that enables foreign governments, firms, interest groups,
and individuals to intervene in the domestic politics of the United States to affect outcomes
in international politics and economics, such as lowering trade barriers, attracting more
foreign aid, or arranging state visits. Hence, the study of foreign lobbying can be of interest
to scholars who research the intersection of international and domestic politics. American
Politics scholars who study interest group politics can also benefit from the Foreign Lobbying
Dataset. The data highlights the activities of foreign actors, who are overlooked but who
aggressively compete with domestic (American) lobbying actors for U.S. policies. Both
American and foreign policymakers may find the data useful as well. U.S. policymakers can
track which country is most diligently attempting to have an impact on American domestic
politics with the Foreign Lobbying Dataset. Policymakers of other countries may utilize the
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data to compare their lobbying efforts with others’ and to formulate optimal strategies for
future lobbying activities.
The Foreign Lobbying Dataset is one of the few sources that provide systematic in-
formation on foreign lobbying activities. Other available sources are: You (Forthcoming),
OpenSecrets (N.d.), Pevehouse and Vabulas (2019), and Kim (2018). The first three datasets
are constructed based on FARA reports and the database of Kim (2018) is based on lobby-
ing activities submitted under the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995. Each dataset
differs in scope and observation period. The Lobbying Contact Data of You (Forthcom-
ing) concentrates on contacts between agents and targets during lobbying activities. You
(Forthcoming) provides granular information on the number of contacts by the type of target
(e.g., Congress, executive branch, media, etc.) and the type of contact media (e.g., meeting,
phone call, etc.) at the country-year level. The database of OpenSecrets (N.d.) focuses on
information on expenses for lobbying activities since 2017. Pevehouse and Vabulas (2019)
record both the number of lobbying incidents and expenses at the country-year level for all
activities reported under FARA between 1942-2012. Pevehouse and Vabulas (2019) focus on
activities by foreign governments to examine how lobbying influences the U.S. State Depart-
ment’s Human Rights Reports.2 For the missing years of 1992-1994, Pevehouse and Vabulas
(2019) impute possible lobbying cases by consulting the activities conducted in surround-
ing years, assuming persistence in lobbying activities.3 Kim (2018) includes the lobbying
activities reported under LDA since 1999, and his database includes lobbying activities by
both foreign and American actors. Kim (2018)’s API is particularly beneficial in that users
can search congressional bills relevant to lobbying activities.4 However, lobbying activities
are registered under LDA only when Members of Congress are approached and when the
2According to their codebook, Pevehouse and Vabulas (2019) classify lobbying activities by eight principal
types: company, government, individual, NGO, IGO, interest group, school, and political party. For the
particular paper, Pevehouse and Vabulas (2019) use only lobbying activities by foreign governments as the
sample for emprical analysis
3Pevehouse and Vabulas (2019) search the Supplemental Statements of 1990, 1991, 1995, and 1996 in the
FARA website. The authors assume that any actors that engaged in lobbying activities in the surrounding
four years also participated in lobbying activities in 1992, 1993, and 1994. However, the authors warn that
lobbying activities that took place between 1992 and 1994 can be left out from their sample if actors did not
engage in the same lobbying activities in 1990, 1991, 1995, and 1996.
4Users can also search the number of lobbying incidents and the amount of lobbying expenses by searching
the name of the foreign principal. When lobbying agents register their activities under LDA, all agents are
required to choose the issue area (topic) of lobbying activities from a given list.
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principals are private entities - lobbying activities where the executive branch is contacted
by a foreign government are not covered in the sample. While scholars have the opportunity
to choose from diverse datasets, the Foreign Lobbying Dataset will be particularly useful for
scholars who need information on lobbying activities on specific topics or who comparatively
analyze lobbying activities on different topics or lobbying activities conducted by different
types of actors.
2.3 Data and Methodology
The Foreign Lobbying Dataset Version 1.0 provides information on the lobbying activities
conducted by foreign governments, firms, interest groups, and individuals in the United
States from 1971-1991 and 1995-2017. I constructed the data based on the U.S. Department
of Justice’s Reports to Congress on foreign lobbying activities, submitted under the Foreign
Agents Registration Act (FARA) of 1938. The Foreign Lobbying Dataset codes (1) the total
number of lobbying activities, (2) the number of lobbying activities classified by the topic
of lobbying (e.g. trade-related, security-related, etc.), (3) the number of lobbying activities
by the type of principal (e.g., foreign government or firm), and (4) the number of lobbying
activities by the tactic used in lobbying. The dataset also records (5) the total amount of
lobbying expenses and (6) the expenses by the type of principal. The unit of analysis is the
country-year. Foreign entities around the world have engaged in 52,913 lobbying incidents
during the observation period of 44 years.
2.3.1 Data Source
The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 has allowed foreign governments, firms, in-
terest groups, and individuals (i.e. foreign principals) to legitimately participate in lobbying
activities by hiring American agents who represent their interests. American lobbying agents
are obligated to register with the Department of Justice and to disclose information about
foreign principals and agents, the details of lobbying activities, and (optionally) the expenses
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foreign principals spent for lobbying. The Department of Justice periodically submits reports
on the foreign lobbying activities to Congress. I use the annual and semi-annual “Reports to
Congress” between 1971 and 2017 as the source to compile the Foreign Lobbying Dataset.
The original “Reports to Congress” under FARA (hereafter, FARA reports) are available at:
https://www.justice.gov/nsd-fara/fara-reports-congress.
The differences in the formats of FARA reports over time posed challenges in constructing
the Foreign Lobbying Dataset. First, the Foreign Lobbying Dataset excludes three years,
1992, 1993, and 1994, from the observation period because FARA reports are missing for
these three years. Since the unavailable years are a transition period from the Cold War to
the Post-Cold War period, lobbying behaviors in these years might be different from other
years. Perhaps the reports from 1992-1994 might not be missing at random. Therefore, I
drop these three years from my sample and categorize lobbying activities in two groups, the
Cold War (1971-1991) and Post-Cold War (1995-2017) eras as necessary.
Second, the change of annual FARA reports into semi-annual reports after 1996 requires
extra data-cleaning steps to ensure the consistency of the data. When semi-annual reports
are published, lobbying incidents which were conducted throughout the year and which
appear in both June and December reports might be double-counted. For instance, Varig
Brazilian Airlines (foreign principal) consulted Holland & Knight (agent) for legal advice
and service in 1995 and 1996. While the lobbying of Varig Brazilian Airlines would be coded
as a single incident in 1995, it might be erroneously coded as two separate incidents in 1996
if I simply count how many times the lobbying is recorded in FARA reports. To keep all
units at the country-year level, I estimate the similarity of lobbying incidents recorded in
the June and December reports of each year and collapse identical lobbying incidents to one.
However, when collapsing the same lobbying activities, I take the sum of lobbying expenses
in June and December to avoid under-reporting only a part of the expenses as the yearly
spending.5
Third, the Department of Justice combined the lobbying activities that occurred in 1988-
5For instance, Varig Brazilian Airlines spent $36,046.30 in the 1995 report, $16,543.50 in the June report
of 1996, and $43,981.77 in the 1996 December report. To simultaneously address the problem of double-
counting the number of lobbying incidents and the problem of under-reporting finances, I code the case of
Varig Brazilian Airlines in 1996 as one lobbying incident with the expense of $60,525.27. Details on the
lobbying on Varig Brazilian Airlines are retrieved from the June and December FARA reports of 1996.
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1991 in a single report. FARA reports document whether principals or agents terminated
their registration for lobbying with the Department of Justice. I used this termination
information to detect in which year(s) each lobbying incident happened. More details on
how I managed the raw FARA reports to produce a systematic dataset are written in the
codebook (Appendix D).
2.3.2 Coding of Foreign Lobbying Activities
The Foreign Lobbying Dataset classifies the lobbying activities by topic, type of principal,
and tactic. To categorize the variables on foreign lobbying activities according to these three
criteria, I conduct text analysis of four indices in the FARA reports: the foreign principal’s
name, the description of lobbying activities, the nature of lobbying service, and the political
propaganda of lobbying.
2.3.2.1 Classification by Topic
I identify twelve frequently lobbied topics. I selected key words relevant to each topic
and coded the topic of lobbying incidents according to whether the key words were used to
describe the incidents. I briefly illustrate the scope of each lobbying topic below. The exact
key words and more details on coding can be found in the codebook (Appendix D). The
classification of lobbying activities by topic is neither exclusive nor exhaustive. For instance,
a lobbying incident can be on trade and security. Also, a lobbying incident in the sample
may be about a topic other than the twelve I use.
• Trade Lobbying activities are relevant to: trade, exports, imports, tariffs, customs,
anti-dumping/dumping, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World
Trade Organization (WTO), free trade agreements (FTA), and preferential trade benefits
such as the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) and the African Growth
and Opportunity Act (AGOA).
• Economy (non-trade) Lobbying activities are relevant to: economics, finance, ex-
change rates, tax/taxation, monetary/fiscal/antitrust issues, investment, debt, banking,
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government bond, securities, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World
Bank.
• Security Lobbying activities are relevant to: international/national/regional security,
alliances (including a specific alliance such as NATO), defense, military, disarmament,
arms sales, Security Council decisions, peace processes/treaties, and terrorism.
• Policy/Legal Issues Lobbying activities focus on providing consultation, counseling,
advice, or analysis of U.S. policies and laws to principals.
• Publicity Lobbying activities are relevant to the foreign principal’s public relations
activities in the United States.
• Tourism Lobbying activities aim to promote tourism to the foreign principal’s coun-
try/region.
• Foreign Aid Lobbying activities are relevant to: U.S. aid, economic assistance, and
military assistance.
• Nuclear Lobbying activities are relevant to: nuclear weapsons, nuclear energy, and
atomic/uranium issues.
• Visa Lobbying activities are relevant to: visas and immigration.
• Diplomacy Lobbying activities are relevant to: governmental relations, bilateral rela-
tions, and diplomatic relations between the foreign principal and the United States.
• Human Rights Lobbying activities are relevant to: human rights issues.
• Secession Lobbying activities are relevant to: self-determination issues.
2.3.2.2 Classification by Principal Type
Based on the name of foreign principals, I sort whether the principal of lobbying is a gov-
ernmental or non-governmental entity. The classification of lobbying activities by principal
types are dichotomous. All lobbying activities are either foreign public lobbying or private
lobbying.6
6I use the terms public and governmental interchangeably.
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• Public/Governmental Lobbying Lobbying activities by foreign governmental enti-
ties must include one of the followings in the principal’s name: government, embassy,
republic, ministry, department, consulate, or ambassador.
• Private Lobbying Any lobbying activities not conducted by governmental entities.
2.3.2.3 Classification by Tactic
I identify four major tactics agents use during their lobbying activities. Classification by
tactic is neither exclusive nor exhaustive.
• Contact Agents hold meetings or make contact with the targets of lobbying.
• Information Agents distribute information to the target or garner information from the
target.
• Advice Agents provide advice, consultation, or counseling to principals on the po-
lices/issues that may have an impact on the principal’s relationship with the United
States.
• Research Agents research, monitor, or analyze issues relevant to foreign principals.
2.3.2.4 Other
• Target Lobbying activities where the targets are U.S. Members of Congress, their staff,
or officials of the U.S. executive/legislative branches.
2.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
The unit of analysis is the country-year in the Foreign Lobbying Dataset. After classifying
individual lobbying incidents by topic, principal type, and tactic, I code the total number
of lobbying incidents that belong to each category by country-year. Also, I retrieve the
sum of lobbying incidents in each category by country-year-principal type and the sum of
lobbying expenses by country-year and country-year-principal type, but not by topic. This
is because classification by topic is not exclusive. If lobbying activities are on more than
one topic, I can not tell how much of the expenses is spent for each topic. FARA reports
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record the expenses mostly in U.S. dollars. However, when the expenses are reported in
other currencies, I converted the value in U.S. dollars of the particular year using the World
Bank’s official exchange rate data.7 I coded the expenses in the natural log of the original
value.
Table 2.1: Total Number of Lobbying Activities #
Variable Obs. Mean Std.
Dev.
Min. Max.
Total Lobbying (sum) 9517 5.383 14.891 0 378
By Topic
Trade 9517 1.405 6.361 0 179
Economy 9517 .884 3.562 0 117
Security 9517 .173 .703 0 13
Policy/Legal Issues 9517 .649 2.385 0 63
Publicity 9517 1.293 3.319 0 84
Tourism 9517 .951 2.186 0 30
Aid 9517 .048 .256 0 4
Nuclear 9517 .032 .289 0 10
Visa 9517 .029 .228 0 5
Diplomacy 9517 .101 .561 0 17
Human Rights 9517 .030 .205 0 3
Secession 9517 .002 .050 0 2
By Tactic
Advice 9517 1.129 4.120 0 117
Contact 9517 .958 3.878 0 121
Information 9517 .707 2.852 0 78
Research 9517 .614 3.757 0 110
7I refered to WorldBank (N.d.) for exchange rates between U.S. dollar and other currencies in a particular
year.
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Table 2.2: Number of Lobbying Activities # by Foreign Government Principals
Variable Obs. Mean Std.
Dev.
Min. Max.
Government Lobbying
(sum)
9517 1.693 3.231 0 41
By Topic
Trade 9517 .359 1.154 0 18
Economy 9517 .314 .856 0 17
Security 9517 .096 .412 0 6
Policy/Legal Issues 9517 .248 .708 0 11
Publicity 9517 .471 1.099 0 23
Tourism 9517 .310 1.047 0 16
Aid 9517 .028 .185 0 3
Nuclear 9517 .007 .109 0 4
Visa 9517 .018 .172 0 5
Diplomacy 9517 .064 .328 0 6
Human Rights 9517 .015 .134 0 2
Secession 9517 .002 .049 0 2
By Tactic
Advice 9517 .449 1.147 0 15
Contact 9517 .356 .886 0 11
Information 9517 .219 .859 0 21
Research 9517 .154 .595 0 11
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Table 2.3: Number of Lobbying Activities # by Foreign Private Principals
Variable Obs. Mean Std.
Dev.
Min. Max.
Private Lobbying
(sum)
9517 3.690 12.556 0 337
By Topic
Trade 9517 1.046 5.580 0 161
Economy 9517 .570 3.050 0 107
Security 9517 .077 .513 0 12
Policy/Legal Issues 9517 .400 1.969 0 57
Publicity 9517 .822 2.679 0 75
Tourism 9517 .641 1.640 0 27
Aid 9517 .020 .160 0 4
Nuclear 9517 .026 .262 0 10
Visa 9517 .011 .137 0 5
Diplomacy 9517 .038 .412 0 17
Human Rights 9517 .016 .147 0 3
Secession 9517 .000 .010 0 1
By Tactic
Advice 9517 .678 3.461 0 107
Contact 9517 .602 3.549 0 116
Information 9517 .488 2.284 0 57
Research 9517 .461 3.455 0 102
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Table 2.4: Amount of Expenses ($) Used for Foreign Lobbying
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Expenses for lobbying activities in total, by principal, in thousands of USD
All Principals 9517 4958.464 61395.09 0 3402753
Government 9517 1584.747 43063.33 0 3399723
Private 9517 3373.717 41619.59 0 2149417
2.4 Variations in Foreign Lobbying
2.4.1 Who Lobbies?
Figure 2.1 shows the annual mean of the number of lobbying activities conducted by
countries around the world between 1971 and 2017. While the number of foreign lobbying
activities peaked in the late 1980s and early 1990s, lobbying activities have been gradually
declining. The United States might have experienced the most prolific lobbying activities
between 1986 and 1991 because international politics and economics were undergoing radical
changes during these years. In international politics, the Cold War ended, as the reform
movements of East Central European countries were followed by the fall of the Berlin Wall
and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The transition from a bipolar to a unipolar world
immensely enhanced the global influence of the United States. Thus, the new world order
may have motivated prolific foreign lobbying activities. It is also possible that states had
high incentives for participating in lobbying activities even before the end of communism, in
order to succeed in their reforms. In international economics, countries were moving toward
liberal trade but experiencing contention with trade partners. Particularly, the United States
encountered large trade deficits, on average $110 billion a year from 1987 to 1991, and the
loss of American jobs as a result (U.S. Census, 2009; Corry, 1986). The U.S. Congress,
dissatisfied with the liberal trade practiced under the GATT, passed the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act in 1988. The Super 301 provision of the 1988 Trade Act required
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the United States Trade Representatives to provide Congress with the list of priority foreign
countries whose discriminatory actions, which had impeded fair liberal trade with the United
States, had to be rectified. Foreign actors turned to profuse lobbying activities to counter
such protectionist policies of the United States and secure their access to the American
market. While foreign private lobbying activities were more voluminous than foreign public
lobbying activities, the gap has been diminishing since the late 1990s.
Figure 2.1: Global Mean of the Number of Lobbying Activities #, 1971-2017
Note: Since information on foreign lobbying activities from 1992-1994 is missing, there is a break
in the line graph.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 visually compare the intensity of lobbying activities across countries
in the Cold War and Post-Cold War eras. Table 2.5 lists the top 30 countries with the
highest annual mean of the number of lobbying incidents. Japan, the United Kingdom,
and Canada have been engaging in foreign lobbying activities most proactively since 1971.
In the Cold War era, six communist countries, including the Soviet Union, ranked among
the top 30 lobbying actors. While the top lobbying countries were rather clustered in the
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Figure 2.2: Intensity of Lobbying Activities Conducted in the United States by Countries
around the World in the Cold War Era, 1971-1991
Note: The mean number of lobbying activities conducted by West Germany and East Germany is
displayed for Germany.
20
Figure 2.3: Intensity of Lobbying Activities Conducted in the United States by Countries
around the World in the Post-Cold War Era, 1995-2017
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Table 2.5: Top 30 Lobbying Countries, All Topics, Lobbying Activities #
Cold War (Mean Number of Lobby-
ing Activities #)
Post-Cold War (Mean Number of
Lobbying Activities #)
1 Japan (172.81) 1 Japan (75.48)
2 Canada (91.14) 2 United Kingdom (35.96)
3 Soviet Union (80.14) 3 Canada (34.78)
4 United Kingdom (78.00) 4 South Korea (27.52)
5 West Germany (60.67) 5 Mexico (24.57)
6 France (57.52) 6 Taiwan (23.39)
7 Mexico (52.90) 7 China (17.78)
8 South Korea (39.76) 8 Germany (17.52)
9 Taiwan (36.43) 9 Saudi Arabia (15.83)
10 Australia (29.86) 10 Switzerland (14.30)
11 Israel (28.48) 11 Turkey (12.70)
12 Italy (24.24) 12 France (12.57)
13 Jamaica (21.71) 13 Hong Kong (12.09)
14 South Africa (20.95) 14 Israel (11.87)
15 Romania (19.81) 15 United Arab Emirates (11.57)
16 Switzerland (19.57) 16 Iraq (10.35)
17 Brazil (18.67) 16 Russia (10.35)
18 Netherlands (17.71) 18 Morocco (9.61)
19 Austria (17.33) 19 India (9.13)
20 Saudi Arabia (14.52) 20 Colombia (9.09)
20 India (14.52) 21 Australia (8.78)
22 China (14.33) 22 Ireland (7.87)
23 Dominican Republic (14.05) 23 Italy (7.78)
24 Panama (13.90) 24 Malaysia (7.74)
25 Sweden (13.29) 25 Bermuda (7.65)
26 Poland (13.24) 25 Singapore (7.65)
27 Czechoslovakia (12.81) 27 Nigeria (7.52)
28 Hungary (12.76) 28 Jamaica (7.17)
29 Spain (12.67) 29 Thailand (6.78)
30 Hong Kong (12.52) 30 Ukraine (6.70)
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Cold War era, belonging to the free world (U.S. allies or developed democracies) or the
communist bloc, the intense lobbying actors have been diversified in the Post-Cold War
era. Several countries, both democratic and communist, that made the top list in 1971-1991
abated lobbying activities. The Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and
Hungary dropped out and France, Italy, and Russia are at lower ranks. Since 1995, countries
in Asia (Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand), the Middle East (Turkey, United Arab Emirates,
Iraq), and Africa (Morocco, Nigeria) have made a presence as enthusiastic lobbying actors.
Tracing who are the most likely actors of foreign lobbying produces interesting questions.
First, why did the Soviet Union relentlessly undertake lobbying activities before the end of
the Cold War, despite being an official enemy of the United States? As the hotline established
between the United States and the Soviet indicates, the two superpowers were aware of the
risk that mistrust and misperception could lead to a war. If the hotline were a communication
channel for emergency, lobbying activities might have functioned as a channel to approach
the United States for lower-level, routine issues. Second, why do some countries, such as
Japan, Canada, the United Kingdom, South Korea, Germany, Mexico, and Taiwan steadily
participate in intense lobbying activities while others fluctuate their lobbying activities?
These seven countries are likely to be strategically close to the United States, as U.S. allies,
major trade partners, or geographic neighbors. The persistent lobbying of these countries
suggests mixed implications. Do dense linkages with the United States induce a greater need
for collaboration and encourage more lobbying activities? Or does maintaining a steadfast
relationship with the United States require costly extra efforts like lobbying?
2.4.2 What Do Countries Lobby For?
Next, I investigate the topics for which foreign actors lobby. Figures 2.4-2.9 display the
distribution of frequent lobbying topics for the top 30 countries in the Cold War and the
Post-Cold War periods. While I show major lobbying topics as independent categories, I
put the topics which are not often lobbied under “Other.”
Figure 2.4 demonstrates that trade and economic policies were primary agendas of lob-
bying for the top 10 countries. Particularly, Japan engaged in an incomparably large number
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of Lobbying Topics for the Top 1-10 Countries in the Cold War Era,
1971-1991
Figure 2.5: Distribution of Lobbying Topics for the Top 11-20 Countries in the Cold War
Era, 1971-1991
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Figure 2.6: Distribution of Lobbying Topics for the Top 21-30 Countries in the Cold War
Era, 1971-1991
of trade-related lobbying activities, due to the U.S.-Japan trade war in the 1980s. Between
1987 and 1990, the annual trade deficit of the United States with Japan was approximately
$50 billion per year, which composed nearly 40% of the entire U.S. trade deficit (U.S. Census,
2009; Brock, 1989). Americans perceived Japan as an imminent threat, even more so than
the Soviet Union, and “Japan bashing” was spreading in the United States (Mastanduno,
1991; Brock, 1989). As the partner accountable for the highest U.S. trade deficit, Japan was
cited as the subject of the Super 301 provision in 1989 (Mastanduno, 1991; Brock, 1989;
King, 1991). Japan had already been participating in trade-related lobbying incidents in
response to the growing tension regarding trade with the United States and boosted their
activities even more due to the Trade Act of 1988. The number of Japan’s trade-related
lobbying activities increased from 87 in 1986 to 179 in 1988. For example, the associa-
tions of Japanese manufactures and exporters, such as the Japan Machine Tool Builders’
Association, the Japan Machinery Exporters’ Association, and the Japan Metal Forming
Machine Builders’ Association, participated in lobbying activities in 1987 where the agents
“contacted U.S. Government officials to determine the U.S. position on proceedings against
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Japanese machine tool imports.”8 In the same year, the Japan Automobile Manufacturers’
Association even used lobbying to request newspaper editors to publish editorials that op-
posed legislation coercing Japanese manufacturers to include auto-parts made in the United
States.9 Another noticeable feature is the Soviet Union’s disproportionately high level of
lobbying activities on trade. From the early 1970s, the Soviet Union sought expanding trade
with Western countries, specifically with the United States, as a means to attain economic
modernization (Yergin, 1976). Amtorg Trading Corporation, as a trade representative of
the Soviet Union to the United States, also served as a lobbying agent for several dozens of
Soviet firms, and was involved in more than 1,000 trade-related lobbying incidents between
1971 and 1991. Techsnabexport, an exporting branch of the state-owned uranium supplier
company Rosatom, which still engages in foreign lobbying, was one of the clients of Amtorg
(Kostyaev, 2012). Considering that uranium can be used to build nuclear weapons, the in-
volvement of Techsnabexport in foreign lobbying activities reinforces the idea that the Soviet
Union eagerly expected to facilitate trade with the West to revive their economy.
Although the top lobbying countries did not forgo security-related lobbying activities,
these activities pale in comparison to trade-related lobbying activities in terms of volume and
depth. Even though NATO allies conducted lobbying activities for security relatively more
frequently, their lobbying activities did not pertain to high-level security issues. For example,
the lobbying activities of the United Kingdom and Germany were on administrative issues,
such as marketing their military vehicles and equipment and discussing their use among
NATO members. Why were security-related lobbying activities few in number and peripheral
compared to trade/economy-related lobbying activities? The presence of a solid alliance may
be the reason why intense lobbying activities for security issues were lacking. It is likely
that countries pursued ample lobbying activities on trade because they suspected that the
GATT efficiently assisted them in achieving liberal trade to the degree they wanted. While
a weak trade institution incentivized countries to use lobbying as a secondary channel to
promote trade, a strong security institution might have disincentivized resorting to lobbying
to address their security concerns. The tight alliances with a high level of commitment and
8Detailed narrations on lobbying activities by Japanese actors are from FARA report of 1987.
9Information on lobbying by the Japan Automobile Manufacturers’ Association is also from FARA report
of 1987.
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stable communication probably left few issues on security to lobby for during the Cold War.
Figure 2.5 demonstrates that publicity and tourism were important lobbying topics for
the top 11-20 countries. Foreign actors used lobbying to build up their reputation in the
United States and attract more American tourists as well as to address political and economic
issues. As another country cited in the Super 301 provision in 1989 because of its import
quotas, which actually conformed to GATT provisions for developing countries (King, 1991),
Brazil had a large share of trade-related lobbying activities. The top 21-30 countries similarly
concentrated most of their lobbying activities on trade, economics, publicity, and tourism
(Figure 2.6). Developing countries highly dependent on the United States politically and
economically, such as Panama and the Dominican Republic, lobbied to draw larger U.S.
foreign aid. Such phenomena indicate that foreign entities have been flexibly using lobbying
to pursue their interests in diverse issues.
Figure 2.7: Distribution of Lobbying Topics for the Top 1-10 Countries in the Post-Cold
War Era, 1995-2017
I find both static and variant features in the patterns of lobbying activities in the Post-
Cold War era. The top 10 prolific lobbying actors (Figure 2.7) have not changed except
for three - China, Switzerland, and Saudi Arabia. Also, foreign actors still mainly focus
their lobbying activities on trade, economics, policy/legal issues, and publicity. However, an
interesting change is that countries have begun to invest in lobbying activities that aim to
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Figure 2.8: Distribution of Lobbying Topics for the Top 11-20 Countries in the Post-Cold
War Era, 1995-2017
Figure 2.9: Distribution of Lobbying Topics for the Top 21-30 Countries in the Post-Cold
War Era, 1995-2017
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strengthen the relationship with the United States. In other words, foreign actors have been
putting more emphasis on lobbying for diplomacy. While other conventional lobbying topics
may involve issue/time-specific activities, lobbying on diplomacy tend to be more general.
For example, as a lobbying agent for the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in 2002, Patton Boggs
“advised the foreign principal on the status of legislation and legislative inquiries of interest
to the Royal Kingdom, strategies for dealing with Congress and U.S. Government officials,
and strategies for improving the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship.”10 Overall, lobbying on
diplomacy has been conducted by the governments and embassies of foreign countries as
a routine,11 and the description of the activities are usually comprehensive and abstract.12
Since the Post-Cold War international system pushed countries to a world where an amicable
relationship with the United States can be a fungible asset politically and economically,
many countries may be motivated to use lobbying regularly and preemptively to improve
their relationship with the United States. However, it is yet unclear why the number of
lobbying activities on diplomacy is almost none for Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany,
and Switzerland. Perhaps countries who are assured that they have a strong and symmetric
relationship with the U.S. might be refraining from lobbying activities on diplomacy. From
1995-2017, South Korea amplified its lobbying activities by and large and ranked second
in trade-related lobbying activities. The increase of South Korea’s trade-related lobbying
activities is primarily influenced by the 2012 Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement because
Korean actors have been intensively participating in lobbying activities for (re)negotiation
the agreement. However, recent trade-related lobbying activities do not exclusively pertain
to the bargaining of trade agreements. For countries without U.S. Free Trade Agreements,
lobbying has been an opportunity to research American trade policies, discuss how current
10The direct quote is from the December FARA report of 2002.
11See Appendix A for the distribution of lobbying topics by foreign public and foreign private actors
(Appendix A Figures A.1 and A.2). Lobbying on diplomacy is more easily noticeable in Figure 1 describing
the patterns of lobbying activities by governmental entities.
12The Government of Japan hired Hogan Lovells for managing the bilateral relationship with the U.S. The
FARA lobbying report submitted by the agent in 2010 reads: “The registrant rendered advice and represen-
tation to the foreign principal on U.S. laws, regulations, policies and actions by the executive branch and U.S.
Government agencies that may affect or related to the activities and interests of the foreign principal, the
bilateral U.S.-Japan/Japan-U.S. relationship, and/or Japanese nationals, including corporations, or policy
regarding the United Nations. The registrant conducts services in international trade-related matters and
litigation. In some instances, these services included representation in international trade-related matters
and litigation.”
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trade practice complies with WTO regulations, or arrange meetings/events to advertise the
benefits that expanding trade with the foreign principal can bring to the United States.
Figures 2.8 and 2.9 vividly show the changes in the lobbying actors and in the distribution
of lobbying topics. The distributions of lobbying topics between the top 10 and top 11-20
countries diverge in the Post-Cold War era, whereas the distributions between the two top
groups were quite alike in the Cold War era. For the top 11-20 countries (Figure 2.8), security
is a relatively salient topic of lobbying activities. Israel, Turkey, United Arab Emirates,
Morocco, and Iraq - as countries in a conflict-prone region - emphasize security issues as much
as trade issues. Saudi Arabia has been undertaking lobbying activities to communicate with
U.S. Members of Congress and government officials about regional security, international
terrorism, and cooperation between the two countries. In the case of Iraq, Ayad Allawi
who took political offices in the U.S.-led Interim Governing Council, engaged in six lobbying
activities in 2003 and 2004 to approach U.S. government officials and media representatives to
discuss some security and political issues of Iraq. The top 11-20 countries have participated
in lobbying on diplomatic issues. Figure 2.9 displays regionally diverse, newcomers to intense
lobbying activities; such as Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Bermuda, Nigeria, and Ukraine.
While the top 21-30 countries frequently engage in trade, economy, publicity, and tourism-
related lobbying activities, diplomatic lobbying is not in the mainstream. However, similar
to the top 21-30 countries of the Cold War era, countries in this group undertake lobbying
activities to receive greater foreign aid from the United States. The Crimea Crisis accounts
for the inclusion of Ukraine in the top 30 list. Ukraine had fewer lobbying activities in the
mid-2000s but has increased its lobbying activities more than 200% since 2013.
Between 1971 and 2017, lobbying activities on nuclear, visa, human rights, and secession
issues have occurred persistently by a handful of countries, but the number of incidents has
been low. Over the 44-year period, about 200 lobbying cases are respectively reported for
the topics of nuclear, visa, and human rights, and 21 cases are reported for secession-related
lobbying activities. Lobbying activities on nuclear issues have been mostly relevant to nuclear
energy, such as exporting/importing nuclear power or managing nuclear waste. However, a
few activities, mainly by Pakistan and India, are related to the non-proliferation of nuclear
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weapons.13 The objective of visa-related lobbying activities has been enlarging the number
of U.S. visas issued for the people of lobbying countries. Lobbying activities on human
rights have been conducted by authoritarian regimes such as the Soviet Union and China to
attenuate their images as human rights violators, and also by ethnic minority groups such
as the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq and the Oromo Liberation Front of Ethiopia, to
communicate their countries’ humanitarian issues to the United States.14 The Government
of Gibraltar has been a chief actor for lobbying activities on self-determination.15
2.4.3 Who Has High Spending for Foreign Lobbying Activities?
Figure 2.10 displays the global annual mean of lobbying expenses at the aggregate and
disaggregate levels. The amount of money spent in foreign lobbying activities has remained
rather constant between 1978 and 2017, whereas the number of lobbying activities has been
gradually declining (Figure 2.1). Since 1995, the spending of foreign governments has ex-
ceeded the spending of foreign private actors. Table 2.6 reports the list of countries with
the highest lobbying expenses. The richest countries do not seem to be the ones who invest
the largest amount in lobbying activities. However, since the data on lobbying finances is
missing for 36% of all lobbying cases, Table 2.6 ranks countries based on their voluntarily dis-
closed information on spending in FARA reports. For example, while Liberia, South Korea,
and the Bahamas reported their spending in 82% of their lobbying activities, Saudi Arabia
and Switzerland disclosed spending in 52% and 68% of their activities respectively between
1995-2017. Because the level of transparency in disclosing lobbying finances differs across
countries, the real largest spenders might be different than those that appear in Table 2.6.
I provide information on lobbying expenses in the Foreign Lobbying Dataset, since lobbying
expenses are used for empirical analysis in existing research (Gawande, Krishna and Rob-
13Countries that have engaged in nuclear-related lobbying activities between 1971 and 2017 are: Canada,
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Spain, Germany (West Germany),
Russia (the Soviet Union), Sweden, Namibia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan,
Pakistan, Australia, Nauru, the Marshall Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
14According to Pevehouse and Vabulas (2019), foreign lobbying has a positive and significant effect on the
U.S. Department of State’s evaluation of countries in its Human Rights Reports.
15Gibraltar has engaged in fifteen lobbying incidents for self-determination. Eleven cases between 1995-
2007 were reported under the United Kingdom, and four recent cases from 2014 have been independently
classified under Gibraltar in FARA reports.
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bins, 2006; Gawande, Maloney and Montes-Rojas, 2009; Kee, Olarreaga and Silva, 2007).
However, due to the missing data problem, I recommend the number of lobbying activities as
a more accurate measure of the intensity of foreign lobbying activities. The maps depicting
the level of lobbying expenses around the world in 1971-1991 and 1995-2017 are provided in
Appendix A (Figures A.3 and A.4).
Figure 2.10: Global Mean of Lobbying Expenses $, 1978-2017
Note: FARA reports asked lobbying agents to (optionally) report lobbying expenses from 1978.
Since information on foreign lobbying from 1992-1994 is missing, there is a break in the line graph.
2.4.4 What Do Agents Do in Foreign Lobbying Activities?
The tactics agents mainly use in foreign lobbying activities can be classified into four
categories: (1) meeting or contacting American entities, (2) providing information about
foreign principals to relevant American entities or collecting information from them, (3)
researching and monitoring policies and issues related to foreign principals, and (4) offering
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Table 2.6: Top 30 Lobbying Countries, All Topics, Lobbying Expenses $
Cold War (Mean of Lobbying Ex-
penses in millions of USD)
Post Cold War (Mean of Lobbying
Expenses in millions of USD))
1 Chile (331.12) 1 Liberia (177.63)
2 Poland (117.87) 2 South Korea (136.47)
3 New Zealand (90.82) 3 Bahamas (112.46)
4 France (23.23) 4 Japan (82.61)
5 Japan (20.40) 5 Poland (59.74)
6 Canada (16.52) 6 Cayman Islands (49.95)
7 Colombia (16.12) 7 Ireland (45.09)
8 United Kingdom (14.29) 8 China (44.94)
9 Jamaica (13.58) 9 Canada (42.09)
10 West Germany (12.09) 10 Hong Kong (40.67)
11 Soviet Union (11.81) 11 Germany (40.61)
12 Mexico (10.46) 12 Israel (37.95)
13 Italy (10.39) 13 Marshall Islands (30.77)
14 Australia (10.03) 14 United Kingdom (26.02)
15 Israel (8.67) 15 Georgia (22.89)
16 Ireland (8.16) 16 Angola (19.08)
17 Bermuda (7.29) 17 Mexico (18.15)
18 South Korea (5.71) 18 Colombia (17.20)
19 Bahamas (5.42) 19 Azerbaijan (16.27)
20 South Africa (5.02) 20 Bermuda (16.11)
21 Saudi Arabia (4.10) 21 India (15.30)
22 Hong Kong (3.73) 22 Chile (12.75)
23 Liberia (3.53) 23 Jamaica (12.68)
24 Indonesia (3.51) 24 Australia (11.08)
25 Czechoslovakia (3.34) 25 United Arab Emirates (9.30)
26 Austria (3.32) 26 Saudi Arabia (9.14)
27 Netherlands (3.03) 27 Malaysia (8.77)
28 Cayman Islands (2.94) 28 British Virgin Islands (8.53)
29 India (2.84 ) 29 Bosnia and Herzegovina (8.48)
30 Switzerland (2.62) 30 Switzerland (8.30)
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advice to foreign principals.
2.4.5 What Are the Predictors of Foreign Lobbying Activities?
Next, I run simple analysis to identify the basic, systematic predictors of foreign lobbying.
Figure 2.11 compares the mean of the number of lobbying activities between U.S. allies and
non-allies (left), and between democracies and non-democracies (right) from 1971 to 2017
with the exception of 1992-1994.16 The mean of lobbying incidents by U.S. allies is triple the
mean of U.S. non-allies, and the mean of lobbying activities by democracies is double the
mean of non-democracies.17 Also, countries whose exports to the United States are greater
than their imports from the United States have a significantly larger number of total lobbying
activities, regardless of the topics of lobbying (Figure 2.12, left). While the difference is not
large, countries that have a diplomatic relationship with the United States, for example
either by having an embassy in the United States or a U.S. embassy in their homeland,
more frequently participate in lobbying activities (Figure 2.12, right).18 Although lobbying
is a materialistic strategy, a country’s propensity to conduct lobbying activities does not
seem to necessarily correlate with its economic capability (Figure 2.13, Figure 2.14 left).
The correlation between the number of lobbying activities and GDP per capita is .126.
Next, I examine whether countries that have more immigrants in the U.S. are more likely to
participate in lobbying activities. I distinguish lobbying activities by foreign governments,
firms, and interest groups (foreign lobbying) and lobbying activities by diasporas (ethnic
lobbying), and my data concentrates only on foreign lobbying activities. However, diasporas
can be a short-cut channel providing information on the host country to the homeland
(Leblang, 2010). If so, homeland countries with a larger number of expatriates in the United
States may have well-organized diaspora networks, which may efficiently assist foreign actors
in launching lobbying activities. Figure 2.14 (right) shows an inverted U-shaped relationship
between the number of immigrants and lobbying activities.
16By democracy, I refer to countries with a polity score greater than or equal to 6.
17The differences in the means are statistically significant for both allies vs. non-allies and democracies
vs. non-democracies. The score of the t-test for alliance is -21.84 and the score for democracy is -12.69.
18The differences in the means, by trade deficit level and by diplomatic relationship, are both statistically
significant. The score of the t-test by trade deficit level is -8.95 and the score by diplomatic relationship is
-2.23.
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Figure 2.11: Mean Comparison of Number of Lobbying Activities: Alliance vs. Non-Alliance,
Democracies vs. Non-Democracies, 1971-2017
Figure 2.12: Mean Comparison of Number of Lobbying Activities: U.S. Trade Deficit vs.
Surplus, Diplomatic Relationship vs. No Diplomatic Relationship, 1971-2017
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Figure 2.13: Mean Comparison of Number of Lobbying Activities: GDP per Capita, 1971-
2017
Figure 2.14: Mean Comparison of Number of Lobbying Activities: GDP per Capita, Size of
Co-Ethnic Diaspora, 1971-2017
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2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I introduce a new and systematic dataset on the lobbying activities of
foreign governments, firms, interest groups, and individuals in the United States between
1971 and 2017 and discuss patterns of foreign lobbying activities. The Foreign Lobbying
Dataset reports the number of lobbying activities in which each country engaged in each
year and the annual expenses for lobbying activities. The data also codes the number of
lobbying activities by lobbying topic, type of foreign principal, and tactic. The Foreign
Lobbying Dataset illustrates that since 1995 the United States has been experiencing fewer
lobbying incidents but the proactive lobbying countries have been regionally diversified.
The distribution of the topics of foreign lobbying activities reflect the preferences of foreign
countries, particularly the interests they prioritize in relation to the United States. Trade,
economics, public relations, and tourism are generally the most intensely lobbied topics,
but the specific distributions vary across countries and time. This data on foreign lobbying
activities will be a resource to scholars who study how foreign actors pursue their benefits
in international politics and how foreign interests influence American policies.
However, the Foreign Lobbying Dataset also has limitations. First, the missing years of
1992, 1993, and 1994 impede users from observing how foreign actors engaged in American
domestic politics during the unique transition period from the Cold War to the Post-Cold
War era. Second, classification of lobbying activities by topics is not exhaustive. While I
made extensive efforts to identify the topics of lobbying activities through text analysis, I
could not identify the topics of 10% of the lobbying activities in my sample. However, I do
identify whether lobbying activities are conducted by a foreign public actor or foreign private
actor for all cases. I expect to enhance the quality of classification of lobbying activities in
future versions of the Foreign Lobbying Dataset.
Numerous foreign governments, firms, interest groups, and individuals have been par-
ticipating in lobbying activities for a long time as a way to influence the U.S. policies and
achieve their goals in international politics and economics. So far, the resources available
for scholars and policymakers to study foreign lobbying activities have not been sufficient.
However, various datasets on the lobbying activities of foreign entities (You, Forthcoming;
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OpenSecrets, N.d.; Pevehouse and Vabulas, 2019; Kim, 2018) have been developing recently.
Along with these datasets, which vary in scope and observation period, the Foreign Lobby-
ing Dataset will help researchers empirically study foreign lobbying activities from diverse
perspectives.
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3.0 Foreign Lobbying as a Complement to International Institutions
3.1 Introduction
How do different actors interact with the United States, the pivotal player in international
politics and economics? On the one hand, countries have been institutionalizing interaction
and collaboration with the United States by signing agreements or joining international or-
ganizations. The United States has emphasized institutions as a strategy to build a durable
international order in the aftermath of World War II (Ikenberry, 2001). The growth in the
number of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), from 67 in 1945 to 335 in 2014, depicts
the prevalence and prominence of institutions in contemporary international relations (Peve-
house et al., 2019). Figure 3.1 demonstrates that countries around the world, including the
United States, have gradually increased participation in IGOs. On the other hand, diverse
international actors have been approaching the United States through lobbying activities
under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) of 1938. Foreign entities from more
than 200 countries engaged in nearly 53,000 lobbying incidents to attain their goals across
various issues in relation to the United States.1
Both international institutions and foreign lobbying have the capacity to help countries
facilitate interaction with the United States and pursue their interests. Whereas the ability
to standardize actors’ behavior is central to international institutions, flexibility is funda-
mental to foreign lobbying. Despite the distinctive features of institutions and lobbying,
many states do not seem to have strict preferences between the two channels. Anecdotal ev-
idence suggests that rather than resorting to either of the two channels, states have relied on
both international institutions and foreign lobbying for interacting with the United States.
According to reports of foreign lobbying activities submitted under FARA, allies and part-
ners of free trade agreements (FTAs) still engage in lobbying activities to deal with security
and trade issues with the United States. The parallel use of foreign lobbying activities and
1Political or geographical entities which are not usually recognized as sovereign states, such as overseas
territories, autonomous regions, or disputed regions are considered to be independent countries of origin by
the U.S. Department of Justice which administrates foreign lobbying activities.
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Figure 3.1: State Participation in IGOs, 1945-2014
Note: The dashed red line denotes the global mean of the number of IGOs in which states partici-
pate. The solid blue line indicates the number of IGOs in which the United States participates.
international institutions by a number of states raises questions. Why do countries choose
to engage in costly lobbying activities when there are international institutions that lock in
collaboration with the United States? What makes informal interaction channels like foreign
lobbying compatible with formal institutions? This paper focuses on examining how link-
ages through international institutions affect foreign actors’ lobbying activities in the United
States. I argue that institutional linkages and foreign lobbying activities are positively asso-
ciated because foreign actors utilize lobbying as a complement to international institutions.
That is, lobbying helps actors better achieve what they expect to attain through institutions.
By using lobbying, actors may prevent and resolve misunderstandings and disputes about the
interpretation and implementation of institutional decisions between them and the United
States. Lobbying the United States may offer foreign actors an information shortcut in in-
stitutions and a private channel for selectively sharing sensitive information. Also, foreign
lobbying may help actors approach American domestic actors and indirectly influence the
U.S. actions in institutions by invoking audience costs. Thus, I argue that international in-
stitutions provide actors a high incentive for foreign lobbying activities. However, the effects
of international institutions in motivating foreign actors’ participation in lobbying activities
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may vary by era and the type of institution. Since the concern of security dominated the
Cold War era, alliance is likely to be the institutional linkages that incentivize intense lob-
bying activities. In the Post-Cold War era, as actors could afford to care about non-military,
diverse issues, layering of institutional linkages, rather than a specific institution, may be the
predictor of proactive lobbying. Using data on foreign lobbying activities from 1971 to 2014,
I find a robust positive and significant relationship between the level of joint memberships
in intergovernmental organizations with the United States and the number of lobbying inci-
dents in the Post-Cold War era. Also, alliance with the United States is found to be robustly
and significantly associated with a larger number of lobbying activities in the Cold War era.
The variation in the effects of institutional linkages across time and institutional types re-
iterate how the changes in international relations shape actors’ preferences. As the salience
of security concerns has declined and the importance of diverse multilateral institutions has
surged since the end of the Cold War, actors have invested in multilateral institutions for a
wide range of topics.
This paper contributes to the study of foreign lobbying and international institutions.
First, I highlight the value of foreign lobbying as an alternative form of diplomacy that
complements traditional channels like international institutions. By demonstrating the as-
sociation between institutional linkages and foreign lobbying activities, I show that lobbying
is not at odds with other, more conventional forms of interactions in international relations.
Foreign lobbying, as well as diplomacy, aims at influencing another country’s government for
the interests of the homeland through interstate interactions. Still, foreign lobbying allows
more diverse actors’ participation and more flexibility in activities. Second, my paper adds
to our understanding of the way that institutions project influence. The literature has been
increasingly studying the question of how, beyond whether or not, international institutions
affect actors (Martin and Simmons, 1998). My research suggests that actors may engage in
foreign lobbying activities to cope with the effects of institutions for their relationship with
the United States. While this research is limited in testing the precise mechanism, the find-
ings on the correlation between institutional linkages and lobbying activities lend support to
my expectation that institutions have spillover effects and influence actors’ behaviors even
outside institutions. Also, variation in the impact of alliances and multilateral IGO mem-
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berships in the Cold War and the Post-Cold War eras provide a more nuanced implication.
The contrasting effects of institutions suggest that even if international institutions are ca-
pable of driving actors’ behavior, which institution has such influence is not static. Also, the
capability of institutions to affect actors is, at the same time, determined by the dynamics
of the international system.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I explain why linkages through
international institutions may boost foreign lobbying activities with a review of the literature.
The third section describes the research design and the discussion of the results follows in
the fourth section. The fifth section concludes.
3.2 Foreign Lobbying Activities and International Institutions
How do international institutions lock-in interstate cooperation? International institu-
tions enable member states to efficiently reach consensus on a set of expected behaviors
and negotiate the appropriate rules to attain the cooperation they expect (Krasner, 1983;
Keohane, 1984; Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Moravcsik, 1991; Abbott and Snidal, 1998).
Because international institutions standardize compliance and provide information on mem-
bers’ behaviors, each member state builds a reputation based on its past behaviors (Keohane,
1984). A state’s reputation in an international institution has substantial consequences both
inside and outside the institution. The costs of a bad reputation range from “naming and
shaming” (Hafner-Burton, 2008; Franklin, 2008; Murdie and Davis, 2012) to direct material
punishments such as sanctions and reciprocal retaliation (Tomz, 2007b; Kono, 2007; Wilson,
2007) to losing opportunities to join additional international networks (Kinne, 2013). Public
shaming of international institutions, despite the lack of immediate material punishment,
is not empty rhetoric and can effectively shape a state’s behavior (Franklin, 2008; Tingley
and Walter, 2011; Murdie and Davis, 2012), because a state’s bad reputation in one institu-
tion can induce negative outcomes in another institution or in the state’s relationship with
other countries even outside the institution. When poor reputations spread globally through
publicly available ratings and rankings of international organizations, a state’s chance of
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receiving foreign aid and investment tends to suffer (Cooley and Snyder, 2015).2 Also, bad
ratings and rankings may influence countries who fear being judged inferior to others or
who genuinely feel ashamed for their performance because they have internalized the norm
institutions advocate (Cooley and Snyder, 2015; Kelley, 2017). By enhancing information
transparency and producing reputation, institutions make compliance a rational choice for
members.
Nevertheless, the literature of international institutions has been debating the effective-
ness of institutions in producing cooperation - whether institutions are constraining (Sim-
mons, 2000; Simmons and Hopkins, 2005) or screening mechanisms (Von Stein, 2005). It is
possible that institutions are insufficient to enforce actions that states would not have taken
otherwise and that states comply because they have ex-ante willingness to act the way insti-
tutions favor or because compliance requires little extra effort (Downs, Rocke and Barsoom,
1996; Hathaway, 2002; Von Stein, 2005). Therefore, while memberships in international insti-
tutions signal the commitment of actors who select into the agreements (Koremenos, Lipson
and Snidal, 2001; Kydd, 2001), the existence of institutions does not necessarily guarantee
the successful promotion of international cooperation.
I argue that foreign actors engage in lobbying activities to overcome institutions’s weak-
nesses and facilitate international institutions’ objectives. Foreign actors may input their
efforts in both international institutions and lobbying - two channels that share the same
goal of promoting interstate interaction and cooperation - to ensure that institutions work
the way they are designed to work. First, foreign actors may use lobbying to facilitate
communication among members so that misunderstanding and disputes can be prevented
or resolved. While institutions are supposed to clarify expectations and codes of conduct
among members, there is a risk that member states interpret and implement the agreements
differently. The general language of the agreements might increase the risk of incoherent
understanding and application of the agreements and become a source of unintentional non-
compliance (Chayes and Chayes, 1993). Even if the terms of the agreements are written in
2Cooley and Snyder (2015) discuss the effects of ratings and rankings in the realm of governance, democ-
racy, economy, human rights, etc. provided by intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organiza-
tions, and individual states. Kelley (2017) focuses on the effects of the U.S. Department of States Trafficking
in Persons reports.
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detail, because new issues not included in the agreements constantly emerge, like intellectual
property rights and use of drone, loopholes in interpretation and implementation are in-
evitably likely. To prevent misunderstanding in cooperation with the United States, foreign
actors may use lobbying to (a) confirm American interpretation of institutional agreements.
When misunderstanding and disputes emerge between foreign actors and the United States,
foreign actors may engage in lobbying to (b) gauge the U.S. position about their actions
and (c) defend their (alleged/unintentional) noncompliance. Lobbying may help foreign ac-
tors to appeal their benign intentions, excuse their (involuntary) defection and signal their
future commitment to alleviate U.S. retaliation when they are accused of defection or are
aware of their potential noncompliance. For example, the Brazilian Footwear Industries As-
sociation resorted to lobbying in 1995 to collect information related to the proceedings of
Brazil’s GATT case from private and public sources and to monitor U.S. actions regarding
the import of Brazilian products.3 Nippon Steel Corporation of Japan engaged in hired
lobbyists in 1996 to represent the corporation “before the Department of Commerce and the
International Trade Commission in defense of anti-dumping cases involving steel products”
and monitor “possible filing of additional anti-dumping petitions, progress toward multilat-
eral steel agreements, short supply legislation and implementation regulations under GATT
Uruguay Round implementing legislation.”4 Whereas institutions improve the transparency
of compliance-related information, foreign lobbying furthers communication, beyond merely
notifying member states about others’ compliance. Since misunderstanding can escalate into
disputes and since member states are often left to bilateral resolve disputes outside institu-
tions (Fang, 2010), lobbying can be an essential tool to advance the bilateral exchange of
information among states and sustain durable cooperation.5
Second, foreign actors may use lobbying the United States as an information shortcut.
The United States has been exerting dominant influence in major international institutions
- to the extent that the decisions of institutions might be swayed by the favoritism of the
3Detail on lobbying by the Brazilian Footwear Industries Association is retrieved from FARA report of
1995.
4Direct quotes are from the December FARA report of 1996.
5Dispute settlement mechanisms are relatively newly added to international institutions. Even when
dispute resolution through institutions are available, states vary in whether they prefer to resort to such
institutional mechanism.
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United States (Thacker, 1999; Stone, 2002; Barro and Lee, 2005; Fleck and Kilby, 2006;
Kilby, 2006).6 Foreign actors may find lobbying toward the United States as an efficient
intermediary path to obtain information about institutions. For instance, the Government
of Argentina participated in lobbying in 2002 to approach the U.S. government officials to
inquire about the possibility of an IMF lending agreement.7 In 1999, the Government of
Bosnia and Herzegovina used lobbying to meet with “U.S. Government officials and private
groups to discuss the case concerning genocide, which is currently before the International
Court of Justice.”8 Foreign actors may also engage in lobbying to deliver their message to the
decision-makers of international institutions. For example, Taiwan and Saudi Arabia have
been conducting lobbying activities to acquire the World Trade Organization memberships.
Different actors may resort to lobbying activities to cast the United States as a competent
broker of information between them and international institutions.
Third, actors may pursue lobbying as a private channel of communication with the
specific member within multilateral institutions. When the membership size of institutions
is broad, members may form and act in blocs (Kim and Russett, 1996; Bailey, Strezhnev and
Voeten, 2017). Perhaps, actors, who are likely to distinguish in-group and out-group within
institutions, may want to discriminate members in information sharing. Actors may hesitate
to report information which they think is related to national interests. Actors may refuse to
publicize such sensitive information to the entire members but anticipate disseminating the
information with particular members they trust selectively. For example, if a humanitarian
crisis breaks out in North Korea, South Korea will likely share its intelligence with the
United States to coerce North Korea toward reform effectively. However, South Korea will
dislike doing so with China and Russia, whose interference can weaken U.S. pressure. Thus,
members may resort to lobbying activities to control the circulation of sensitive information.
As many countries worldwide are under the political, economic, and military umbrella of the
United States, various foreign actors may have an incentive to engage in lobbying to access
6Thacker (1999), Stone (2002), and Barro and Lee (2005) find that the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) is likely to offer loans more frequently and leniently to countries that are strategically important to
the United States. The lending decisions of the World Bank also represent the interests of the United States
(Fleck and Kilby, 2006) and the Asian Development Bank the interests of the United States and Japan
(Kilby, 2006).
7Information is from the December FARA report of 2002.
8Direct quote is from the June and December FARA reports of 1999.
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the United States for selective distribution of valuable information.
Fourth, foreign actors may participate in lobbying activities to influence U.S. behaviors
regarding international institutions. Whereas the United States employed institutions as the
foundation to construct an American-led international order after World War II, institutions
also made the hegemonic American power acceptable to others by binding the United States
to institutional rules (Ikenberry, 2001). However, the United States has been retreating its
engagement in international institutions. For example, the United States did not participate
in the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court and withdrew from the Paris
Climate Agreement and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organiza-
tion (UNESCO). Foreign actors, who anticipate proactive participation in institutions and
compliance from the United States, may employ lobbying activities to approach American
media and public and indirectly influence the U.S. government. While the United States
might neglect international criticism, U.S. decision-makers might respond to the pressure of
American domestic actors.9 Thus, foreign actors may undertake lobbying activities to incur
the audience costs and alter the U.S. actions in international institutions.
To sum, I argue that foreign actors may participate in lobbying activities to ensure
that institutions work as designed. When foreign actors perceive that institutions cannot
effectively mitigate tension between actors and the United States or promote bilateral infor-
mation exchange between institutions and members, they may engage in lobbying activities
to advance communication. Also, foreign actors can use lobbying to secure a private channel
of contact with the United States and encourage the United States’ participation in institu-
tions. Thus, I argue that foreign actors undertake lobbying as a complement to international
institutions. The higher institutional linkages actors have with the United States, the higher
the demand for foreign lobbying activities. However, does the complementary relationship
between international institutions and foreign lobbying activities apply generally over time
and different institutional types?
Since the dynamics of international relations have changed after the end of the Cold War,
I argue that the relationship between institutional linkages and foreign lobbying activities
9Keck and Sikkink (1999) discuss how advocacy groups may use transnational ties to pressure the home-
land government by invoking a foreign government’s interference. Likewise, foreign actors may contact
transnational counterparts (American domestic actors) to affect U.S. government decisions.
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varies by era and institutional types. During the Cold War, military tension between the free
world and the communist bloc was tangible, and security was a top priority. Bourantonis,
Ifantis and Tsakonas (2007) describe that concern and attention for non-security issues were
superimposed by “the threat of military conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact (p.
1).” Such predominance of security issues made alliances an indispensable institution for
survival and stability and prosperity. Alliances with the United States functioned as a
catalyst for a state’s advance in international politics and economy. For instance, the United
States-Japan alliance, which granted Japan access to the economic market and top-notch
technology of the United States, was the foundation for Japan’s resurgence as a global power
(Pyle, 2007; Samuels, 2007). However, the end of the Cold War diminished the salience of
military issues and allowed actors to care about diverse, new global issues (Bourantonis,
Ifantis and Tsakonas, 2007). Such international relations changes produced the blooming of
multilateral international institutions and made working through institutions a new norm in
the Post-Cold War era.
If actors employ lobbying to complement international institutions in promoting inter-
state interaction and cooperation in issue areas that institutions advocate, actors would
invest in costly lobbying activities only for institutions and issues they value. Thus, only
military alliances are likely to have produced a high incentive for lobbying during the Cold
War, whereas such an incentive dropped in the Post-Cold War period. However, the issues
that matter in international relations have diversified in the Post-Cold War era. Thus, not
merely military alliances but a wide array of institutions are likely to provide foreign actors
incentives to participate in foreign lobbying activities. Therefore, I argue that while military
allies of the United States had a high propensity to engage in lobbying activities during
the Cold War, actors with higher institutional linkages with the United States have a high
likelihood of lobbying the Post-Cold War era. For these reasons, I derive:
• H1-a: The more institutional linkages states have with the United States, the more they
are likely to engage in foreign lobbying activities.
• H1-b: A higher level of institutional linkages is likely to have a more significant effect on
lobbying activities in the Post-Cold War era than the Cold War era.
• H2-a: Military allies of the United States are more likely to participate in foreign lobbying
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activities.
• H2-b: A military alliance is likely to have a more significant effect on lobbying activities
in the Cold War era than the Post-Cold War era.
3.3 Research Design
3.3.1 Data
I use lobbying activities by foreign governments, firms, interest groups, and individuals
from 200 countries, conducted in the United States from 1971-2014 as the data. The unit
of analysis is country-year. Foreign entities can legitimately engage in lobbying activities
in the United States by hiring American agents who represent their interests under FARA.
All lobbying agents are obligated to register with the Department of Justice and disclose
information about: (a) the name of the foreign principal, (b) the name and address of
the American agent, (c) the nature of services, (d) the descriptions of activities conducted,
and (e) (optionally) the amount of expenses paid by foreign principal. The Department of
Justice has been submitting reports on foreign lobbying activities, sorted by country and
year, to Congress since 1942 (FARA, 2019). Based on the Justice Department’s FARA
reports, I constructed a new systematic dataset of foreign lobbying activities. I use lobbying
incidents conducted between 1971 and 2014 from my Foreign Lobbying Dataset (FOLD) for
the empirical analysis of this paper.10 However, the Department of Justice’s FARA reports
are missing for 1992, 1993, and 1994. I drop these three years from my sample and categorize
my observation period into two groups: the Cold War era (1971-1991) and the Post-Cold
War era (1995-2014). Further details on the procedure of producing a systematic data from
the archival FARA reports are written in the codebook (Appendix D).
10The Foreign Lobbying Dataset (FOLD) records all lobbying incidents from 1971 to 2017, with the
exception of 1992-1994, during which the Justice Department did not publish reports on lobbying. The
FOLD classifies lobbying activities by topics, principal types, and tactics, using the text-mining package of
R. However, for this paper, I focus on the number of total lobbying activities, without applying disaggregated
classifications.
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3.3.2 Dependent Variable
I use the number of lobbying activities at the country-year level (Lobby #) as my de-
pendent variable to understand patterns of foreign lobbying activities. While several studies
have used lobbying expenditures as an indicator to measure the intensity of foreign lobby-
ing activities (Gawande, Krishna and Robbins, 2006; Gawande, Maloney and Montes-Rojas,
2009; Kee, Olarreaga and Silva, 2007; Pevehouse and Vabulas, 2019), I suggest the count
of lobbying incidents as a more reliable measure.11 Even if registration to the Department
of Justice is mandatory for lobbying agents, the agents are not required to report lobbying
expenditures.12
Lobby # counts the number of total lobbying activities undertaken by all types of foreign
principals, including governments and private entities like firms and interest groups. Even
if governments are the actors who sign onto international agreements, the impact of inter-
national institutions is not necessarily restricted to governmental actors. Various firms and
industries can be affected by the decisions of the GATT and the WTO. International human
rights treaties might be of interests to transnational advocacy groups. Developments in the
nuclear energy sector must comply with IAEA agreements. Since all actors are susceptible
to the influence of international institutions and eligible to engage in lobbying activities, I
use the count of total lobbying activities as the dependent variable.
Lobby # includes all lobbying activities, whether or not the activities are reported to
be explicitly related to international institutions. In some cases, lobbying is directly related
to specific institutions and even the name of the institution is mentioned in FARA reports.
For example, the Government of Zambia lobbied “the U.S. Government concerning general
the U.S.-Zambia relations as well as international institutions such as the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund” to promote investments in Zambia in 1998. In other cases,
actors also use lobbying to invest in image-building or to manage the influence of institutions
on their bilateral relationship with the United States. The reports of such lobbying cases
may not contain the name of institutions at all. Therefore, I find it plausible to use all
11Pevehouse and Vabulas (2019) use both the count of lobbying incidents and the amount of lobbying
expenses as dependent variables for empirical testing.
12Lobbying agents were not even asked to report the lobbying expenditures before 1978.
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lobbying activities as my sample.
3.3.3 Independent Variables
I use two independent variables Shared IGO % and Alliance to capture the institutional
linkages a country has with the United States. The Intergovernmental Organizations Dataset
of Pevehouse et al. (2019) provides information on the membership status of states in IGOs,
which have at least three member states, secretariat and headquarters, and regular plenary
sessions at least once in ten years. The IGO Dataset records the joint IGO memberships
of states in a dyad as well as the monadic memberships of states (Pevehouse et al., 2019).
My independent variable Shared IGO % is the number of joint full memberships in IGO
between each country and the United States in a given year divided by the number of each
country’s individual IGO memberships. I assume that the higher the percentage of shared
IGO memberships, the higher a country’s institutional linkage to the United States. To check
the robustness of the relationship between institutional linkages and the patterns of foreign
lobbying activities, I also use Shared IGO #, the number of joint IGO memberships in a
dyad between each country and the United States, as an alternative independent variable.
The IGO Dataset includes all types of institutions - like alliances and FTAs, if the number
of member states is equal to or greater than three. However, bilateral alliances and FTAs
are not included in the IGO Dataset. To maintain consistency, I drop multilateral alliances
and FTAs, the Australia-New Zeland-US Treaty Organization (ANZUS), the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) from the sample.
Alliance is a binary variable that codes whether a country has an active military alliance
with the United States in a given year. Also, I use Asymmetric Alliance as an independent
variable in the robustness check section to examine if the effects of alliance on lobbying
activities change by the distribution of obligation between allies. I retrieve the information
on alliances from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Project (Leeds et al., 2002).
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3.3.4 Control Variables
To accurately examine the effects of international institutions on foreign lobbying activi-
ties, I control for the effects of other predictors of foreign lobbying. The most important task
is addressing the problem of endogeneity. The goal of my research is to test the influence
of multilateral institutions and alliances on lobbying activities. However, it is also possible
that the underlying linkages between a country and the United States affect the country’s
choice to engage in lobbying activities and to join institutions with the United States. If an
omitted variable is increasing both the propensities of lobbying and of forming institutions,
there is a risk that the relationship between institutions and lobbying activities is spurious.
I presume that linkages between countries other than formal international institutions,
such as the volume of bilateral trade and the country’s voting similarity to the United
States in the United Nations General Assembly, might be such omitted variables capturing
the underlying linkages. Since trade may intensify interdependence and converge interests
(Oneal and Russet, 1997; Oneal and Russett, 1999), a high volume of trade may imply a
dense linkage between states. Voting pattern at the UNGA are regarded as a measurement
of a state’s preference and the similarity in voting is interpreted as alignment between states
(Russet, 1966; Holloway, 1990; Kim and Russett, 1996). Thus, a greater level of similarity in
UNGA votes may implicate a state’s latent connection to the United States. ln Trade Volume
codes the log of the annual volume of bilateral trade with the United States. UNGA Voting
% codes the similarity in voting at the UNGA between each country and the United States in
a given year, with 0 indicating least similar and 1 most similar. I retrieve the bilateral trade
data from the Direction of Trade Statistics of the IMF (IMF, 2019) and the dyadic voting
pattern data from the United Nations General Assembly Voting Data (Bailey, Strezhnev
and Voeten, 2017). By controlling for the effects of underlying linkages, which increase the
interconnectedness of countries, like trade connections and preference alignments, I attempt
to rigorously estimate the independent effects of international institutions on the patterns
of foreign lobbying.
Next, I control for the influence that the characteristics of a country may have on foreign
lobbying activities. Although no minimum fee is required to participate in lobbying, hiring
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competent lobbying agents who effectively represent the principals’ interests would be costly.
Since the economic capabilities of actors may determine the choice to conduct lobbying
activities, I control for the effects of GDP per capita (ln GDP p.c.). Democracy is another
control variable because the demand to facilitate interaction and collaboration with the Unied
States might be closely associated with a country’s regime type. Also, regime types may
affect the decision-making of principals regarding whether to undertake lobbying activities.
The information on GDP per capita and regime types is retrieved respectively from the
Maddison Project Database (Bolt et al., 2018) and the Polity Project V (Marshall and Gurr,
2020).
I take into account the persistent effects of the dependent variable by taking one-, two-,
and three-year lags of Lobby # as control variables. Since the the likelihood that an actor
participates in lobbying activities in two consecutive years is 0.9 (Kerr, Lincoln and Mishra,
2014), addressing serial correlation is essential in the study of foreign lobbying activities.
Also, since it is possible that a country might be motivated to engage in lobbying activities
when the tendency to participate in lobbying activities are diffused globally, I control for
year fixed effects.
3.3.5 Model
I use Poisson regression models to estimate the relationship between institutional linkages
and foreign lobbying activities because the dependent variable Lobby # is a count variable.
Since I focus on whether and how linkages through international institutions produce vari-
ations in patterns of foreign lobbying activities across countries, I do not use country fixed
effects for the main model.
3.4 Results
Before statistically testing the effects of international institutions on foreign lobbying, I
demonstrate the correlation between institutional linkages and lobbying activities. Figure 3.2
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displays the log of the mean number of foreign lobbying activities across countries and Figure
3.3 exhibits the mean percentage of shared IGO memberships with the United States. The
overlap in the dark colored areas, such as in Canada, Mexico, Korea, Japan, Australia, and
New Zealand, suggests that the correlation between the two indicators can be supported with
empirical evidence. Table 3.1 displays the results of chi-square test, testing the difference in
the mean of the number of lobbying incidents by alliance status in the Cold War and the
Post-Cold War eras. The difference in the intensity of lobbying activities between U.S. allies
and non-allies across different time periods, reiterates that alliances may be significantly
related to lobbying activities.
Figure 3.2: Intensity of Lobbying Activities Conducted in the United States by Countries
Around the World, 1971-2014
Table 3.2 reports how institutional linkages with the United States, such as shared mem-
berships in IGOs and alliances, affect foreign lobbying activities. Columns (1)-(2) record the
effects of shared IGO memberships and Columns (3)-(4) exhibit the influence of alliances.
Whereas a higher level of common memberships in IGOs is associated with a greater number
of lobbying incidents in the Post-Cold War era, alliances are related to more lobbying activ-
ities only during the Cold War era. Columns (5)-(6) report the outputs of the full models.
I continue to find that the influence of linkages on patterns of lobbying activities vary by
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Figure 3.3: Percentage of Shared IGO Memberships with the United States by Countreis
Around the World, 1971-2014
Table 3.1: Chi-Square Test of Mean Number of Lobbying Activities by Alliance Status
Lobby # Allies Non-Allies Total
No Lobby 260 1855 2115
Low 1129 2495 3624
High 934 842 1776
Total 2323 5192 7515
Pearson Chi2(2) 734.2161
Pr 0.000
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the types of institutions and by time periods. Countries with a higher level of joint IGO
memberships with the United States are more likely to engage in prolific lobbying activities
in the Post-Cold War era. The systematic difference in the propensity of lobbying activities
between U.S. allies and non-allies reflect the change in international system - that the dom-
inance of security issues and alliances in international relations has withered since the end
of the Cold War. In the Post-Cold War era, since the threat of war among major powers is
much less imminent, countries could afford to pay their attention to diverse issues. Thus,
the power to shape state interests and behaviors, which was primarily seized by military
alliances, has diffused to multiple international institutions. The significant and positive
association between lobbying activities and the level of shared IGO memberships indicate
such change. In the Post-Cold War era, as the international institutions actors find relevant
have increased and diversified, the layering of common memberships in IGOs became a sig-
nificant predictor of lobbying activities. Rather than U.S. allies, states that are involved in a
dense network of international institutions with the United States are found to be proactive
lobbyists. The results in Table 3.2 imply that while institutions affect the choice of foreign
actors to engage in lobbying activities, changes in the international system influence which
institutions matter. Figure 3.4 displays the outputs of Columns (5)-(6) of Table 3.2.
It is noteworthy that I find significant effects of institutional linkages on foreign lobbying
activities after taking into account of the effects of other ties between the United States
and foreign countries. The outputs demonstrate the significant and independent effects of
alliances and joint IGO memberships on lobbying patterns, which are not endogenous to
the baseline connections states have with the United States. To elaborate the influence of
control variables, a greater volume of bilateral trade is associated with more intense lobbying
activities. Consistent with the literature (Gowa and Mansfield, 1993; Mansfield and Bronson,
1997), trade intensifies interdependence among countries, and thereby increase the demand
for lobbying. However, voting similarity with the United States at the UNGA is found to be
irrelevant to foreign lobbying. While economic capability (ln GDP p.c.) reduced lobbying
activities only in the Cold War era, democracies engaged in a fewer number of lobbying
activities in the Post-Cold War era. During the entire observation period, path-dependency
in lobbying activities is found, which is shown in the positive and significant effects of one-
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Table 3.2: Effects of Institutional Linkages on the Number of Lobbying Activities #
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CW PCW CW PCW CW PCW
Shared IGO % -0.140 1.036∗ -0.211 1.024∗
(0.316) (0.500) (0.316) (0.500)
Alliance 0.298∗∗∗ -0.178 0.301∗∗∗ -0.174
(0.073) (0.099) (0.073) (0.098)
ln Trade Volume 0.201∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.025) (0.022) (0.025) (0.022) (0.025)
UNGA Voting % -0.040 0.090 -0.146 0.175 -0.143 0.112
(0.157) (0.212) (0.159) (0.211) (0.159) (0.213)
ln GDP p.c. -0.163∗ -0.011 -0.166∗ -0.011 -0.165∗ -0.007
(0.072) (0.049) (0.072) (0.050) (0.072) (0.049)
Democracy -0.001 -0.197∗∗∗ -0.008 -0.170∗∗ -0.010 -0.182∗∗
(0.044) (0.057) (0.044) (0.058) (0.044) (0.058)
Lobby# t−1 0.003∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
Lobby# t−2 -0.000 -0.004∗ -0.000 -0.004∗ -0.000 -0.004∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Lobby# t−3 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects No No No No No No
Constant 2.045∗∗ -1.229∗∗ 1.957∗∗ -0.730 2.080∗∗ -1.295∗∗
(0.660) (0.475) (0.630) (0.400) (0.655) (0.477)
Observations 2039 2479 2039 2479 2039 2479
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
56
Figure 3.4: Effects of Institutional Linkages on the Number of Lobbying Activities #
Note: The figure displays the coefficient of independent variables, with confidence intervals, of the
models reported in Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3.2.
year lagged dependent variable. If foreign actors engage in prolific lobbying activities in a
given year, they are likely to have conducted intense lobbying activities one year before.
Not only the effects of alliances and shared IGO memberships but also the effects of control
variables like regime types and the size of economy systematically differ in the Cold War
and the Post-Cold War eras. Such variations underscore that the factors that shape state
behaviors changes according to shifts in the international system.
3.4.1 Robustness Checks
Table 3.3 shows additional models estimated to check the robustness of my findings on
the relationship between institutional linkages and foreign lobbying activities. First, I run
the main models of Table 3.2 with country fixed effects to examine how changes in the degree
of institutional linkages within a country affect the intensity of lobbying activities in Columns
(1)-(2). While becoming an U.S. ally encouraged actors to participate in intense lobbying
activities during the Cold War, surprisingly a new alliance with the United States discouraged
lobbying activities in the Post-Cold War era. An increase of common IGO memberships with
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Table 3.3: Robustness Checks, Effects of Institutional Linkages on the Number of Lobbying
Activities #
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CW PCW CW PCW CW PCW
Shared IGO % -0.498 -0.234 -0.228 0.979
(0.326) (0.684) (0.317) (0.505)
Alliance 0.271∗∗∗ -0.258∗ 0.293∗∗∗ -0.244∗
(0.076) (0.131) (0.072) (0.103)
Shared IGO # 0.010 0.019∗
(0.006) (0.008)
Asy. Alliance 0.298∗∗∗ 0.144
(0.077) (0.184)
ln Trade Volume 0.171∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.037) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.027)
UNGA Voting % -0.290 -0.150 -0.094 0.101 -0.023 0.079
(0.162) (0.228) (0.158) (0.213) (0.160) (0.214)
ln GDP p.c. -0.449∗∗∗ -0.237∗∗ -0.164∗ -0.011 -0.194∗∗ -0.022
(0.078) (0.090) (0.072) (0.049) (0.069) (0.050)
Democracy -0.067 -0.176∗∗ 0.012 -0.198∗∗∗ -0.035 -0.191∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.061) (0.044) (0.057) (0.044) (0.058)
IGO Member # 0.025∗∗∗ -0.004
(0.004) (0.005)
Lobby# t−1 0.003∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
Lobby# t−2 -0.000 -0.003∗ -0.000 -0.004∗ -0.000 -0.004∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Lobby# t−3 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No No No
Constant 2.165∗∗ -1.202∗ 1.250∗ -0.875∗
(0.660) (0.475) (0.592) (0.409)
Observations 1981 2420 2039 2479 2039 2479
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 58
the United States did not push a country to boost lobbying activities than before. Perhaps,
while actors who have higher institutional linkages with the United States compared to
others are inclined to proactively engage in lobbying activities, a particular actor might
not increase lobbying activities because of addition of joint IGO memberships. Second, I
estimate the influence of asymmetric alliance in Columns (3)-(4). Even if the distribution
of responsibilities among allies becomes more asymmetric, U.S. allies are likely to undertake
more lobbying activities only during the Cold War. Shared IGO % lose significance in the
Post-Cold War era. Third, I examine the effects of the count of joint IGO memberships with
the United States (Shared IGO #) instead of the ratio of joint memberships in Columns
(5)-(6). Since Shared IGO % is the number of IGOs to which both a country and the United
States belong, divided by the number of IGOs to which a country individually belongs,
Shared IGO % implicitly accounts for the state’s propensity to participate in international
institutions. To similarly adjust for such propensity, I control for IGO #, the number of a
country’s individual IGO memberships. I find that the count of joint IGO memberships has
a robust positive and significant effect on lobbying activities only in the Post-Cold War era.
Also, alliance is associated with more lobbying activities during the Cold War. The outputs
of Table 3.3 reiterate the prominent effects of alliance in motivating foreign actors to actively
engage in lobbying activities. However, the relationship between institutional linkages and
lobbying activities are lack robustness. One of the unexpected results in robustness checks
is that alliance become a predictor of less lobbying activities in the Post-Cold War era.
Estimation of more models with different specifications is required to understand whether or
not the negative and significant effects of Alliance in the Post-Cold War era is substantively
meaningful.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I examined how the institutional linkages foreign actors hold with the
United States affect their lobbying activities. I argue that a dense network of international
institutions provides foreign actors with a high incentive to participate in lobbying activi-
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ties. Foreign actors may use lobbying to effectively facilitate the function of international
institutions and promote interaction and cooperation with the United States. By analyzing
foreign lobbying activities in the United States from 1971 to 2014, I find significant support
for the positive relationship between institutional linkages and foreign lobbying activities.
Countries that have more joint memberships in IGOs with the United States have a higher
likelihood of prolific lobbying activities in the Post-Cold War era. In contrast, U.S. allies
had a higher propensity for intense lobbying activities in the Cold War era. The relationship
between institutional linkages and lobbying activities imply that foreign actors use lobbying
as a complement to institutional linkages to advance their interests in international relations.
The findings also suggest that while institutions can shape actors’ behavior, the effects of
institutional linkages vary across time and linkage types. Since imminent security threats
have declined with the end of the Cold War, diverse issues have started to receive global
attention. As a result, the prominent influence concentrated on military alliances seems to
have been spread to a wide range of institutions. In the Post-Cold War era, the layering of
institutional linkages seems to have stronger effects on actors’ behaviors, such as the choice
to engage in lobbying activities.
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, the paper contributes to the growing
literature on foreign lobbying. The current literature has mainly focused on examining the
effectiveness of foreign lobbying activities (Gawande, Krishna and Robbins, 2006; Gawande,
Maloney and Montes-Rojas, 2009; Kee, Olarreaga and Silva, 2007; Pevehouse and Vabulas,
2019) and scant attention has been paid to studying the conditions under which actors de-
cide to engage in lobbying activities. By demonstrating the significant association between
institutional linkages and lobbying activities, I introduce the potential that lobbying acts as
alternative diplomacy, which can be used to complement more traditional diplomatic chan-
nels like IGOs and alliances. Second, this paper makes a contribution to our understanding
of the effects of international institutions on actors. I suggest that countries may resort to
lobbying activities to manage the consequences of institutions on their bilateral relationship
with the United States. Also, the clear difference in the effects of alliances and those of joint
IGO memberships between the Cold War and the Post-Cold War eras emphasize that the
influence of institutions is closely related to changes in the international system. Institutions
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are indeed “simultaneously causes and effects” (?, 743) in that while they have power over
actors, their power can be expanded or restrained by dynamics in international relations.
The concept of foreign lobbying as a complementary diplomatic channel and the influence of
a network of international institutions on actors’ behaviors have the potential to be expanded
in future research.
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4.0 The Effects of Trade Institutions on Patterns of Foreign Lobbying:
When Do Actors Lobby?
4.1 Introduction
How do international actors achieve trade liberalization? Foreign lobbying has been a
widely used strategy for governments, businesses, and interest groups to promote trade with
advanced economies and obtain access to their markets. For several decades, the United
States has been the target of intense foreign lobbying activities as the leader of the global
economy with the largest market. The Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) of 1938 has
enabled any foreign entity to legitimately engage in the domestic politics of the United States
by hiring American agents to lobby on their behalf. While actors around the world have
participated in lobbying activities concerning various issue areas, trade has been one of the
top issues on lobbying agendas. Between 1971 and 2017, the United States experienced more
than 13,000 lobbying incidents for trade issues from foreign entities. For example, the Japan
External Trade Organization (JETRO) has been routinely engaging in lobbying activities to
conduct outreach programs like trade exhibitions and conferences to advertise the benefits of
trade with Japan to the American public and businesses. Canadian Sugar Institute engaged
in multiple lobbying activities between 1995-1998 to conserve its sugar exports to the United
States.1 These included monitoring the U.S. Sugar Program and discussing policies affecting
Canada’s sugar exports with Members of Congress. Also, the embassies of Australia and
Panama used lobbying to approach the U.S. government for facilitating negotiation over FTA
provisions on beef, wheat, and agricultural products. More interestingly, while the number
of total foreign lobbying activities has been declining gradually, the ratio of trade-related
lobbying has stayed at about 25% in both the Cold War and Post-Cold War eras. At the
same time, however, the Post-cold War era has seen the proliferation - and strengthening -
of bilateral and regional trade agreements designed to institutionalize commitments to free
1See FARA reports between 1995 and 1998 for more information on Canadian Sugar Institute’s lobbying
activities.
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trade. Pursuing trade agreements is an institutional strategy, designed to lock in policies
against future changes in administration, whereas foreign lobbying is a cruder material policy
to push for the promotion of free trade. I argue that these two strategies are in fact closely
related.
The current literature considers trade institutions and lobbying to be two distinct chan-
nels available to attain the same objective of trade liberalization. However, I suggest that
foreign lobbying is an instrument actors use to negotiate and establish trade institutions. I
argue that, because trade agreements are two-level games, actors employ lobbying to launch
trade institutions and affect their design. As an international negotiation that involves a
two-level game (Putnam, 1988), successful Free Trade Agreements require the approval of
both the U.S. government and its constituents. Foreign governments, firms, and interest
groups may participate in lobbying to access American chief negotiators of the FTA at Level
I and other governmental officials, politicians, and domestic actors at Level II, who affect the
American win-set but who do not sit at the negotiation table. Lobbying will allow foreign
actors to interact with diverse American actors to transmit and extract information that can
facilitate the negotiation. Foreign actors employ lobbying to appeal their expectations and
the potential benefits of an FTA to the United States, and learn more about authentic U.S.
preferences, American public opinion, and the level of support or opposition in Congress for
the ratification of the FTA. Hence, I expect incentives for foreign lobbying and the magni-
tude of lobbying activities to surge during the bargaining period of an FTA and also until
the FTA comes into force after signing. The variance in the mean of the number of lobbying
activities clearly exhibited in Figure 4.1 for FTA partners of the United States compared to
the rest of the world in the mid-2000s, when the United States signed eleven FTAs, seems
to yield support for the theoretical association between FTAs and lobbying patterns that I
suggest. While any foreign entities are eligible to engage in lobbying activities, I expect the
patterns of lobbying to differ by the types of lobbying principals. As the actor accountable
for FTA negotiation outcomes and susceptible to domestic audience costs of the homeland,
foreign governments may have a higher incentive to engage in lobbying activities until FTAs
are enforced, compared to foreign private actors who specifically focus on their private gains.
In this paper, I examine how Free Trade Agreements affect foreign actors’ decision about
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when to lobby the United States for trade issues. Specifically, I investigate (1) how the
bargaining of Free Trade Agreements and (2) the delay in the enforcement of FTAs affect
foreign actors’ lobbying activities. I also examine (3) if FTAs have a different influence on
the incentive of lobbying for foreign governmental and non-governmental entities.
To analyze the association between FTAs and patterns of foreign lobbying, I use the
Foreign Lobbying Dataset (FOLD), an original dataset which I compiled from the Depart-
ment of Justice’s foreign lobbying reports.2 Foreign lobbying activities on trade issues that
occurred from 1995 to 2014 construct my sample. I identify lobbying activities related to
trade and classify those activities by the type of foreign lobbying principals (i.e., govern-
mental vs. non-governmental) by using the text-mining package of R. I find strong evidence
that foreign actors significantly increase the number of lobbying activities at the final stage
of the negotiation and during the interval between the signature and entry into force of the
FTA. However, an enforced FTA is not found to significantly lower the intensity of lobbying
activities. Also, the negotiation of FTAs significantly affects the lobbying patterns of govern-
mental actors, but not those of non-governmental actors. The results imply that lobbying is
a complementary instrument that foreign actors, particularly governmental entities, strate-
gically use to get an FTA. However, foreign lobbying and FTAs are not substitutes - that
is, an active FTA does not eliminate the propensity of lobbying aiming to further bilateral
trade with the United States.
A few theoretical and empirical contributions of this paper are as follows. First, by ex-
amining the relationship between foreign lobbying activities and FTAs, the paper advances
our understanding of the scope conditions that predict lobbying. Knowledge about the likely
timing of lobbying will be an addition to the literature on foreign lobbying, which primarily
concentrates on examining the effectiveness of lobbying (Gawande, Krishna and Robbins,
2006; Kee, Olarreaga and Silva, 2007; Gawande, Maloney and Montes-Rojas, 2009; Peve-
house and Vabulas, 2014; You, 2016; Pevehouse and Vabulas, 2019). Second, I conceptualize
lobbying as a viable option to affect the design of institutions. Such conceptualization builds
2The full Foreign Lobbying Dataset covers all lobbying incidents by foreign entities that took place
between 1971 and 2017 in the United States, with the exception of 1992-1994 during which period the
lobbying reports are not available. For this paper, since the United States signed most of its FTAs in the
Post-Cold War era, the observation period is limited to 1995-2014.
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Figure 4.1: Trends in Foreign Lobbying Activities for Trade Issues, 1995-2017
Note: The figure captures the global trend of the mean number of trade-related lobbying incidents,
along with the trend classified by FTA signatories of the U.S. and non-signatories. The fluctuation
in the number of lobbying activities found only for FTA signatories implies that FTAs and patterns
of foreign lobbying are related.
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on the argument of Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001), that institutions are the byprod-
ucts of negotiation among actors, by suggesting how actors affect the negotiation over the
design. Third, I extend the information model of lobbying and propose the bilateral infor-
mation exchange model. I explain that lobbying works by not only delivering information to
targets but also by learning the target’s preferences. Fourth, my dataset that provides infor-
mation on lobbying activities specifically on trade issues, classified by actor type is another
contribution of this paper.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the second section, I present my theoretical
argument on why FTAs are likely to affect foreign actors’ lobbying patterns, with a brief
review of the relevant literature. Next, I report the data and research design. In the fourth
section, I present and discuss the empirical analysis. I also explain how the mechanism of
lobbying as a bilateral exchange of information unfolds through analyzing the case of South
Korea. The final section concludes.
4.2 FTAs and Patterns of Foreign Lobbying
4.2.1 On Lobbying: Why Do Actors Lobby?
The existing literature on foreign lobbying has focused primarily on the effectiveness of
lobbying. Scholars have particularly concentrated on the role of foreign lobbying in influ-
encing the politics of trade, such as abating trade barriers or boosting U.S. Congressional
support for FTAs (Gawande, Krishna and Robbins, 2006; Kee, Olarreaga and Silva, 2007;
You, 2016; Pevehouse and Vabulas, 2014).3 A few examples that study the determinants
of lobbying, such as when and from whom lobbying is more likely are You (2017) and Kim
(2017).4 You (2017) finds that interest groups are likely to intensify lobbying activities after
3For the effectiveness of lobbying on non-trade issues, see Pevehouse and Vabulas (2019), who show the
influence of foreign lobbying in changing how the United States evaluates a country’s compliance with human
rights norms. Also, see Gawande, Maloney and Montes-Rojas (2009) for how lobbying helps Caribbean
countries draw more American tourists and Lee (2007) for how lobbying affects the way the lobbying entities
are covered in the U.S. media.
4Pevehouse and Vabulas (2019) look at who lobbies to evaluate whether the effectiveness of lobbying
correlates with the likelihood of lobbying. They are interested in investigating the effectiveness of lobbying,
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the passage of bills they pursue to maximize their private gains. Kim (2017) and Kim and
Milner (N.d.) find that firms with highly differentiated products and multinational corpora-
tions have a greater propensity of engaging in pro-trade lobbying. While these studies and
this paper all examine the scope conditions that predict lobbying, this paper differs in that
it exclusively focuses on lobbying activities conducted by foreign entities.
To understand why lobbying works, one should consult the literature of lobbying in the
context of American Politics. Among the three mechanisms of lobbying developed - the
information model, exchange model, and legislative subsidy model - the information model
has been most prominent in research on foreign lobbying. Some scholars conceptualize
lobbying as an exchange between policymakers and interest groups (i.e., lobbying groups).
In the lobbying as exchange model, lobbyists provide material resources, mostly in the form
of campaign contributions, to obtain legislators’ support for the policies and objectives they
advocate (Grossman and Helpman, 1994; McCarty and Rothenberg, 1996; Snyder Jr, 1992;
Stratmann, 1992; Morton and Cameron, 1992). Because policymakers represent the specific
interests of lobbying groups despite the overall welfare loss (Grossman and Helpman, 1994),
this model is also called the vote-buying model. However, foreign entities have been banned
from making any campaign contributions directly from 1966 (You, 2016), and the vote-buying
model is thought to be less relevant in the case of foreign lobbying.5 Another mechanism
interprets lobbying as a legislative subsidy to the “natural allies” of interest groups (Hall
and Deardorff, 2006). Interest groups target legislators who already support their objectives
and provide legislators and their staff diverse assistance by drafting policy analysis, reports,
and speeches (Hall and Deardorff, 2006). By offering professional service, lobbying expands
the Pareto frontier of legislators with limited resources, which enables legislators to invest
more efforts in achieving the policy interest groups advocate.
The information model conceptualizes lobbying as persuasion, where a lobbying group
convinces legislators to endorse the preference it advocates by providing private information
(Austen-Smith and Wright, 1992, 1994; Hansen, 1991; Schnakenberg, 2017; Chalmers, 2013;
and the conditions that determine lobbying is not the main scope of study.
5Although foreign principals are restricted from making campaign contribution, lobbying firms which
represent both foreign and American principals, such as the Livingston Group and DLA Piper, can donate
in the name of firms (Freeman, 2012). Therefore, we cannot entirely exclude the possibility of indirect
vote-buying in foreign lobbying activities.
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Baumgartner et al., 2009). Distributing information to legislators, government officials, their
staff, and civic groups is a critical tactic for successful foreign lobbying (Gawande, Maloney
and Montes-Rojas, 2009; Pevehouse and Vabulas, 2014, 2019). The delivered information
ranges from factual technical and expert knowledge to analyses of how a politician’s sup-
port (or opposition) for policies an interest group advocates may affect his/her chances of
(re)election (Austen-Smith and Wright, 1994; Chalmers, 2013). A survey of lobbying inter-
est groups also shows that distributing their research on policy implications to legislators is
a major tactic in lobbying activities (Baumgartner et al., 2009). Persuasion through sup-
plying information is regarded to be central to the effectiveness of foreign lobbying as well
(Gawande, Maloney and Montes-Rojas, 2009; Pevehouse and Vabulas, 2014, 2019). Accord-
ing to Gawande, Maloney and Montes-Rojas (2009), foreign lobbying works “by disseminat-
ing informational materials to legislators, government agencies, public officials, as well as
civic and education groups” (267).
However, I build on the information mechanism to explain why foreign principals resort
to lobbying. As Schnakenberg (2017) points out, extant theoretical models are restricted in
that they assume legislators to passively receive information during lobbying and that the
setting of lobbying is a single-legislator environment. However, legislators are unlikely to be
apathetic recipients of information (Milbrath, 1976),6 and I conceptualize foreign lobbying
to be a bilateral information transaction, rather than a unilateral delivery of information.
Foreign entities might employ lobbying not only to transmit their messages but also to
extract information from targets. Information, such as the individual preferences of the
U.S. government officials and legislators, the aggregate preference of government branches
or political parties, the status of relevant policies, and the opinion of the American public,
would be valuable resources for foreign lobbying actors to influence the domestic political
scene of the United States. More information will provide foreign actors greater leverage
vis-a-vis the United States. Thus, foreign lobbying might be used to gather as much as to
send out information.
6Milbrath (1976) claims that legislators selectively listen to what lobbyists say.
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4.2.2 On FTAs and Foreign Lobbying: Why Do Actors Use Foreign Lobbying
to Get FTAs?
To explain why FTAs influence lobbying activities, I lean on the literature on interna-
tional institutions. International institutions are “explicit arrangements, negotiated among
international actors” which states self-select into for their own benefits (Koremenos, Lipson
and Snidal, 2001). Although an international institution can efficiently facilitate coopera-
tion by lowering transaction costs and improving transparency (Keohane, 1984; Axelrod and
Keohane, 1985), the long shadow of the future has the perverse effects of making bargaining
harder (Fearon, 1998). FTAs also possess such characteristics of international institutions.
The long duration and the norm of reciprocity of FTAs give foreign actors large incentives
to bargain intensely to impact the terms of the agreements, and lobbying is a useful tool
for rational actors to prevail in bargaining. Since the expectation of greater gains makes
successful bargaining more important to actors (Fearon, 1998), it is plausible to assume that
foreign entities amplify lobbying activities upon negotiating an FTA with the United States,
which may be a catalyst to the country’s vast economic growth.
Foreign lobbying is a particularly apt instrument for bargaining because the negotiation
of an FTA fits the two-level game model of international negotiations of Putnam (1988).
For FTAs to enter into force, the contents agreed upon between chief negotiators at Level I
must be ratified domestically. United States cannot be assumed to be a unitary actor and
the preferences of different domestic actors as well as those of the negotiators can influence
bargaining outcomes and final implementation of FTAs. Such an entanglement of domestic
and international politics in the negotiation process may attract foreign actors to lobbying
activities. Lobbying activities provide potential FTA partner governments the opportunity
to appeal to diverse American actors, from U.S. negotiators to Members of Congress to the
public, who can directly and indirectly affect the establishment of FTAs. Also, even private
actors of partner countries with high stakes in FTA, such as firms and interest groups, may
employ lobbying activities to approach relevant American actors to impact the agreements.
For potential partner governments, lobbying can be a complementary track to the offi-
cial forum. Although the partner government has official access to U.S. representatives, the
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limited opportunity to interact with the United States is still one of the difficulties in the
negotiation process. My interview with a lawyer who formerly worked for the FTA Division
in Korea’s Ministry of Trade, Investment, and Energy, revealed that potential FTA partners
decide on the Terms of Reference, such as when and where to hold negotiation talks, before
proceeding to meetings discussing substantial topics.7 In addition to the inflexible access,
the incomparably large influence the United States has in drafting trade agreements (Allee
and Lugg, 2016; Kim, 2010) is another challenge foreign governments face during bargain-
ing.8 Foreign lobbying makes contacts with the U.S. representatives outside the scheduled
meetings available for the partner’s negotiators. Such extended contacts may help foreign
governments effectively disseminate information to persuade U.S. negotiators and elicit the
authentic preferences of American representatives. Particularly, lobbyists (i.e., American
agents hired for lobbying) may be competent brokers of informational exchanges between
the United States and the potential partner, helping principals to attain their goals in bar-
gaining. Lobbyists will have the expertise to meticulously determine who to contact and how
to contact those people for each specific issue. Also, communication might be more blatant
and efficient when all involved actors have U.S. background (Pevehouse and Vabulas, 2019).
U.S. representatives are likely to be more open to information when the information-sender is
more familiar (Jervis, 1976). Also, because of their former career as congressional staffers or
legislators and because of their native language skills, American agents of lobbying may able
to draw more frank opinion from the target or infer the target’s genuine preference even when
that is subtly stated in communications. Hence, in addition to official negotiation channels,
foreign governments may participate in lobbying activities for more frequent, in-depth, and
efficient interaction. Particularly, considering the massive influence of the United States in
drafting FTAs (Allee and Lugg, 2016; Kim, 2010), it is reasonable for foreign governments
to seek external help like lobbying to maximize their interests in negotiations, overcoming
U.S. preeminence.
7On January 9, 2019, I conducted an in-person interview with a lawyer who formerly worked for Korea’s
Ministry of Trade, Investment, and Energy in Seoul, Korea.
8The United States usually suggests a new agreement to base off its previous agreements with other
partners (Kim, 2010). The contents of trade agreements the United States signs are highly similar to each
other and even the draft of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, signed by twelve countries, greatly resembled other
FTAs of the United States (Allee and Lugg, 2016).
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At the same time, lobbying is a means for partner governments to target American
players who they cannot directly face at the negotiation table - but who is capable of af-
fecting FTA outcomes. According to a brief observation of my Foreign Lobbying Dataset,
foreign governments approached non-governmental entities in 68% of their incidents related
to trade. Such a high percentage implies that foreign governments are well aware of the
extensive impact various private actors have on the politics of trade.9 By participating in
foreign lobbying activities, partner governments may survey the preferences of relevant Amer-
ican constituents, which might not be revealed otherwise. With more accurate information
gained through lobbying, foreign governments may address the problem of asymmetric in-
formation. Informed negotiators of a partner country can prevent the U.S. government from
misrepresenting the domestic opposition to intentionally shrink its win-set to have greater
leverage in bargaining.10 Lobbying can also be used to directly persuade U.S. domestic actors
such as firms, interest groups, and citizens as consumers, through circulating information
which advertizes the benefits and significance of trade agreements. For foreign governments,
winning the support of domestic actors who can pressure the U.S. government may be an
efficient strategy to circumvent the opposition of U.S. negotiators/Congress and accelerate
the negotiation/ratification process.11
Private actors of partner countries have incentives to conduct lobbying activities as well.
As the preferences of American actors might be divergent, the preferences of the partner’s
private actors may not converge with those of the partner government. What is defined as
the national interests would be the preferences of a subset of domestic actors (Moravcsik,
1997; Putnam, 1988) and competition over the government’s advocacy does occur in the
politics concerning trade agreements. My interviewee from Korea’s Ministry of Trade, In-
vestment, and Energy stated that although private actors can deliver their expectations at
public hearings/meetings to relevant government branches, such as the Ministry of Agricul-
9By using the text-mining package of R, I identified lobbying incidents where American agents contacted
Members of Congress or staff of the executive or legislative branches.
10See Putnam (1988) for the role of win-set in bargaining. By learning about the preferences of U.S. players
at Level II, A’s representatives may suggest deals that can help their American counterparts mitigate the
domestic opposition - “synergistic linkage (p. 447)” in the term of Putnam (1988) - and thereby facilitate
negotiation at Level I.
11See Pevehouse and Vabulas (2019) for the benefits of indirectly affecting the U.S. government by lobbying
the public.
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ture and Korea Chamber of Commerce & Industry, certain actors’ preferences are likely to
be excluded in the aggregate national preference.12 Under such circumstances, the partner’s
private actors might bypass their own government but rather directly approach the U.S.
government through lobbying in order to secure their interests. However, not only the ac-
tors whose preferences are overlooked by the government, but also the well-represented ones
may engage in lobbying for greater distributional benefits. Also, the partner’s private ac-
tors might utilize lobbying to form international alignments with whom they can push their
similar agendas, such as the transnational advocacy group that have compelling influence
on governments (Keck and Sikkink, 1999). Perhaps, export-oriented (import-oriented) firms
of the partner may coordinate with similarly pro-trade (anti-trade) U.S. firms to impose
pressure on respective governments with the assistance of their American lobbying agents.
According to Kim (2017) and Kim and Milner (N.d.), firms that treat highly differentiated
products and multinational corporations (MNCs) are pro-trade. Such firms, regardless of
the nationality, may push for pro-trade agendas together. Also, advocacy groups may resort
to lobbying to connect with American interest groups to support (or oppose) certain envi-
ronmental or labor provisions of FTAs. Table 4.1 provides a few instances of lobbying based
on FARA reports.
As I explained, foreign actors, whether public or private, have ample reasons to engage
in lobbying activities upon the bargaining of FTAs with the United States. Based on my
argument that foreign actors use lobbying as a strategy to prevail in bargaining, I derive:
• H1: Foreign lobbying is likely to increase during the final negotiation period of FTAs
with the United States.
However, intense foreign lobbying may persist even after the trade agreement is signed.
I argue that foreign actors will continue to engage in lobbying proactively until the FTA
is ratified and enforced. Even after the completion of negotiation, FTAs cannot enter into
force without domestic ratification. Anti-free trade domestic interest groups and politicians
may mobilize to oppose ratification and rescind the signed trade agreements. Also, the
U.S. government may use the delay in ratification as an opportunity to request partner
12I had an in-person interview on January 9, 2019 in Seoul, Korea.
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Table 4.1: Examples of Foreign Lobbying for Trade
Year Principal Agent Activity
2002 Australian Dairy
Corporation
Fazzone, Patrick
Brock
(1)Provide advice on dairy trade is-
sues and legislative and regulatory de-
velopments of interests to the foreign
principal.
(2)Meet with U.S. Government offi-
cials to discuss issues regarding tar-
iff rate quotas and dairy product im-
ports.
2005 Ministry of Develop-
ment, Industry and
Commerce, Govern-
ment of Nicaragua
Richard L. Collins
& Company, Inc.
(1)Assist the foreign principal in de-
veloping negotiation strategies and
positions regarding the Central Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA).
(2)Prepare and disseminate informa-
tional materials, and provide guid-
ance during meetings with members of
Congress, congressional staffers, U.S.
Government officials, and civic orga-
nizations, regarding the CAFTA
2016 Temasek Holdings
Limited (Singapore)
Squire Patton
Boggs, LLP
(1) Represent foreign principal regard-
ing the impact of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) Agreement on its
business.
(2)Contact congressional staff to pro-
vide background, and introductory in-
formation on the structure and nature
of Temasek’s operations.
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governments substantial revisions to FTAs, particularly for the most contentious provisions
(Robertson, 2012).13 To avoid wasting time and efforts devoted for bargaining an FTA with
the United States, foreign actors are likely to invest in lobbying activities to overcome the
hurdle of ratification and ensure enforcement of the FTA. The negative impact of stagnating
trade agreements on economic activities, such as reduction in investment (Rodrik, 1991;
Cinar and Gulotty, 2018), may heighten foreign actors’ incentives for lobbying. Therefore,
foreign actors may intensively engage in lobbying activities to lock in the negotiated trade
agreements during the interval between FTA signing and entry into force.
• H2: Foreign lobbying is likely to increase during the interval between FTA signing and
entry into force.
I also examine whether foreign actors’ propensity to employ lobbying decreases when
foreign actors have achieved the goal of landing an FTA. Also, with the enforcement of the
FTA, foreign actors will be granted stable and open access to the American market, which is
one of the primary objectives of trade-related lobbying. Hence, the incentive of foreign actors
to participate in intense lobbying activities may decrease when FTAs are already enforced.
• H3: Foreign lobbying is likely to decrease after an FTA enters into force.
I examine the effects of FTAs on the lobbying patterns of different types of foreign
actors. The principals of foreign lobbying include both public and private actors. Foreign
public actors refer to governmental entities and foreign private actors refer to firms, interest
groups, and individuals. While the existing literature seldom distinguishes foreign actors
by type, it is important to analyze patterns of lobbying at the disaggregate level since
states are not unitary actors, and the preferences of public and private actors might be
different. Government actors will be interested in trade benefits at the national level and
the overall contours of the agreement, whereas private actors will be lobbying for more
particular gains such as reducing the tariff of items they export.14 In this sense, governments
lobby for providing a public good, an FTA with the United States. Since governmental
13Robertson (2012) notes that Korea and the United States went through altering the signed agreement.
14Kim (2017) also states that “firms individually lobby on trade policies targeting very specific products”
(p. 1).
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entities are the ones who sit at the negotiation table and more responsible for a much wider
range of issues, they are likely to partake in more lobbying activities than private actors.
Also, the potential audience costs governments face in the domestic politics of the homeland
may drive them to intensify lobbying. Conceivably, unless governments are confident that
establishing an FTA is advantageous to their economy, they would not have initiated the
negotiations.15 If so, governments would have propagated the benefits of the FTA with the
United States to obtain public support.16 When the public’s expectation are heightened,
there will be political costs for the government to making commitments and not being able
to follow through (Fearon, 1994; Tomz, 2007a). Since FTA negotiations with the United
States receive a disproportionate amount of public attention than trade agreements with
other partners, the government may face audience costs not only when the public dislikes
the leader’s inconsistency but also the outcomes, such as the terms of agreement (Chaudoin,
2014).17 Therefore, governments will have large incentives to magnify lobbying activities to
complete the establishment of publicized trade agreements and avoid making concessions in
the issues the domestic public is particularly sensitive about. Private actors do not bear
such political burden. However, once an FTA goes into force, both types of actors will have
less reasons to continue lobbying activities aiming to influence the terms of the agreement.
• H4: Foreign lobbying by public actors is more likely to increase compared to the lobbying
by private actors during the final negotiation period of FTA and during the interval
between FTA signing and enforcement.
• H5: Foreign lobbying is likely to decrease by both public and private actors after an FTA
enters into force.
This research concentrates on examining the effects of FTAs but not the effects of Pref-
erential Trade Agreements (PTAs), such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act, the
Andean Trade Preference Act, and the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, on pat-
terns of lobbying activities. FTAs are trade agreements based on reciprocity, implemented
15Governments usually perform cost-benefit analyses by multiple experts to determine whether to pursue
trade agreements/cooperation with certain countries.
16See Naoi and Kume (2015) for how a government’s issue framing can affect the public’s preference for
trade.
17According to Chaudoin (2014), audience costs can be produced by the public’s dislike of policy contents
as well as their dislike of leaders’ inconsistency.
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after negotiations among partner countries. In contrast, PTAs of the United States are trade
benefits the United States unilaterally grant to underdeveloped or less developed countries.
The United States often use PTAs as a political reward or punishment for the beneficiaries’
actions. A country’s membership in a PTA changes according to whether the United States
determines the country eligible for trade benefits at a given time. Hence, PTAs are not likely
to produce the demand for lobbying activities to prevail in bargaining as FTAs do. For this
reason, the scope of research excludes PTAs.
4.3 Research Design
4.3.1 Data
I use information on lobbying activities related to trade issues conducted by foreign gov-
ernment, firms, interest groups, and individuals in the United States between 1995 and 2014
as the data for empirical analysis. FARA requires any American agents representing foreign
interests to register their lobbying activity with the Department of Justice and disclose infor-
mation about: (a) the name and address of the foreign principal, (b) the name and address of
the American agent, (c) the nature of services provided for the foreign principal, (d) the de-
scription of activities conducted, and (e) (optionally) the amount of relevant expenses. The
Department of Justice classifies the files submitted by individual lobbying agents according
to the country of origin of foreign principals and has reported foreign lobbying activities since
1942 to Congress (FARA, 2019). From the archival reports of the Department of Justice to
the Congress, I constructed an original dataset, the Foreign Lobbying Dataset. The Foreign
Lobbying Dataset covers all lobbying incidents conducted from 1971 to 2017, which amounts
to approximately 53,000 lobbying incidents. I code all lobbying incidents by the topic of lob-
bying, the lobbying tactic, and the type of lobbying principals, using the text-mining package
of R.18 For this paper, I specifically identified trade-related lobbying activities that occurred
18You (Forthcoming) and Pevehouse and Vabulas (2019) also construct dataset based on FARA lobbying
reports. You (Forthcoming) measures lobby contacts between 1942 and 2014. Pevehouse and Vabulas (2019)
measures the number and expenses of lobbying activities between 1997 and 2012. Both datasets are not yet
published.
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from 1995 to 2014 from the FOLD Dataset. This is because most Free Trade Agreements
were formed in the Post-Cold War era and because the Department of Justice’s lobbying
reports are missing for three years, from 1992 to 1994. Further information can be found
in the codebook of the Foreign Lobbying Dataset (Appendix D). In my observation period
from 1995-2014, the United States received 4,590 lobbying incidents related to trade issues.
In constructing the data on foreign lobbying activities, I chose lobbying reports filed
under FARA rather than the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA). To put the influ-
ence of organized interests on politics under surveillance, LDA demands registration of any
individuals or groups that lobby Congress on behalf of both domestic and foreign actors.
Lobbying agents can choose to register with either FARA or LDA as long as the principals
they represent are not foreign governmental entities or political parties. Since my research
focuses on examining the effects of trade institutions on both public and private foreign
actors, foreign lobbying activities under FARA are a more suitable sample to capture my
research interest. Also, only foreign lobbying activities that target members of the House
and Senate are included in the LDA sample while no such classification by target type ap-
plies to lobbying under FARA. However, the U.S. executive branch has been a pivotal target
in foreign lobbying, particularly because of the fast-track authority given to the President
(Milner and Tingley, 2015). Foreign principals have also attempted to influence the general
public, media, and think tanks through lobbying (Lipton, Williams and Confessore, 2014;
Lee, 2007; Zhang and Cameron, 2003). Therefore, FARA reports are a more appropriate
sample for my analysis.
4.3.2 Dependent Variables
To capture patterns of lobbying, I use the number of lobbying incidents relevant to
trade, Trade Lobby #, at the country-year level.19 While most research uses lobbying ex-
penditures to measure the magnitude of foreign lobbying (Gawande, Krishna and Robbins,
19Since the Department of Justice publishes FARA reports twice a year and my unit of analysis is the
country-year, if a particular lobbying incident representing a principal X continues throughout the year of
2005 (i.e. registered in both June and December 2005), this is counted as two lobbying incidents. To avoid
over-counting and keep the unit of analysis at the country-year level, I estimated the similarity of lobbying
incidents using the contents of lobbying reports as data and collapsed such cases into one lobbying incident.
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2006; Gawande, Maloney and Montes-Rojas, 2009; Kee, Olarreaga and Silva, 2007), I use
the count of lobbying incidents instead.20 Although American agents are required to report
to the Department of Justice about their activities, they are not forced to disclose infor-
mation on finances, which results in a considerable amount of missing data problems. For
example, among 17,445 cases of total lobbying incidents the information on expenses were
not disclosed for 31% of cases. Hence, I find the number of lobbying incidents to be a more
reliable source to capture the magnitude of foreign lobbying.
To identify foreign lobbying specifically on trade from total lobbying incidents, I use a
text analysis program in R. I search for the following keywords, reported in the stem of the
word, in the lobbying reports: trade; export; import; fta; nafta; cafta; drcafta
; ftaa; naftas; kfta21; caftas; korusfta22; tpp23; gsp24; mcool25; tariff; cus-
tom; agoa26; tpl27; wto; gatt; mfn28; antidump; dump ; caribbean & basin29;
traders; exporters; imports; importers. Whenever the keyword is included in one
of the four categories - the name of foreign principal, the nature of services, the description of
activities, or the political propaganda - that incident is counted toward foreign lobbying for
trade.30 I reviewed FARA reports of several years to select key words related to trade. I also
retrieved the frequency of words appearing in FARA reports by producing word matrices
using the text-mining function of R to objectively evaluate the plausibility of my initial list
and finalize the search key words. After identifying foreign lobbying on trade, I sort the
incidents by country and year to construct the dependent variable, the annual number of
lobbying incidents on trade. Also, I construct Public Trade Lobby # and Private Trade Lobby
20Exceptions are Pevehouse and Vabulas (2019) and You (2016). Pevehouse and Vabulas (2019) use both
the number of lobbying incidents and the log of lobbying expenses as their dependent variables and You
(2016) used the number of contacts made during lobbying activities.
21Denotes the FTA between Korea and the United States
22Korea-U.S. FTA
23Trans-Pacific Partnership
24Generalized System of Preferences
25The mandatory country of origin labeling
26African Growth and Opportunity Act
27Tariff Preferential Level
28Most-favored nation
29Because I search for any lobbying related to “Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA)” and
its successors, the words Caribbean and Basin must be simultaneously present.
30In some cases, information on the nature of services and the activities is not provided. However, if the
foreign principal is a trade organization/association, like the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO),
it is reasonable to assume that the lobbying is relevant to trade.
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#, which respectively record the number of lobbying incidents employed by foreign public
and private actors. Whenever the name of foreign principal included one of the following
words, I coded such incidents as foreign public lobbying. The search keywords are: gov-
ernment; embassy; republic; ministry; department; consulate; ambassador.
Any lobbying incidents not conducted by public actors are coded as foreign private lobbying.
Although I measure the magnitude of lobbying by the number of lobbying incidents, I
use the log of annual lobbying expenses of each country, Trade Lobby $, as a dependent
variable for the models in the robustness check section. I also build Public Trade Lobby
$ and Private Trade Lobby $ which code the log of annual expenses of foreign public and
private actors. When the expenses are reported in currency other than U.S. dollar, I use the
official exchange rate data of World Bank (WorldBank, N.d.) to convert to U.S. dollar of
the corresponding year.
4.3.3 Independent Variables
The independent variables are FTA Signed, FTA Signed-1, FTA Signed-2, FTA Signed-3,
FTA Interval, and Active FTA. I operationalize the year the FTA was signed, along with 1,
2, and 3 years before the signing as the final negotiation period. FTA Signed, FTA Signed-1,
FTA Signed-2, and FTA Signed-3 are dummy variables that respectively code the year an
FTA with the United States is signed and one/two/three year(s) before the FTA is signed.
FTA Interval is coded 1 if the FTA is signed but not yet enforced in a given year, and
0 otherwise. Active FTA is coded 1 if a country has an enforced FTA with the U.S. in a
given year, and 0 otherwise. I use the database of the World Trade Organization to retrieve
information on the formation of FTAs (WTO, N.d.). Table 4.2 lists the U.S. FTAs.
4.3.4 Control Variables
I control for the effects of various factors that influence the likelihood of lobbying activ-
ities. To estimate the persistent effect of the dependent variables, I take one-, two-, three-
year lags of each dependent variable. Serial correlation is an important issue to address in the
study of foreign lobbying because the probability that actors will lobby in any two consecu-
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Table 4.2: List of FTAs of the United States
Signatory Date of Signature Date of Entry into Force
Israel 1985/04/22 1985/08/19
NAFTA
• Canada
• Mexico
1992/12/17 1994/01/01
Jordan 2000/10/24 2001/12/17
Singapore 2003/05/06 2004/01/01
Chile 2003/06/06 2004/01/01
Australia 2004/05/18 2005/01/01
Morocco 2004/06/15 2006/01/01
CAFTA-DR:
• Costa Rica
• Dominican Republic
• El Salvador
• Guatemala
• Honduras
• Nicaragua
2004/08/05
• Costa Rica 2009/01/01
• Dominican Republic 2007/03/01
• Guatemala 2006/07/01
• Honduras, Nicaragua 2006/04/01
• El Salvador 2006/03/01
Bahrain 2005/09/14 2006/08/01
Oman 2006/01/19 2009/01/01
Peru 2006/04/12 2009/02/01
Colombia 2006/11/22 2012/05/15
Panama 2007/06/28 2012/10/31
South Korea 2007/06/30 2012/03/15
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tive years is 0.9 (Kerr, Lincoln and Mishra, 2014; De Figueiredo and Richter, 2014). Since
prolific lobbying activities from a country might be due to its general tendency to engage in
lobbying, rather than the process of institutionalizing FTA, I also control for the influence of
the annual number of non-trade foreign lobbying incidents by country (Non-Trade Lobby #).
To test if foreign actors emulate other countries’ lobbying activities due to the diffusion of
global tendency to lobby, I control for year fixed effects. In addition, I control for the effects
of military regime type (Democracy) and the economic capability (ln GDP p.c.) because
the characteristics of country might affect their propensity to engage in lobbying. I account
for the possible effects of the linkages between a country and the United States on lobbying
patterns such as military alliances, bilateral trade, and common memberships in intergovern-
mental organizations. Interstate ties might produce intricate relationships with the United
States and enhance the demand for lobbying. Thus, I control for the effects of Alliance,
the volume of bilateral trade with the U.S. (ln Trade Volume), and the number of joint
memberships in IGOs between a country and the United States (Joint IGO Memberships). I
use the Polity score (Marshall and Gurr, 2020) for regime type31, and the Maddison Project
Database (Bolt et al., 2018) for GDP per capita. I use the Alliance Treaty of Obligations
and Provisions (ATOP) data (Leeds et al., 2002) for the alliance variable, the International
Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistic (IMF, 2019) for bilateral trade volume with the
United States and the Intergovernmental Organizations Dataset (Pevehouse et al., 2019) for
IGO memberships.
4.3.5 Model
I estimate the effects of FTAs on patterns of foreign lobbying activities using fixed effects
Poisson regression models. Poisson models are apt for estimating count data (Allison, 2009),
like the number of lobbying incidents, the dependent variable of this research. I use country
fixed effects to estimate the influence of FTA negotiations on lobbying activities with-in each
country.
31I code polity score of 6-10 as democracy==1 and 0 otherwise.
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4.4 Results
Table 4.3 estimates how FTAs affect foreign actors’ participation in trade-related lob-
bying activities. The positive and significant effects of FTA Signed, FTA Signed-1, FTA
Signed-2 and FTA Interval in Column (1) demonstrate that foreign actors engage in a
greater number of lobbying activities in the year an FTA is signed and up to two years be-
fore the signing of the agreement. They also expand lobbying activities during the interval
between the signing and entry into force of an FTA (FTA Interval). The results corroborate
my expectation that foreign actors intensify their lobbying activities to prevail in bargaining
and facilitate the enforcement of FTAs. However, contrary to my expectation, the num-
ber of lobbying incidents foreign entities conduct does not significantly decrease despite the
enforcement of the FTA, which is demonstrated by the statistically insignificant effect of
Active FTA. The vividly contrasting patterns of lobbying before and after the establishment
of FTAs imply that while foreign entities use lobbying as an instrument to get FTAs, a trade
agreement does not reduce the foreign actor’s need to lobby.
The effects of the control variables are also notable. The significant effects of lagged Trade
Lobby# at t-1 and the insignificant effects of two-/three-years lagged dependent variables
indicate that path-dependency in lobbying activities only occur in two consecutive years.
The null effects of Non-Trade Lobby# also imply that how frequently foreign actors conduct
lobbying activities for other issues does not determine the magnitude of their current trade-
related lobbying activities. By specifying year fixed effects in the regression model, I can
infer that the influence of FTA bargaining on lobbying activities is significant and robust,
which is independent of potential global diffusion effect. Among the country-specific control
variables, the regime type (Democracy) is found to be significantly associated with lobbying
patterns, but the size of the economy (ln GDP p.c.) is not. The ties between a country and
the United States mostly have positive effects on lobbying activities. While a high level of
shared memberships in IGOs (Joint IGO Membership) and a high volume of bilateral trade
with the United States (ln Trade Volume) are significant predictors of intense lobbying
activities, alliance is not.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 4.3 demonstrate the influence of FTAs on the lobbying
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Table 4.3: Effects of FTAs on the Number of Lobbying Activities #
(1) (2) (3)
Trade Lobby # Public Trade Lobby # Private Trade Lobby #
FTA Signed 0.927∗∗∗ 1.386∗∗∗ 0.410
(0.163) (0.262) (0.236)
FTA Signed-1 0.734∗∗∗ 1.342∗∗∗ 0.195
(0.160) (0.254) (0.232)
FTA Signed-2 0.377∗ 0.768∗ 0.162
(0.182) (0.301) (0.239)
FTA Signed-3 0.110 0.582 -0.154
(0.199) (0.324) (0.263)
FTA Interval 0.646∗∗∗ 1.110∗∗∗ 0.169
(0.140) (0.251) (0.181)
Active FTA -0.044 0.250 -0.263
(0.145) (0.250) (0.188)
Alliance 0.578 0.605 12.642
(0.483) (0.503) (726.307)
Joint IGO Memberships 2.678∗ 6.284∗∗ 1.384
(1.111) (1.929) (1.435)
ln Trade Volume 0.316∗∗∗ 0.150 0.340∗
(0.093) (0.122) (0.139)
ln GDP p.c. 0.269 -0.295 0.735∗
(0.219) (0.330) (0.304)
Democracy -0.528∗∗∗ -0.633∗∗ -0.384
(0.148) (0.217) (0.203)
Trade Lobby# t−1 0.021∗∗∗
(0.005)
Trade Lobby# t−2 -0.003
(0.005)
Trade Lobby# t−3 -0.009
(0.005)
Non-Trade Lobby# 0.006
(0.005)
Public Trade Lobby# t−1 0.136∗∗∗
(0.022)
Public Trade Lobby# t−2 0.010
(0.026)
Public Trade Lobby# t−3 -0.012
(0.023)
Public Non-Trade Lobby# 0.020
(0.019)
Private Trade Lobby# t−1 0.036∗∗∗
(0.009)
Private Trade Lobby# t−2 -0.010
(0.008)
Private Trade Lobby# t−3 -0.013
(0.008)
Private Non-Trade Lobby# 0.002
(0.008)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2018 1685 1313
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 83
patterns of foreign public and private actors. The significant effects of FTA Signed, FTA
Signed-1, FTA Signed-2, and FTA Interval in increasing lobbying incidents are robust for
public actors but not for private actors. Public actors are likely to magnify their lobbying
activities at the final negotiation stage of an FTA and until the agreement is fully enforced,
but private actors are not likely to intensify lobbying because of FTA negotiations per se.
The tendency of public actors to engage in more prolific lobbying activities for a longer period
of time supports my expectation. Public actors are more likely to increase lobbying activities
due to their role as the chief negotiator at the Level I game and the potential audience costs
imposed on them when the agreement breaks down. At the same time, the results show
that private actors lobby for their particular interests (Kim, 2017) and do not invest their
additional resources to obtain an FTA with benefits that will be shared by numerous actors.
Also, the lobbying activities by both type of actors do not substantially decline even when
an FTA goes into force. Figure 4.2 exhibits the influence of FTAs on the lobbying patterns
of all, public, and private actors.
Figure 4.3 presents the changes in the mean number of lobbying activities by FTA part-
ners before and after signing FTAs. Year 0 denotes the year an FTA is signed. The years
before signing are expressed in negative values and the years after signing are expressed in
positive values. The amount of lobbying activities rapidly increases in the final negotiation
period, specifically from two years before and until the signing of an FTA. The amount of
lobbying activities tends to decline after signing but boosts again from three years after the
signature. Such fluctuation is not an aberration. The surge of lobbying activities from three
to five years after signing FTAs indicates foreign actors’ prolific lobbying activities in the in-
terval between FTA signing and enforcement. Among twenty partner countries of the United
States, only six countries had FTAs implemented the next year FTAs were signed. The max-
imum length of an interval was five years. Perhaps the more enforcement was delayed, the
more partner countries participated in lobbying activities. Figure 4.4 compares the change
in lobbying activities of Australia and Colombia. While the FTA between the United States
and Australia entered into force the next year after signing, Colombia experienced a five-year
interval period. The fluctuation of lobbying activities of Colombia, which is in contrast to
decreasing activities of Australia since 2005, seems to explain the surge of lobbying activities
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Figure 4.2: Effects of FTAs on Number of Trade Lobbying Activities #
Note: The figure displays the coefficient of independent variables, with confidence intervals, of
the models reported in Table 4.3. Positive and significant effects on the number of trade-related
lobbying activities are found for FTA Signed, FTA Signed-1, FTA Signed-2, and FTA Interval, for
all principals and foreign public principals.
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in Figure 4.3 between Year 2-5. Thus, Figure 4.3 is consistent with my expectation and
the statistical findings that foreign actors engage in intense lobbying activities in the final
negotiation period and the interval between signing and entry into force.
Figure 4.3: Trends in Foreign Lobbying Activities for Trade by FTA Signatories, Before and
After Signing FTA
Note: The figure displays the change in the mean of the number of trade-related lobbying activities
of U.S. FTA signatories, before and after signing FTAs. Year 0 denotes the year an FTA is signed;
-1 denotes one year before signing and 1 denotes one year after signing.
The unexpected null effects of Active FTA leads to a question. Why do lobbying activities
persist even after FTAs come into force? On the one hand, it is possible that foreign actors
continue lobbying because the agreement leaves flexibility. When the partners of the FTA
agree to phase out tariffs or subsidies instead of immediate elimination, the United States and
partner governments have discretion over the specific schedule of deduction - for instance,
what percentage of tariffs to reduce by the following year. Such discretion may encourage
foreign actors to engage in ex-post lobbying activities, which occur after the implementation
of trade agreements (Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, 2007). For example, rational foreign actors
may use lobbying to expedite the deduction of U.S. tariffs on their exports and buy more
time before cutting down subsidies to their country’s import-competing sectors.32 On the
32Partners adopt phase-out options usually for contentious items of FTAs, which might increase actor’s
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of Foreign Lobbying Activities for Trade Before and After Signing
FTA, Australia and Columbia
Note: The left figure displays the change in lobbying activities of Australia and the right one
displays that of Colombia. The red (solid) line denotes the year FTA was signed. The green (dash)
line denotes the year FTA entered into force. The period between the red and green lines is the
interval between signing and entry into force.
other hand, foreign actors may engage in lobbying but for different objectives after the entry
into force of an FTA. Once an FTA is implemented, foreign actors are given open access to
the partner country’s market. To secure their privileged status in the target country, foreign
actors from FTA partners may engage in lobbying activities as anti-trade domestic actors to
prevent other foreign actors from entering the market (Stoyanov, 2009). While foreign actors
use ex-ante lobbying to lock in liberal trade with the United States by establishing a trade
agreement, they may resort to ex-post lobbying to block other international competitors in
the American market. These are the potential reasons I suggest to understand why an active
FTA does not significantly diminish lobbying activities.
incentivse to keep intense lobbying activities. Several U.S. FTAs adopt immediate tariff elimination for
industrial products, but phase-out tariffs for agricultural/fishery products (Kim, 2010). For example, the
U.S. implemented a phase-out tariff which is scheduled to be completely applied over 18 years with Australia,
and phase-out tariffs on fishery items such as tuna and sardine in FTAs with Chile, Singapore, Morocco,
and CAFTA-DR (Kim, 2010).
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4.4.1 Robustness Checks
Multiple models estimated to check the robustness of the findings are provided in Ap-
pendix C (Tables C.1-C.4). First, I estimate the effects of FTAs on foreign actors’ expenses
for lobbying activities (Figure 4.5). I find a significant increase in lobbying expenses in the
year FTA is signed and a year before from all lobbying entities and public entities. How-
ever, only public actors are likely to make a greater financial investment during the interval
between FTA signing and entry into force. Conceivably, foreign governments have a higher
demand for lobbying to responsibly ensure the enforcement of the signed FTA. When an
FTA comes into force, public actors increase lobbying spending. Perhaps, foreign govern-
ments may enlarge their spending in lobbying to counter the efforts of pro-trade interest
groups and other foreign countries to block other foreign competitors’ entry and secure their
gains in the American market (Austen-Smith and Wright, 1994; Stoyanov, 2009).
Figure 4.5: Effects of FTAs on Trade Lobbying Expenses $
Note: The figure displays the coefficients of independent variables, with confidence intervals, on
expenses for trade-related lobbying activities conducted by all, public, and private foreign principals.
See Table C.1 in Appendix C for the regression output.
Second, I examine whether FTAs that went through negotiation but did not successfully
conclude, such as the Transatlatic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), similarly affect lobbying patterns. The negotiation of TTIP
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between the United States and the European Union started in July 2013 and broke down
by the end of 2016. The United States withdrew from TPP in 2017 after signing onto
the agreement in 2016. Theoretically I expect an increase in lobbying activities during
the bargaining period, regardless of the outcome of the FTA. However, I do not find any
significant surge in lobbying activities from actors either involved in TTIP or TPP.33 Perhaps
this result implies that there are scope conditions regarding when actors engage in more
prolific lobbying activities to prevail in the bargaining of FTAs. FTAs that the United
States has established so far are mostly bilateral agreements. Exceptions are NAFTA and
CAFTA-DR (with 6 countries), but compared to TTIP (with 28 European Union countries)
and TPP (with 11 Asia-Pacific countries), the enforced FTAs have fewer members. Hence,
it is possible that actors adopt different strategies for the bargaining of multilateral trade
agreements and do not necessarily intensify lobbying activities. It is also conceivable that
the potential signatories of TTIP and TPP perceived the feasibility of FTAs to be low and
rationally chose not to invest in costly lobbying activities.
Third, the estimation of the main model (Table 4.3) without country fixed effects do not
alter the findings, indicating that foreign actors who are at the final negotiation and pre-
enforcement (interval) stage of an FTA with the United States have a higher likelihood of
expanding their lobbying activities than any other actors around the world. Fourth, models
with FTA Signed-4 and FTA Signed-5 robustly support the findings that foreign actors
proactively undertake more lobbying activities from two years before the signing of an FTA
and until entry into force. However, foreign actors invest more financial resource in the year
FTA is signed and one year before. Such results suggest that foreign actors consider the last
two years of negotiation to be the critical time to mobilize their political activity, both in
terms of frequency and spending, in the United States. The insignificance of years prior to
FTA Signed-2 illustrates that foreign actors probably consider starting lobbying from too
early on inefficient.
33The variable TTIP Negotiation is coded 1 if the United States and the European Union engaged in
FTA negotiation in a given year. TPP Negotiation is coded 1 if a given year is the year FTA was signed or
one-/two-/three-years before signature.
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4.4.2 Case Study of South Korea: Lobbying Activities for the KORUS FTA
Whereas my statistical analyses demonstrate the significant effects of FTAs on patterns of
lobbying activities, I show how lobbying activities may help foreign actors for the negotiation
and enforcement of an FTA with the case of South Korea. The example supports my
argument that bilateral information transaction is a major objective of foreign lobbying
activities. According to FARA documents, a foreign principal, the Korea International
Trade Association (KITA) hired Patton Boggs LLP (an American agent) to conduct lobbying
activities for advancing the FTA with the United States.34 KITA is a non-governmental trade
association representing about 70,000 firms, and is partially subsidized by the government
of Korea. Patton Boggs worked on behalf of KITA during the interval period between
the signing and the enforcement of the U.S.-Korea FTA, also known as the KORUS FTA
signed in June 2007 and enforced in March 2012. The major task of Patton Boggs was
assisting the principal in the interval period “in communicating with the legislative and
Executive Branches of the U.S. Government (Exhibit B)” and providing consultation on
how to proceed, since the KORUS FTA faced difficulties at the U.S. Congress ratification
stage. The activities of Patton Boggs are reported in detail in an e-mail sent to the Chairman
of KITA in September 2009, which is disclosed in FARA Exhibit AB documents. Patton
Boggs frankly stated that “..., it is that we acknowledge at the outset of the representation
that the KORUS FTA cannot pass the U.S. Congress without some further changes” (p. 4).
In their efforts to facilitate the approval of the FTA, on the one hand Patton Boggs lob-
byists concentrated on learning the thoughts of the primary actors in the United States and
suggesting how to reconcile the preferences of KITA and the American actors. They articu-
lated President Obama’s expectation to modify the agreement by changing the actual text or
adjusting side agreements, and mentioned that modification might render the Obama-Biden
team to induce support from the undecided Democrats. The lobbyists stressed the strong
preference of the United States with an analysis that modifications regarding beef and au-
tomobile issues are requested even from the advocates of KORUS FTA like Congressman
Kevin Brady (R-TX), a Ranking Member of the House Ways and Means Trade Subcommit-
34See FARA (2010) for the lobbying activities of Patton Boggs LLP on behalf of KITA.
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tee. Also, Patton Boggs endeavored to resolve controversies over contentious items, such as
the automobile/beef issues and labor/environmental provisions, by eliciting the preferences
of relevant U.S. actors and gauging the potential range of reconciliation between the two
countries. The agents assured that “Our ties with the Democratic Congressional Leadership
and with senior officials in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. labor orga-
nizations, and U.S. automobile companies will enable us to garner information (emphasis
added) and help determine exactly which provisions must change or be supplemented. As we
discussed, we then can combine our legal and political expertise to help craft language that
is mutually acceptable to KITA’s and U.S. interests” (p. 4). The report of Patton Boggs
add validity to my argument that foreign lobbying can be used to obtain critical information
from the lobbying targets.
On the other hand, the lobbyists strove to inform different American audiences about
the potentials benefits and significance of KORUS FTA. Patton Boggs agents advised em-
phasizing the benefits brought to several U.S. regions by the investment of Hyundai and Kia
to make Americans more open to future economic cooperation with Korea.35 The lobbyists
also proposed advertising how entry into the Korean market can profit certain U.S. sectors
and regions, such as California by exporting agricultural products. The agents suggested
highlighting the interest of President Lee and KITA member firms in green energy, which
is one of the priorities of the Obama administration, to propel support for the FTA with
Korea. In the e-mail, Patton Boggs listed critical targets in the U.S. executive and legisla-
tive branches, giving the names of actors opposing the KORUS FTA whom lobbyists must
approach to alter their position and the ones in favor to consolidate their support.36 How-
ever, the targets of foreign lobbying were not limited to the U.S. government. The agents
35Hyundai and Kia are Korean automobile companies that have manufacturing facilities in the United
States
36The lobbyists stated that they will access high-rank officials in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
the Departments of State, Commerce, Agriculture, and Treasury, and the Office of Management and Budget.
They particularly pointed out Demetrios Marantis, a Deputy USTRs, Kurt Campbell, the newly appointed
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, and Timothy Reif, the General Counsel for USTR as
key players. In the legislative branch, Nancy Pelosi (D-CA, Speaker of the House), Harry Reid (D-NV,
Senate Majority Leader), Charlie Rangel (D-NY, Ways and Means Chairman), and Max Baucus (D-MT,
Senate Finance Chairman) were listed as those opposing the FTA whom the lobbyists should pay extra
attention. They listed Howard Berman (D-CA, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair), James Webb (D-
VA, Senate Foreign Relations East Asia Subcommittee Chair), Brad Sherman (D-CA, House Foreign Affairs
Nonproliferation Subcommittee Chair) and Ed Royce (R-CA) as reliable supporters of Korea.
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suggested hosting forums about trade issues with Korea at think tanks such as the Peterson
Institute for International Economics, the Brookings Institute, and the Center for Strategic
and International Studies. In order to reach out to more general, wider audience, the agents
recommended hosting country-wide “KITA roadshows.” The agents underscored the signif-
icance of targeting the American public, analyzing that the lack of information is possibly
what causes aversion and opposition about the KORUS FTA. The various tactics discussed
show that persuading targets with information is crucial to how lobbying works.
According to the supplemental statement Patton Boggs submitted to the Department of
Justice, the lobbying agents made 242 contacts - 80 Members of Congress (or their staff),
3 officials of the USTR, 5 from the Department of State, and 1 from the National Security
Council - between July 2009 and December 2010 to advance the KORUS FTA on behalf
of KITA. The lobbyists also contacted a Deputy USTRs Demetrios Marantis, the staff of
Congressman Kevin Brady and Congressman Howard Berman, whom they described as
especially important actors for moving the FTA forward. The details of lobbying reported
by Patton Boggs exhibit that promoting a bilateral exchange of information is an essential
role of foreign lobbying activities as I argue.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I examined how FTAs with the United States affect foreign actor’s lobby-
ing activities. I argue that foreign entities use lobbying to facilitate the bilateral exchange
of information with U.S. actors and to provide leverage in negotiations over FTAs. I demon-
strated that foreign actors engage in a higher number of lobbying activities at the final
negotiation stage of FTAs and maintain prolific lobbying activities until the FTAs fully
come into force. The impact of FTAs on lobbying patterns are salient for foreign govern-
mental entities, but not for foreign firms and interest groups. However, an enforced FTA
is not likely to significantly reduce lobbying activities - rather lobbying returns to a normal
level. The findings suggest that while foreign actors use lobbying to achieve FTAs, which
institutionalize liberal trade with the United States, the institutions do not diminish foreign
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actors’ need to lobby. That is, lobbying is a complementary instrument for foreign actors to
project influence on the bargaining of an agreement, but not a substitute to an international
institution.
This paper makes a few theoretical and empirical contributions. First, this research con-
tributes to the growing literature on foreign lobbying. By examining the association between
FTAs and lobbying activities, I study when foreign actors have a high incentive to partic-
ipate in lobbying. I suggest an important scope condition that the period of international
bargaining is the prime time we are likely to observe intense foreign lobbying activities. Sec-
ond, I introduce lobbying as a feasible strategy international actors can choose to influence
the design of the institutions. Rather than perceiving trade institutions and foreign lob-
bying as two separate channels for promoting liberal trade, I conceptualize lobbying as an
instrument for actors to affect the design of institution. By suggesting how actors can use
lobbying for negotiations, this paper speaks to the literature on international institutions as
well. Third, this paper makes a theoretical contribution to our understanding of the mecha-
nisms of lobbying. Although the empirical analyses are limited in testing the mechanism of
the relationship between FTAs and lobbying activities, I expand the information model of
lobbying by suggesting that (foreign) actors not only disseminate but also elicit information
during lobbying activities. The detailed lobbying reports filed under FARA add validity to
my argument that the bilateral exchange of information is a critical function of lobbying.
Fourth, my original Foreign Lobbying Dataset is a contribution of the paper. By classifying
lobbying activities by different types of actors, the data provides granular information on
the political activities diverse foreign entities undertake for issues relevant to trade with the
United States.
This research examined the influence of FTAs in encouraging the lobbying activities of
foreign governments, firms, and interest groups who aspire to successfully negotiate and
implement a trade agreement with the United States. While the paper focused on the
negotiation of trade institutions, the concept of lobbying as a complementary instrument
of bargaining can be applied in other issues areas. Also, the bilateral information model
of foreign lobbying has the potential to explain how lobbying works beyond the context of
trade.
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Appendix A Tables and Figures from Chapter 2
Figure A.1: Distribution of Lobbying Topics by Foreign Government Principals, 1971-2017
Figure A.2: Distribution of Lobbying Topics by Foreign Private Principals, 1971-2017
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Figure A.3: Expenses Used for Lobbying Activities Conducted in the United States by
Countries Around the World, 1971-1991
Figure A.4: Expenses Used for Lobbying Activities Conducted in the United States by
Countries Around the World, 1995-2017
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Table A.1: Top 20 Lobbying Countries for Trade Lobbying Activities
Cold War (Mean Number of Lobby-
ing Activities)
Post Cold War (Mean Number of
Lobbying Activities)
1 Japan (78.76) 1 Japan (35.30)
2 Soviet Union (42.57) 2 South Korea (15.70)
3 Canada (31.24) 3 Taiwan (11.91)
4 South Korea (24.81) 4 Canada (11.09)
5 Taiwan (16.48) 5 Hong Kong (8.83)
6 United Kingdom (14.76) 6 Mexico (7.78)
7 West Germany (13.95) 7 Germany (6.35)
8 Mexico (13.24) 8 United Kingdom (6.26)
9 France (9.57) 9 China (4.09)
10 Romania (8.67) 10 France (3.48)
11 Australia (8.38) 11 New Zealand (3.30)
12 Brazil (6.76) 12 Australia (3.26)
13 Hong Kong (6.67) 13 Colombia (3.09)
14 Colombia (5.14) 14 Jamaica (2.65)
15 Austria (5.00) 15 Ireland (2.61)
16 Netherlands (4.33) 16 Russia (2.57)
17 Poland (4.29) 17 Philippines (2.30)
18 Italy (4.00) 18 Spain (2.26)
19 Czechoslovakia (3.90) 18 Barbados (2.26)
20 China (3.76) 20 Angola (2.17)
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Table A.2: Top 20 Lobbying Countries for Security Lobbying Activities
Cold War (Mean Number of Lob-
bying Activities)
Post Cold War (Mean of Number
Lobbying Activities)
1 United Kingdom (3.43) 1 Saudi Arabia (2.70)
2 France (3.29) 2 Japan (2.13)
3 Italy (2.62) 3 United Kingdom (2.04)
4 West Germany (2.57) 4 Morocco (1.78)
5 Israel (1.95) 5 Canada (1.39)
6 Japan (1.38) 5 Qatar (1.30)
7 Egypt (1.29) 7 Israel (1.26)
8 Marshall Islands (1.00) 8 Pakistan (1.17)
9 Canada (0.95) 8 Georgia (1.17)
11 Switzerland (0.81) 10 Taiwan (1.09)
11 Angola (0.81) 10 Angola (1.09)
11 Oman (0.81) 12 Egypt (0.91)
13 United Arab Emirates (0.76) 13 Germany (0.83)
14 Sweden (0.67) 14 Philippines (0.78)
15 Soviet Union (0.62) 14 Iraq (0.78)
15 Turkey (0.62 ) 16 United Arab Emirates (0.74)
18 Taiwan (0.57) 16 Romania (0.74)
18 Nicaragua (0.57) 16 Macedonia (0.74)
18 Morocco (0.57) 16 Nagorno Karabakh (0.74)
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Appendix B Supplementary Item for Chapter 3
List of IGOs Used for Information on Memberships (Pevehouse et al., 2019)
1. ACP-EU Joint Assembly (ACPEU)
2. Administrative Center for Social Security for Rhine Boatmen (ACSSRB)
3. Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL)
4. African and Malagasy Council for Higher Education (CAMES)
5. African and Malagasy Sugar Council (AMSC)
6. African Civil Service Observatory (ACSO)
7. African Cultural Institute (ACI)/African and Maritanian Cultural Institute
8. African Development Bank (AfDB)
9. African Export Import Bank (AFEXIMB)
10. African Foundation for Research and Development (AFRAND)
11. African Fund for Guarantee and Economic Cooperation (AFGEC)
12. African Groundnut Council (AGC)
13. African Intellectual Property Organization (AIPO)
14. African Malagasy Coffee Organization (AMCO)
15. African Ministers’ Council on Water (AMCOW)
16. African Oil Palm Development Association (AFROPDA)
17. African Organization of Cartography and Remote Sensing (SOCRS)
18. African Petroleum Producers Association (APPA)
19. African Postal and Telecommunications Union (APTU)
20. African Postal Union (AFPU)
21. African Regional Industrial Property Organization (ARIPO)
22. African Reinsurance Corporation (AFRICA RE/Africare)
23. African School of Architecture and Town Planning (ASATP)
24. African Standing Conference on Bibliographic Control (ASCBC)
25. African Timber Organization (ATO)
26. African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP)
27. African Legal Support Facility (ALSF)
28. Afro-Asian Rural Reconstruction Organization (AARO)
29. Afro-Malagasy Industrial Property Office (AMIPO)
30. Afro-Malagasy Postal and Telecommunications Union/African Posts and Telecommunications
Union (AMPTU)
31. Afro-Malagasy Union (Common Afro-Malagasy Economic Organization)(OCAM)
32. Agence de La Francophonie (ACCT)
33. Agency for International Trade Information and Cooperation (AITIC)
34. Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL)
35. Agency for the Safety of Aerial Navigation in Africa and Mdagascar (ASECNA)
36. Agreement for cooperation in dealing with pollution of the Northe Sea (Bonn Agreement)
37. Amazonian Cooperation Council (AmCC)
38. American Committee on Dependent Territories (ACDT)
39. Andean Common Market (ANCOM/Andean)
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40. Andean Parliament (AP)
41. Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development (AAAID)
42. Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (ABEDA)
43. Arab Centre for Medical Literature (ACML)
44. Arab Cooperation Council (ACC)
45. Arab Federation for Technical Education (AFTE)
46. Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD)
47. Arab Gulf Programme for United Nations Development Organizations (AGPUNDO)
48. Arab Industrial Development and Mining Organization (AIDO)
49. Arab Investment Company (AIC)
50. Arab Labour Organization (ALO)
51. Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)
52. Arab Monetary Fund (AMF)
53. Arab Organization for Agricultural Development (AOAD)
54. Arab Organization for Mineral Resources (AOMR)
55. Arab Postal Union/Arab Permanent Postal Commission (ARPU/APPC)
56. Arctic Council (ArticC)
57. Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF)
58. Asian and Pacific Coconut Community (APCC)
59. Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC)
60. Asian Clearing Union (ACU)
61. Asian Development Bank (AsDB)
62. Asian Industrial Development Council (AIDC)
63. Asian Productivity Organization (APO)
64. Asian Reinsurance Corporation (ARC)
65. Asian Vegetable Research and Development Center (AVRDC)
66. Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee (AALCO)
67. Asian-Oceanic Postal Union/Asian-Pacific Postal Union (AOPU)
68. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
69. Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development (APIBD)
70. Asia-Pacific Telecommunity (APT)
71. Association between the European Economic Community and the Partner States of the East
African Community (ABEPSEAC)
72. Association of African Central Banks (AACB)
73. Association of African Tax Administrators (AATA)
74. Association of African Trade Promotion Organizations (AATPO)
75. Association of Caribbean States (ACS)
76. Association of Financial Supervisors of Pacific Countries (AFSPC)
77. Association of Iron Ore Exporting Countries (AIOEC)
78. Association of Natural Rubber Producing Countries (ASCRubber)
79. Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
80. Association of Supervisors of Banks of Latin American and the Caribbean (ASBLAC)
81. Association of Tin Producing Countries (ATPC)
82. Baltic Council (BC)
83. Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT)
84. Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
85. Bank of the South (BS)
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86. Banque internationale d’information sur les Etats francophones (BIISEF)
87. Bay of Bengal Programme Inter-Governmental Organization (BOBP)
88. Benelux Organization for Intellectual Property (BORGIP)
89. Benelux Economic Union (BENELUX)
90. BioNET INTERNATIONAL - Global Network for Biosystematics (BIONET)
91. Board of Nordic DEvelopment Projects (BNDP)
92. British Commonwealth Scientific Committee/Commonwealth Science Council (BCSC)
93. CAB International (CABI)
94. Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF)
95. Caribbean Commission/Anglo-American Caribbean Commission (CComm)
96. Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
97. Caribbean Development Bank (CDB)
98. Caribbean Examinations Council (CXC)
99. Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF)
100. Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA)
101. Caribbean Organization (Corg)
102. Caribbean Postal Union (CPU)
103. Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC)
104. Central American Coffee Board (CACB)
105. Central American Energy Commission (CAEC)
106. Central American Institute for Public Administration (CAIPA)
107. Central American Integration System (SICA)
108. Central American Monetary Stabilization Fund (CAMSF)
109. Central American Research Institute for Industry (CARII)
110. Central and Eastern European Privatization Network (CEEPN)
111. Central Asian Economic Community (CAECC)
112. Central Bureau for the International 1:1,000,000 Map of the World (CBI)
113. Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine (CCNR)
114. Central Compensation Office of the Maghreb (CCOM)
115. Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA)
116. Central European Initiative (CEI)
117. Central Office for International Railway Transport (OTIF)
118. Central Pan American Bureau of Eugenics and Homiculture (CPAB)
119. Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)
120. Centre for Marketing Information and Advisory Services for Fishery/INFOSAMAK (INFSMK)
121. Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN)
122. Cocoa Producers Alliance (CCPA)
123. Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
124. Comite Regional de Sanidad Vegetal del Cono Sur (COSAVE)
125. Commission for International Financial Control in Macedonia (CIFC)
126. Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara (CTCAf)
127. Commission of the Chad Basin/Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC)
128. Common Fund for Commodities (CFC)
129. Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
130. Commonwealth Advisory Aeronautical Research Council (CAARC)
131. Commonwealth Agricultural Bureau/Imperial Agricultural Bureau (ComAB)
132. Commonwealth Air Transport Council (CATC)
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133. Commonwealth Economic Committee (CEC)
134. Commonwealth Education Liaison Commitee (CELC)
135. Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
136. Commonwealth Secretariat (ComSec)
137. Commonwealth Telecommunications Board (CTO)
138. Communaute economique et monetaire d’Afrique centrale (CEMAC)
139. Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPSC)
140. Concerted Action for African Development (CAAD)
141. Conference interafricaine des marchs d’assurances (CIMA)
142. Conference des ministres de la jeunesse et des sports des pays (CONFEJES)
143. Conference of African Ministers Responsible for Sustainable (CAMRSD)
144. Conference of Heads of State of Equatorial Africa (CHSTEA)
145. Conference of Ministers of Agriculture of West and Central Africa (CMAOC)
146. Conference of Posts and Telecommunications Administrations of Central Africa (COPTAC)
147. Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures (CICA)
148. Conferencia de Autoridades Cinematogrficas de Iberoamerica (CACI)
149. Congo Basin Forest Partnership (CBFP)
150. Convenio Andrs Bello de integraci n educativa, cientfica y cultural (CAB)
151. Council for Mutual Economic Aid (CMEA)
152. Council for Technical Cooperation in South and Southeast Asia (COLOMBO)
153. Council of Europe (COE)
154. Council of Ministers for Asian Economic Cooperation (CMAEC)
155. Council of Ministers of Health of the Arab States of the Gulf (CMHASG)
156. Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS)
157. Council of the Entente/Entente Council (Entente)
158. Danube Commission (Danube)
159. Desert Locust Control Organization for East Africa (DLCOEA)
160. Developing 8 Organization for Economic Cooperation (D8)
161. Development Bank of the Great Lakes States (DBGLS)
162. East African Common Market (EACM)
163. East African Common Services Organization (EACSO)
164. East African Development Bank (EADB)
165. East Caribbean Common Market (ECCM)
166. Eastern Caribbean Currency Area (ECCA)
167. Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB)
168. Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
169. Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL)
170. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
171. Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO)
172. Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
173. Empire Marketing Board (EMB)
174. Eurasian Patent Organization (EAPO)
175. Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC)
176. Euro Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)
177. European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization (EMPPO)
178. European Association of National Metrology Institute (EURAMET)
179. European Atomic Energy Commission (EURATOM)
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180. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
181. European Central Bank (ECB)
182. European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
183. European Collaboration on Measurement Standards (EUROMET)
184. European Commission for the Control of Foot and Mouth Disease (EUFMD)
185. European Commission for Control of the Danube (EcCD)
186. European Company for the Chemical Processing of Irradiated Fuels (ECCPIF)
187. European Company for the Financing of Railway Rolling Stock (EUROFIMA)
188. European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (ECPTA)
189. European Food Code Council (EFCC)
190. European Customs Union Study Group/World Customs Organization (WCO)
191. European Economic Community/European Community (EEC)
192. European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working (EFILWC)
193. European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
194. European Institute for Peace (EIP)
195. European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA)
196. European Investment Bank (EIB)
197. European Molecular Biology Conference (EMBC)
198. European Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL)
199. European Monetary Institute (EMI)
200. European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN)
201. European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL)
202. European Patent Office/European Patent Organization (EPO)
203. European payments Union (EPU)
204. European Postal Financial Services Commission (EPFPSC)
205. European Productivity Agency (EPA)
206. European Southern Observatory (ESO)
207. European Space Agency (ESA)
208. European Space Research Organization (ESRO)
209. European Space Vehicle Launcher Development Organization (ELDO)
210. European Training Foundation (ETF)
211. European Union (EU)
212. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
213. Far East Commission (FEC)
214. Fund for the Development of the Indigenous Peoples of Latin America (FDIPLAC)
215. Gambia River Basin Development Organization (OMVG)
216. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
217. General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration (SIECA)
218. Global Environment Facility (GEF)
219. Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI)
220. Group of Fifteen (G-15)
221. Group of Latin American and Caribbean Sugar Exporting Countries (GLASCSEC)
222. Group of Schengen (SCHENGEN)
223. Group of Temperate Southern Hemisphere Countries on the Environment (VALDIVA)
224. Group of Three (G-3)
225. Group on Earth Observations (GEO)
226. Group on the Balkan Agreement on Cooperation on Tourism (GBACT)
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227. Guidance Committee for Road Safety in the Nordic Countries (GCRSNC)
228. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
229. Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting (GOIC)
230. Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCPIL)
231. Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB)
232. Ibero-American Office of Education, Science and Culture (IABE)
233. Imperial Defense Committee (IDC)
234. Imperial Institute of Entomology (IIE)
235. Imperial Mycological Institute (IMI)
236. Imperial War Graves Commission/Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC)
237. Indian Ocean Commission (IOCom)
238. Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IORARC)
239. Indo-Pacific Fisheries Coucil/Asia Pacific Fishery Commission (APFIC)
240. Institute of Nutrition for Central America and Panama (INCAP)
241. Inter-African Committee on Statistics (IACS)
242. Inter-African Phytosanitary Convention (IAPhy)
243. Inter-Allied Reparation Agency (IARA)
244. Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission (IARHC)
245. Inter-American Children’s Institute (IACI)
246. Inter-American Coffee Board (IACB)
247. Inter-American Commission of Women (IACW)
248. Inter-American Conference on Social Security (IACSS)
249. Inter-American Defense Board (IADefB)
250. Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)
251. Inter-American Federation of Cotton (IAFC)
252. Inter-American High Commission (IAHC)
253. Inter-American Indian Institute (IAII)
254. Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Science (IAIAS)
255. Inter-American Investment Corporation (IAIC)
256. Inter-American Radio Office (IARadiO)
257. Inter-American Trademark Bureau (IATB)
258. Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC)
259. Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation (IAIGC)
260. Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
261. Intergovernmental Bureau for Informatics (IBI)
262. Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration/International Organization for Migra-
tion (IOMig)
263. Intergovernmental Committee of the River Plate Basin Countries (ICRPBC)
264. Intergovernmental Copyright Committee (IGCC)
265. Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (ICCEC)
266. Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary (G24)
267. Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOcC)
268. Intergovernmental Organization for Marketing Information and Technical Advisory Services for
Fishery Products in the Asia and Pacific Region (INFOFISH)
269. Intergovernmental TV and Radio Corporation (ITVRC)
270. Intergovernmental University of Cooperation (IUIC)
271. Interim Committee for Coordination of Investigatios of the Lower Mekong Basin (ICCILMB)
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272. International Advisory Committee for Long Distance Telephony (IALong)
273. International African Migratory Locust Organization (IAMLO)
274. International Arbitration Tribunal at San Jose (IATSJ)
275. International Association for Public Baths and Cleanliness (IABath)
276. International Association of Seismology (IAS)
277. International Association of Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions (IASAJ)
278. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
279. International Authority for the Ruhr (IARuhr)
280. International Bank for Economic Cooperation (IBEC)
281. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank (IBRD)
282. International Bauxite Association (IBA)
283. International Bureau for Information and Enquiries regarding Relief to Foreigners (IBIER)
284. International Bureau for the Protection of the Moselle against Pollution (IBPMP)
285. International Bureau for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution (ICPRP)
286. International Bureau of Commercial Statistics (IBCS)
287. International Bureau of Education (IBE)
288. International Bureau of Weights and Measures (BIPM)
289. International center for the Study of the Preservation and the Restoration of Cultural Property
(ICCROM)
290. International Central American Office (ICAmO)
291. International Centre for Food Mico-Algae Against Malnutrition (ICFAM)
292. International Chemistry Office (IChemO)
293. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
294. International Civil Defence Organization (ICivDO)
295. International cocoa Organization (ICCO)
296. International Coffee Organization (ICfO)
297. International Commission for the Decennial Revision of the Nomenclature of the Causes of
Death (ICDR)
298. International Commission for the Hydrology of the Rhine Basin (ICHRB)
299. International Commission for the Navigation of the Congo (ICNC)
300. International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheris (ICNWAF)
301. Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO)
302. International Commission for the Oder (IComO)
303. International Commission for the Scientific Exploration of the Mediterranean Sea (ICSE)
304. International Commission for the Southeast Atlantic Fisheries (ICSEAF)
305. International Commission of Agricultural Industries/International Commission for Food Indus-
tries (ICAI)
306. International Commission of the Cape Spartel Light in Tangier (ICCSLT)
307. International Commission on Civil Status (ICCS)
308. International Commission on the Teaching of Mathematics (ICTM)
309. International Committee of Military Medicine and Pharmacy (ICMMP)
310. International Conference for Promoting Technical Unification on the Railways (ICPTU)
311. International Cooper Study Group (ICSG)
312. International Coral Reef Initiative (ICRI)
313. International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC)
314. International Council for The Exploration of the Sea (ICES)
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315. International Criminal Police Commission/International Criminal Police Organization/ICPO
(INTERPOL)
316. International Criminal Court (ICC)
317. International Elbe Commission (IEC)
318. International Energy Agency (IEA)
319. International Exchange Service (IES)
320. International Exhibition Bureau (IEXB)
321. International Finance Commission at Athens (IFCA)
322. International Finance Corporation (IFC)
323. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
324. International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (AralSea)
325. International Hydrographic Bureau/International Hydrographic Organization (IHO)
326. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT)
327. International Institute for Water and Environment Engineering (IIWEE)
328. International Institute of Agriculture (IIA)
329. International Institute of Commerce (IICom)
330. International Institute of Refrigeration (IIF)
331. International Jute Organization (IJO)
332. International Labour Organization (ILO)
333. International Lead and Zinc Study Group (ILZSG)
334. International Maritime Bureau Against Slave Trade (IMBSlav)
335. International Maritime Organization (IMO)
336. International Mobile Satellite Organization (IMSO)
337. International Monetary Fund (IMF)
338. International Moselle Company (IMC)
339. International Natural Rubber Organization (INRO)
340. International Nickel Study Group (INSG)
341. International North Pacific Fisheries Commission (INPFC)
342. International Office of Epizootics (IOEz)
343. International Office of Public Hygiene (IOPH)
344. International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds 1971 and 1992 (IOPCF)
345. International Olive Oil Council (IOOC)
346. International Organization for Legal Metrology (IOLM)
347. International Patent Institute (IPI)
348. International Pedological Institute (IPedI)
349. International Penitentiary Commission (IPentC)
350. International Pepper Community (IPC)
351. International Physiological Laboratories on Monte-Rosa (IPhyL)
352. International Prize Court (IPrizeC)
353. International Red Locust Control Services (IRLCS)
354. International Refugee Organization (IRO)
355. International Regional Organization against Plant and Animal Diseases/International Regional
Organization for Plant Protection and Animal Health (RIOPPAH)
356. International Relief Union (IRU)
357. International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)
358. International Rubber Study Group (IRSG)
359. International Sava River Basin Commission (ISRBC)
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360. International Seabed Authority (ISA)
361. International Secretariat for the Unification of Pharmacological Terms (ISUPT)
362. International Sugar Council (ISuC)
363. International Tea Promotion Association (ITPA)
364. International Technical Committee of Legal Experts on Air Questions (ITCLE)
365. International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
366. International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT)
367. International Telegraph Consultative Committee (ITCC)
368. International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor International Fusion Energy Organization
(IIFEO)
369. International Tin Council (ITC)
370. International Tripartite Rubber Organization, Thailand (ITRO)
371. International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO)
372. International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property (IUPIP)
373. International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs (IUPCT)
374. International Union of Pruth (IUPR)
375. International Vine and Wine Office (IVWO)
376. International Whaling Commission (IWhale)
377. International Wheat Advisory Committe/International Grains Council (IGC)
378. International Wool Study Group (IWSG)
379. Interoceanmetal (Iocean)
380. Inter-State Bank (ISB)
381. Inter-State Organization for Advanced Technicians of Hydraulics and Rural Equipment (IOATHRE)
382. Inter-State School of Hydraulic and Rural Engineering for Senior Technicians (ISHREST)
383. Islamic Development Bank (ISDB)
384. Joint Administration of the Turkic Culture and Arts (Turksoy)
385. Joint Anti-Locust and Anti-Aviarian Organization (JALAAO)
386. Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR)
387. Joint Nordic Organization for Lappish Culture and Reindeer Husbandry (JNOLCRH)
388. Latin American Center for Physics (LACP)
389. Latin American Civil Aviation Commission (LACAC)
390. Latin American Economic System (SELA)
391. Latin American Educational Film Institute/Latin American Institute of Educational Commu-
nication (LAIEC)
392. Latin American Energy Organization (LAEO)
393. Latin American Fisheries Development Organization (LAFDO)
394. Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA)
395. Latin American Integration Association (LAIA)
396. Latin Union (LATIN)
397. League of Arab States (LOAS)
398. League of Nations (LoN)
399. Liptako-Gourma Integrated Development Authority (LGIDA)
400. Mano River Union (MRU)
401. Maritime Analysis and Operation Centro-Narcotics (MAOCN)
402. Mediterranean Water Network (MWN)
403. Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative (MARRI)
404. Ministerial Conference of West and Central African States on Maritime (MCWCASM)
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405. Multi-Country Posts and Telecommunications Training Centre (MCPTTC)
406. Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
407. Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)
408. Network of Aquaculture Centres in Asia-Pacific (NACAP)
409. Niger River Commission/Niger Basin Authority (NRC)
410. Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
411. Nordic Centre for Welfare and Social Issues (NVC)
412. Nordic Council (NordC)
413. Nordic Council for Tax Research (NCTR)
414. Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM)
415. Nordic Development Fund (NDF)
416. Nordic Economic Research Council (NERC)
417. Nordic Investment Bank (NIB)
418. Nordic Patent Institute (NPI)
419. Nordic Telecommunications Satellite council (NTSC)
420. Nordic World Heritage Foundation (NWHF)
421. North American Plant Protection Organization (NAPPO)
422. North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission (NPAFC)
423. North Pacific Fur Seal Commission (NPFSC)
424. North Pacific Marine Science Organization (PICES)
425. Northeast Atlantic Fisheries COmmission (NEAFC)
426. Observatoire conomique et statistique d’Afrique subsaharienne (AFRISTAT)
427. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
428. Organization for African Unity (OAU)
429. African Union (AU)
430. Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)
431. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
432. Organization for the Collaboration of Railways/Organization of Railways Cooperation (OCR)
433. Organization for the Management and Development of the Kagera River (OMDKR)
434. Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)
435. Organization of Black sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
436. Organization of Central American States (OCAS)
437. Organization of Coordination for the Control of Endemic Diseases in central Africa (OC-
CEDCA)
438. Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)
439. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
440. Organization of The Islamic Conference (OIC)
441. Oslo Commission (OSLO)
442. OSAPR Commission (OSPAR)
443. Pacific Cable Board (PCB)
444. Pan-African Parliament (PAP)
445. Pan American Institute of Geography and History (PAIGH)
446. Pan American Sanitary Bureau (PAHO)
447. Pan American Union (OAS)
448. Pan African Postal Union (PAPU)
449. Paris Commission (PC)
450. Partners in Population and Development- A South-South Initiative (PIPD)
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451. Permanent Association of Pan American Highway Congresses (PAHC)
452. Permanent Commission for the Conservation of the Maritime Resources of the South Pa-
cific/Permanent Commission for the South Pacific (PCSP)
453. Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)
454. Permanent International Association of Road Congresses/World Road Association (PIARC)
455. Permanent International Bureau of the Analytical Chemistry of Human and Animal Food
(PIBAC)
456. Permanent International Commission of Studies on Sanitary Equipment (PICS)
457. Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS)
458. Permanent Secretariat of the South American Agreement on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances (PSNARCO)
459. Pole europeen de developpement (PED)
460. Port Management Association of Eastern and Southern Africa (PMAESA)
461. Postal Union of the Americas, Spain, and Portugal (PUASP)
462. Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States (PTASE)
463. Radiotelegraph Union (RadioU)
464. Regional African Satellite Communications Organization (RASCOM)
465. Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons (RESCA)
466. Regional Commonwealth in the Field of Communications (RCFC)
467. Regional Cooperation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science (ARCAL)
468. Regional Cooperation Council (RCC)
469. Regional Council for Adult Education and Literacy in Africa (RCAELA)
470. Reparation Commission (RepCom)
471. Reserve internationale maritime en mediterranee occidentale (RIMMO)
472. Rio Group (RIOgroup)
473. Scientific Council for Africa South of the Sahara (SCAf)
474. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)
475. Secretariat of the Commission for East African Cooperation (EAC)
476. Senegal River Development Organization (SRDO)
477. Societe arabe des mines de l’Inchiri (SAMI)
478. South and West Asia Postal Union (SWAPU)
479. South Asia Cooperative Environment Programme (SACEP)
480. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
481. South Investment, Trade and Technological Data Exchange Centre (SITTDEC)
482. South Pacific Commission/Secretariat of the Pacific Commission (SPC)
483. South Pacific Forun (PIF)
484. Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO)
485. Southern Africa Regional Tourism Council (SARTC)
486. Southern African Customs Union (SACU)
487. Southern African Development Community (SADC)
488. Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)
489. Southern Common Market (Mercosur)
490. Southwest Pacific Dialogue (SWPD)
491. Special Arab Aid Fund for Africa (SAAFA)
492. Suez Canal Administration (SCA)
493. Sugar Union (SugU)
494. Superior Council of Health (SCH)
108
495. Triparite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold (TCRMG)
496. Union conomique et mon taire Ouest africaine (UEMOA)
497. Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants/International Union of the Protections of
New Varieties of Plants (IUPNVP)
498. Union montaire de l’Afrique centrale (UMAC)
499. Union of Banana Exporting Countries (UBEC)
500. Union of the Mediterranean (UM)
501. United Arab Shipping Company (UASC)
502. United Kingdom–Dominion Wool Disposals (UKDWD)
503. United Nations (UN)
504. United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
505. United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
506. Universal Postal Union (UPU)
507. University of the South Pacific (USP)
508. Vision and Strategies around the Baltic Sea 2010 (VASAB)
509. Warsaw Treaty Organization (WPact)
510. Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and
Technologies (Wassen)
511. West Africa Rice Development Association (AfricaRice)
512. West African Economic Community (CEAO)
513. West African Examinations Council (WAEC)
514. West African Health Community (WAHC)
515. West African Health Community (WAHO)
516. West African Monetary Union (UMOA)
517. Western European Union (WEU)
518. West-Nordic Foundation (WNF)
519. World Meteorological Organization (WMO)
520. Working Community of the Danube Countries (WCDC)
521. World Health Organization (WHO)
522. World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
523. World Tourism Organization (WTOURO)
524. World Trade Organization (WTO)
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Table C.1: Effects of FTAs on Trade Lobbying Expenses $
(1) (2) (3)
Trade Lobby $ Public Trade Lobby $ Private Trade Lobby $
FTA Signed 0.739∗ 1.251∗∗∗ 0.252
(0.314) (0.354) (0.418)
FTA Signed-1 0.822∗∗ 1.269∗∗∗ 0.128
(0.315) (0.338) (0.444)
FTA Signed-2 0.318 0.513 -0.436
(0.367) (0.391) (0.459)
FTA Signed-3 0.304 0.396 -0.455
(0.356) (0.373) (0.495)
FTA Interval 0.488 1.168∗∗∗ 0.117
(0.276) (0.334) (0.350)
Active FTA 0.326 1.111∗∗∗ -0.330
(0.250) (0.310) (0.357)
Alliance 0.992 0.000 0.000
(1.236) (.) (.)
Joint IGO Memberships 3.516 4.270 0.379
(2.280) (2.978) (2.947)
ln Trade Volume 0.590∗∗∗ 0.260 0.942∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.186) (0.236)
ln GDP p.c. 0.135 -0.188 0.602
(0.364) (0.546) (0.534)
Democracy -0.135 -0.783∗∗ 0.167
(0.229) (0.290) (0.352)
Trade Lobby$ t−1 0.033∗∗∗
(0.009)
Trade Lobby$ t−2 0.000
(0.010)
Trade Lobby$ t−3 0.002
(0.009)
Non-Trade Lobby$ -0.690∗∗∗
(0.040)
Public Trade Lobby$ t−1 0.020∗
(0.010)
Public Trade Lobby$ t−2 0.006
(0.011)
Public Trade Lobby$ t−3 -0.030∗∗
(0.011)
Non-Trade Public Lobby$ -0.626∗∗∗
(0.052)
Private Trade Lobby$ t−1 0.038∗∗
(0.013)
Private Trade Lobby$ t−2 -0.012
(0.013)
Private Trade Lobby$ t−3 0.038∗∗
(0.013)
Non-Trade Private Lobby $ -0.677∗∗∗
(0.053)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant 4.336 10.065 -1.658
(3.750) (5.311) (5.745)
Observations 858 513 538
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 111
Table C.2: Effects of Failed FTAs on the Number of Trade Lobbying Activities #
(1) (2)
Trade Lobby # Trade Lobby #
TTIP Negotiation -0.154
(0.207)
TPP Negotiation 0.262
(0.160)
Alliance 0.524 0.504
(0.485) (0.486)
Joint IGO Memberships 2.768∗ 2.720∗
(1.104) (1.107)
ln Trade Volume 0.223∗ 0.219∗
(0.092) (0.092)
ln GDP p.c. 0.368 0.424
(0.221) (0.221)
Democracy -0.499∗∗∗ -0.510∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.147)
Trade Lobby# t−1 0.026∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Trade Lobby# t−2 -0.002 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005)
Trade Lobby# t−3 -0.012∗ -0.011∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Non-Trade Lobby# 0.007 0.007
(0.005) (0.005)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 2018 2018
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table C.3: Effects of FTAs on the Number of Trade Lobbying Activities #, Random Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Trade Lobby # Public Trade Lobby # Private Trade Lobby #
FTA Signed 0.957∗∗∗ 1.364∗∗∗ 0.461∗
(0.158) (0.239) (0.233)
FTA Signed-1 0.763∗∗∗ 1.339∗∗∗ 0.237
(0.156) (0.234) (0.229)
FTA Signed-2 0.408∗ 0.777∗∗ 0.197
(0.179) (0.287) (0.237)
FTA Signed-3 0.136 0.601 -0.131
(0.197) (0.311) (0.262)
FTA Interval 0.683∗∗∗ 1.047∗∗∗ 0.245
(0.135) (0.228) (0.177)
Active FTA -0.045 0.173 -0.261
(0.135) (0.215) (0.181)
Alliance 0.289 0.347 0.117
(0.175) (0.228) (0.284)
Joint IGO Memberships 2.705∗∗∗ 3.528∗∗ 1.781
(0.697) (1.152) (0.978)
ln Trade Volume 0.454∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.056) (0.077)
ln GDP p.c. -0.005 -0.066 0.035
(0.079) (0.102) (0.124)
Democracy -0.348∗∗ -0.519∗∗ -0.148
(0.124) (0.173) (0.184)
Trade Lobby# t−1 0.021∗∗∗
(0.005)
Trade Lobby# t−2 -0.003
(0.005)
Trade Lobby# t−3 -0.010
(0.005)
Non-Trade Lobby# 0.006
(0.005)
Public Trade Lobby# t−1 0.136∗∗∗
(0.022)
Public Trade Lobby# t−2 0.013
(0.025)
Public Trade Lobby# t−3 -0.008
(0.023)
Public Non-Trade Lobby# 0.023
(0.018)
Private Trade Lobby# t−1 0.037∗∗∗
(0.009)
Private Trade Lobby# t−2 -0.010
(0.008)
Private Trade Lobby# t−3 -0.014
(0.008)
Private Non-Trade Lobby# 0.004
(0.007)
Country Fixed Effects No No No
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant -4.981∗∗∗ -4.651∗∗∗ -6.725∗∗∗
(0.664) (0.961) (0.989)
Observations 2528 2528 2528
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 113
Table C.4: Effects of FTAs on the Number of Trade Lobbying Activities #, More Years
(1) (2)
Trade Lobby # Trade Lobby $
FTA Signed 0.991∗∗∗ 2.758∗∗
(0.183) (1.009)
FTA Signed-1 0.800∗∗∗ 3.500∗∗∗
(0.181) (1.003)
FTA Signed-2 0.441∗ -0.942
(0.200) (1.000)
FTA Signed-3 0.171 -0.509
(0.214) (1.016)
FTA Signed-4 0.157 0.013
(0.198) (1.010)
FTA Signed-5 0.105 0.748
(0.210) (1.004)
FTA Interval 0.705∗∗∗ 1.357
(0.159) (0.877)
Active FTA 0.023 -0.159
(0.168) (0.730)
Alliance 0.584 -0.386
(0.483) (0.587)
Joint IGO Memberships 2.658∗ 8.155∗
(1.112) (3.769)
ln Trade Volume 0.318∗∗∗ 0.154
(0.093) (0.146)
ln GDP p.c. 0.256 1.206∗
(0.220) (0.507)
Democracy -0.536∗∗∗ -0.533
(0.149) (0.310)
Trade Lobby# t−1 0.021∗∗∗
(0.005)
Trade Lobby# t−2 -0.003
(0.005)
Trade Lobby# t−3 -0.009
(0.005)
Non-Trade Lobby# 0.006
(0.005)
Trade Lobby$ t−1 0.303∗∗∗
(0.017)
Trade Lobby$ t−2 0.071∗∗∗
(0.018)
Trade Lobby$ t−3 0.013
(0.017)
Non-Trade Lobby$ -0.450∗∗∗
(0.014)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Constant -11.279∗
(5.258)
Observations 2018 2528
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix D The Foreign Lobbying Dataset (FOLD) Veresion 1.0 Codebook
D.1 Introduction
The Foreign Lobbying Dataset (FOLD) Version 1.0 provides information on the lobby-
ing activities conducted in the United States by foreign entities, such as foreign govern-
ments, firms, interest groups, and individuals, from 1971 to 2017, with the exception of
1992-1994. I used the Department of Justice’s Reports to Congress on foreign lobbying, sub-
mitted under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) of 1938 to construct the dataset.
The original foreign lobbying reports, dating back to 1942, are available at FARA website
(https://www.justice.gov/nsd-fara).
My dataset is compiled from FARA’s lobbying reports from 1971 to 2017, with the
exception of 1992-1994 during which period no reports are available at all. Based on the
lobbying reports, I code (1) the total number of lobbying activities, (2) the number of
lobbying activities classified by topic (e.g., trade, security, etc.), type of lobbying entities
(e.g. government or private), and by tactic (e.g., contact, advice, etc.), (3) the total amount
of lobbying expenses, and (4) the amount of lobbying expenses by type of lobbying entities.
The unit of analysis is at the country-year level.
Between 1971-2017, foreign actors from more than 200 countries engaged in 52,912 lob-
bying activities in the United States. The Foreign Lobbying Dataset (FOLD) records 9,517
observations. This codebook introduces the source of my dataset and explains how I used the
source to construct the dataset. I also provide the rules of coding along with the definition
of variables.
D.2 Use of FARA Reports
Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 requires all U.S. lobbying agents (i.e., foreign
agents) who are employed by foreign entities such as governments, firms, interest groups, and
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individuals (i.e., foreign principals) to register with the Department of Justice. Lobbying
agents must disclose the information on the profile of foreign principals and themselves, the
description of lobbying activities, and optionally the expenses spent by foreign principals for
lobbying. The Department of Justice (the Attorney General) has been periodically reporting
to the Congress about the lobbying activities representing foreign interests since 1942. I use
the the Department of Justice’s Reports to Congress submitted for years 1971-2017 as the
source to construct my dataset.
Reports to Congress provide information on foreign principals and lobbying agents. I
use the name of foreign principals to distinguish lobbying activities by foreign governmental
actors and non-governmental ones.1 I define lobbying activities by governmental actors as
foreign public lobbying and those by non-governmental entities as foreign private lobbying. I
analyze the text of the items describing the lobbying activities, such as the nature of services,
activities, and political propaganda, to determine the topic of each lobbying incident.
One of the difficulties of compiling an original dataset from the FARA reports was the in-
consistency in the report formats. While the Department of Justice published annual reports
until 1995, it started submitting semi-annual reports (two reports a year) to the Congress
since 1996. Due to the semi-annual reports, lobbying which has continued throughout a year
appears in both June and December reports and causes the problem of double-counting.2 To
keep the unit of analysis consistently at the country-year level, I use the text-mining package
of R software to estimate the similarity among lobbying incidents documented in June and
December reports, identify the same, continuing incidents, and count the twice-appearing
incidents as one lobbying case. Indices such as foreign principal’s name and country of
origin, American agent’s name and unique numeric identifier3, and the nature of lobbying
service were used to match identical lobbying incidents. However, even when I collapse the
identical lobbying activities, I take the sum of expenses recorded in the June and Decem-
ber reports; since dropping the expense for one of the double-counted incidents without
1I use the term “foreign principal” and “foreign actor” interchangeably.
2For example, if a foreign principal A hired an agent B for the entire year of 1996, that is counted as two
lobbying cases. However, such case will be recorded as one lobbying case in 1995 as only one annual report
was published in that year.
3Each lobbying agent is assigned a numeric code.
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consideration will incorrectly code only half of the money spent.4 By doing so, I address
the problem of double-counting the number of lobbying incidents and the potential problem
of under-reporting the expenses at the same time. For the period between 1988-1991, the
Department of Justice published a single report covering lobbying activities that took place
during four years. FARA reports denote whether a particular principal or agent terminated
its registration with the Department of Justice. I used the termination record of principals
and agents to detect in which year(s) during 1988-1991 a lobbying incident took place.5 None
of FARA reports are provided for 1992-1994, which is the major transition period for interna-
tional relations caused by the end of the Cold War. Due to the unique nature of this period,
I do not think the foreign lobbying reports of these years are missing at random. It is also
uncertain if the patterns of lobbying activities in this transition period are similar to those
of the Cold War or those of the Post-Cold War era. Therefore, rather than implementing
multiple imputation method to yield possible lobbying incidents that might have occurred,
I leave the years 1992-1994 as missing data. Table D.1 summarizes the format and contents
of FARA reports over time. I classify the lobbying activities to two main time periods, (a)
during the Cold War era (1971-1991) and (b) the Post-Cold War era (1995-2017).
D.3 Coding Rules
To classify lobbying activities at the disaggregated level, I consult foreign principal’s
name, the nature of service, the description of lobbying activities and the political propa-
ganda.6 The classifications are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive.
4For example, if a foreign principal A hired an agent B and paid $1000 for a particular lobbying incident
in January-June 2017 and $1500 in July-December, I code 1 for the number of lobbying incident and $2500
for the expenses. If I entirely drop the information in the December report for collapsing, I would erroneously
code the case as one lobbying incident where $1000 was spent.
5For example, if a lobbying incident does not have information on the termination of principal and agent,
the lobbying is coded to have occurred during all four years from 1988 to 1991. However, when FARA
reports record the termination of principal or agent in 1990, that lobbying incident is coded to have taken
place in three years, in 1988, 1989, and 1990. If either an agent or principal reported the termination of
registration to the Department of Justice in 1990, the agent or principal cannot engage in lobbying in 1991,
but the entitiy might maintain the lobbying activity in 1990.
6I refer to foreign principal’s name as well because sometimes more detailed contents such as the nature
of service or the description of activities are missing. However, even in those cases, if the foreign principal is
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Table D.1: Department of Justice FARA Reports
Time Contents Publication
1971-1977 foreign principal’s country, name,
and termination; foreign agent’s
name, address, unique numeric
identifier, and termination; na-
ture of service
annual
1978-1987 foreign principal’s country, name,
and termination; foreign agent’s
name, address, numeric identi-
fier, and termination; activities;
finance
annual
1988-1991 foreign principal’s country, name,
and termination; foreign agent’s
name, address, numeric identi-
fier, and termination; activities;
finance; political propaganda
four-years com-
bined
1992-1994 missing data
1995 foreign principal’s country, name,
and termination; foreign agent’s
name, address, numeric identifier,
and termination; nature of ser-
vice; activities; finance; political
propaganda
annual
1996-2017 foreign principal’s country, name,
and termination; foreign agent’s
name, address, numeric identifier,
and termination; nature of ser-
vice; activities; finance
semi-annual
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D.3.1 Classification by Topic
I identify following as topics highly pertinent to foreign lobbying. Foreign principals may
be heavily influenced by U.S. foreign policies in particular areas, and thus engage in intense
and/or persistent lobbying activities related to these topics. I reviewed FARA reports of
several years to select salient topics of lobbying and keywords related to each topic. I also
retrieved the frequency of words appearing in FARA reports by producing word matrices
using text-mining function of R to objectively evaluate the plausibility of my initial list and
finalize the list of topics and keywords. However, the keywords under each topic change
over time. This is mainly because issues and events relevant to each topic have continuously
changed. For example, as the major trade institution changed from GATT to WTO to FTAs,
so did the wording describing the details of trade-related lobbying incidents. Thus, I reflect
changes in trend by adjusting the keywords for the two different time groups, the Cold War
and the Post-Cold War periods. To do so, I first recorded the list of potential keywords
while reading FARA reports of different years, and cross-checked the list by retrieving the
frequency of words used in respective FARA reports. Below, I list the search keywords
used to classify lobbying activities. Whenever the keywords appear in the description of
activities, the nature of service, and the political propaganda, I code the lobbying incident
to be related to the respective topic. Since I used the stemming function of the tm (text-
mining) package in R, the words might be abbreviated and written in small cases. However,
when the search keywords take very specific form, stemming might undermine the accuracy
without increasing the efficiency. Hence, I did not performing stemming (1) when searching
keywords from the name of foreign principals, and (2) when searching for the topics of
public relations, diplomacy, and human rights, and partially for security, and economy.
This is because when stemming the word “relations”, I will not be able to differentiate
(a) “The registrant represented the foreign principal before elected officials and government
personnel regarding policies that impact Canada and the Province of Saskatchewan, as well
as governmental relationships with the United States (FARA, December 2017, Canada)”
and (b) “The registrant contacted Members of Congress, congressional staffers, and United
a trade association or a ministry of tourism, I can infer that those lobbying activities are respectively related
to trade and tourism.
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States Government officials to discuss issues related to the United States military facilities
in Germany and visits by Rheinland-Pfalz officials (FARA, December 2017, Germany)” - the
former is foreign lobbying on improving governmental relations and the latter is contacting
the U.S. government for military issues. Likewise, I use the stemming command selectively
in the process of classifying lobbying incidents.
1. Trade7
Cold War 1971-1991
trade; export; import; fta; nafta; gsp8; tariff; custom; caribbean & basin9; gatt; mfn10;
antidump; dump; efta; traders; exporters; importers; imports
Post-Cold War 1995-2017
trade; export; import; fta; nafta; cafta; drcafta; ftaa; naftas; kfta11; caftas; korus-
fta12; tpp13; gsp; mcool; tariff; custom; agoa14; tpl15; wto; gatt; mfn; antidump; dump;
caribbean & basin; traders; exporters; imports; importers
2. Economy (non-trade)16
Cold War 1971-1991
financi; financ; tax; taxat; busi; econom; economi; debt; invest; investment; monetari;
bank; antitrust; fiscal; internat & monetari & fund17; world & bank; exchang & rate18;
government & bond ; securities & tax; securities & taxation; securities & exchange; secu-
rities & regulations; securities & regulation; securities & financial; securities & finance;
7I also consult the name of foreign principals to search lobbying on trade. Trade associations constitute a
large portion of foreign principals. Thus, in cases where more details on the lobbying activities are missing,
I identify trade-related lobbying activities by analyzing the name of foreign principals.
8Generalized System of Preferences
9Because I search for any lobbying related to “Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA)” and
its successors, the words caribbean and basin must be simultaneously present.
10Most-favored nation
11Denotes the FTA between Korea and the U.S.
12Korea-U.S. FTA
13Trans-Pacific Partnership
14African Growth and opportunity Act
15Tariff Preferential Level
16Due to stemming, security in terms of military defense and finance both appear as “secur.” When
a lobbying incident is about securities as financial instrument, the word “securities(or security)” is used in
conjunction with other financial/economic terms. To select out lobbying on securities as financial instrument,
I search the cases where “securities” co-occur with relevant financial terms.
17International Monetary Fund
18exchange rate
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securities & exchanges
Post-Cold War 1995-2017
financi; financ; fdi; tax; taxat; busi; econom; economi; debt; invest; investment; monetari;
imf; bank; antitrust; fiscal; internat & monetari & fund; world & bank; exchang & rate;
government & bond; securities & tax; securities & taxat; securities & exchang; securities
&exchanges; securities & regulation; securities & regulations; securities & financial; secur
& finance
3. Security19
Cold War 1971-1991
defens; militari; nato; disarma; terror; antiterrorist; troop; international & security; na-
tional & security; security & relations; peace & process; arms & sales; security & council
Post-Cold War 1995-2017
defens; militari; nato; disarm; terror; counterterror; terrorist; antiterror; extremismter-
ror; troop; peacemak; peacekeep; international & security; national & security; regional
& security; security & relations; security & relationship; peace & process; peace & treaty;
arms & sales
4. Diplomacy20
Cold War 1971-1991
government relations; government relationship; government relationships; bilateral re-
lations; bilateral relationship; bilateral relationships; diplomatic relations; diplomatic
relationship; diplomatic relationships
19The stem of security “secur” confuses whether it means military security or financial securities. To
identify lobbying cases related to military security, I use full words and take into account which words were
used with “security.”
20I identify lobbying activities purposed to maintain and improve the governmental/bilateral relationship
between the U.S. and the foreign principal’s country of origin. For diplomacy, I treat the contents of lobbying
reports as string variables rather than transforming those into word matrix (i.e. stemming each word).
Lobbying incidents aiming to maintain/improve the relationship with the U.S. are usually described with
expressions such as government relations or bilateral relations. However, stemming does not differentiate
“related to” and “relations.” Even when I search for cases where the words government and relate are
simultaneously used, the results include not only cases relevant to government relations but also cases
where both words government and relate are used at the same time; for example, “The registrant contacted
members of Congress, U.S. Government officials and executive branch officials regarding issues related to
the U.S. foreign policy towards Ethiopia.” Therefore, in order to accurately choose lobbying on diplomacy, I
keep the contents the description of activities, the nature of service, and the political propaganda as string
variables and search the key words below.
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Post-Cold War 1995-2017
government relations; government relationship; government relationships; bilateral re-
lations; bilateral relationship; bilateral relationships; diplomatic relations; diplomatic
relationship; diplomatic relationships
5. Policy/Legal Issues
Cold War 1971-1991
polici & consult; polici & counsel; polici & servic; polici & advic; polici & analysi; legal
& consult; legal & counsel; legal & servic; legal & advic; legal & analysi
Post-Cold War 1995-2017
polici & consult; polici & counsel; polici & servic; polici & advic; polici & analysi; legal
& consult; legal & counsel; legal & servic; legal & advic; legal & analysi
6. Publicity21
Cold War 1971-1991
media; news; newspaper; newspapers; newsletter; newsletters; press; public & relations
Post-Cold War 1995-2017
media; news; newspaper; newspapers; newsletter; newsletters; enewslett; press; public &
relations
7. Tourism22
Cold War 1971-1991
tourism; tourist, tour, travel
Post-Cold War 1995-2017
tourism; tourist; tour; travel
8. Nuclear
Cold War 1971-1991
nuclear; atomic; uranium
Post-Cold War 1995-2017
nuclear; atom; uranium
21I do not perform stemming for the classification of lobbying on publicity to include cases on “public
relations”.
22I consult the name of foreign principals as well because sometimes lobbying incidents by the ministry of
tourism or the tourism promotion council lack the information on lobbying activity descriptions, the nature
of service, or the political propaganda.
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9. Visa
Cold War 1971-1991
visa; immigr; immigrat
Post-Cold War 1995-2017
visa; immigr; immigrat; immigrant
10. Foreign Aid
Cold War 1971-1991
aid; usaid; economi & assistanc23; militari & assistanc24
Post Cold War 1995-2017
aid; usaid; economi & assistanc; militari & assistanc
11. Human Rights25
Cold War 1971-1991
human & rights
Post-Cold War 1995-2017
human & rights
12. Secession
Post-Cold War 1995-2017
selfdetermin26
D.3.2 Classification by Principal Type
1. Public/Governmental Lobbying
Cold War 1971-1991
government; embassy; republic; ministry; department; consulate; ambassador
Post-Cold War 1995-2017
government; embassy; republic; ministry; department; consulate; ambassador
23economic assistance
24military assistance
25I do not perform stemming for the classification of lobbying on human rights issues because the words
“human” and “rights” are inseparable to describe human rights issues. Also, stemming is unnecessary for
“rights” as “rights” is always expressed in plural form.
26self-determination
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2. Private Lobbying
All lobbying activities conducted by actors other than governmental entities
D.3.3 Classification by Lobbying Behavior
1. Contact
Cold War 1971-1991
meet; contact
Post-Cold War 1995-2017
meet; contact
2. Information
Cold War 1971-1991
inform; informat
Post-Cold War 1995-2017
inform; informat
3. Advice
Cold War 1971-1991
advis; advic; consult; counsel
Post-Cold War 1995-2017
advis; advic; consult; counsel
4. Research
Cold War 1971-1991
research; monitor; analysi; analyz
Post-Cold War 1995-2017
research; monitor; analysi; analyz
D.3.4 Other
1. Target
Cold War 1971-1991
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congress; congression; congressmen; congressman; execut & branch27; legisl & branch28
Post-Cold War 1995-2017
congress; congression; congressmen; congressman; congresswoman; congressperson; exe-
cut & branch; legisl & branch
D.4 Classification of Countries
All lobbying incidents documented in FARA reports are sorted by year and the country
of origin of foreign principals to build the Foreign Lobbying Dataset. In the FOLD Dataset,
the unit of analysis is at the country-year level. I follow the classification of the country
of origin as managed in FARA reports and consult the State System Membership (v2016)
dataset to assign the standard numeric country codes.29 However, there are some cases where
FARA classifies entities that are not sovereign states, at least not by the Correlates of War
State System Membership Dataset, as distinct countries of origin of lobbying principals.
For example, (a) overseas territory of major powers, such as British Virgin Islands and
Sint Maarten, (b) regions with considerable autonomy, such as Hong Kong and Macao,
(c) territories in dispute, such as Nagorno-Karabakh and Tibet, and (d) territories that
claimed independence but that no longer exist, such as Bophuthatswana30, are recognized
as independent entities. Following the classification of FARA, I treat these entities as a
distinct country of origin and assign my custom numeric codes.31 Also, there are cases
27executive branch
28legislative branch
29For countries whose membership or name has changed over time - e.g., the unification of German Federal
Republic (260) and German Democratic Republic into Germany (265) into Germany (255), the change of
Czechoslovakia (315) into Czech Republic (316) or the collapse of the Soviet Union (365) and the succession
of Russia (365) - such circumstances are reflected in the assignment of numeric country codes. When
both previous and successor states appear, such as Czechoslovakia and Czech Republic, in the supposedly
transition period, I also keep both as possible countries of origin. Although Germany re-unified in 1990, I
use German Federal Republic (260) and German Democratic Republic (265) instead of Germany (255) in
years 1990 and 1991. This is because FARA reports are combined for 1988-1991 and FARA records the
two countries separately for all four years. As the FARA reports of 1992-1994 are not available, re-unified
Germany (255) first appears in the year 1995 in the FOLD Dataset
30Bophuthatswana was a Banustan country nominally recognized independent during the apartheid period
in South Africa.
31The custom numeric codes that I assign start from 2001, to distinguish these from the standard three-
digit Correlates of War country codes.
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where (e) countries engaged in lobbying before obtaining independence or recognition as
states. Many former colonies or overseas territories and former Soviet countries fall into this
category. For example, St. Lucia had been participating in lobbying activities since 1971
before gaining independence from the United Kingdom in 1979, Namibia since 1971 before
its independence from South Africa in 1990, and Estonia from 1988 before the collapse of
the Soviet Union in 1991. For these cases where there is a temporal gap between a country’s
initial participation in lobbying and the start of its membership in the international system,
I include such countries in the universe of cases since the first year of their lobbying activities
and retroactively assign CoW country codes.
However, there are few exceptions where I do not follow the classification of FARA. First
is the case of the United Kingdom. While FARA reports separately list the United Kingdom,
Great Britain, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, those non-overseas territory of the United
Kingdom are rarely recognized as independent countries, in data used for International
Relations research. Hence, I collapse the these groups (United Kingdom, Great Britain,
Scotland and Northern Ireland) into one, United Kingdom with the CoW country code being
200. Second is the case of entities where statehood was unclear and thus the classification
of FARA was inconsistent. For example, Antigua and Barbuda gained independence in 1981
but FARA in few cases used Antigua as the name of country even after independence. When
the expression of country name is inconsistent in FARA reports, I picked a particular version
to keep consistency.
When merging external data for independent and control variables (e.g., IMF, World
Bank, the United Nations, etc.), I assign the standard Correlates of War country codes and
my custom codes to countries. However, the countries that appear in external dataset but
neither in the State System Membership nor FARA reports, such as Falkland Islands or
American Samoa, are excluded from the sample. There are 250 unique countries of origin in
the FOLD Dataset.
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D.5 Lobbying Variables
The unit of analysis is at the country-year level for all lobbying variables.
D.5.1 Count of Foreign Lobbying Incidents
1. lobby ct: the count of all lobbying incidents, from a country in a given year
2. advis ct: the count of lobbying incidents where lobbying agents provided advice/consultation
to foreign principals
3. aid ct: the count of lobbying incidents related to U.S. foreign aid
4. contact ct: the count of lobbying incidents where agents made contacts on behalf of
foreign principals
5. econ ct: the count of lobbying incidents related to non-trade economic issues
6. humanright ct: the count of lobbying incidents related to human rights issues
7. info ct: the count of lobbying incidents where agents distributed and/or retrieved infor-
mation on behalf of foreign principals
8. nuclear ct: the count of lobbying incidents related to nuclear issues
9. policy ct: the count of lobbying incidents where agents provided consultation/analysis
on U.S. policies/legal issues
10. public ct: the count of lobbying incidents related to public relations
11. research ct: the count of lobbying incidents where agents researched, monitored, and/or
analyzed general or particular issues on behalf of foreign principals
12. secession ct: the count of lobbying incidents related to self-determination issues
13. security ct: the count of lobbying incidents related to security issues
14. target ct: the count of lobbying incidents which targeted U.S. Members of Congress, the
officials of the executive and legislative branches or their staff
15. tour ct: the count of lobbying incidents related to tourism issues
16. trade ct: the count of lobbying incidents related to trade issues
17. visa ct: the count of lobbying incidents related to visa/immigration issues
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18. relation ct: the count of lobbying incidents relevant to diplomatic/bilateral relations with
the United States
19. govt ct: the count of all lobbying incidents where the principals were public (govern-
mental) entities, regardless of the lobbying topics/behaviors
20. private ct: the count of all lobbying incidents where the principals were private (non-
governmental) entities, regardless of the lobbying topics/behaviors
D.5.2 Count of Foreign Lobbying Incidents by Topic/Behavior and by Principal
Type
1. advis govtct: the count of lobbying incidents where lobbying agents provided advice or
consultation to foreign governmental principals
2. advis prict: the count of lobbying incidents where lobbying agents provided advice or
consultation to foreign private principals
3. aid govtct: the count of lobbying incidents related to U.S. foreign aid, where the princi-
pals were foreign public entities
4. aid prict: the count of lobbying incidents related to U.S. foreign aid, where the principals
were foreign private entities
5. contact govtct: the count of lobbying incidents where agents made contacts on behalf of
foreign governmental principals
6. contact prict: the count of lobbying incidents where agents made contacts on behalf of
foreign private principals
7. econ govtct: the count of lobbying incidents related to non-trade economic issues, where
the principals were foreign governmental entities
8. econ prict: the count of lobbying incidents related to non-trade economic issues, where
the principals were foreign private entities
9. humanright govtct: the count of lobbying incidents related to human rights issues, where
the principals were foreign governmental entities
10. humanright prict: the count of lobbying incidents related to human rights issues, where
the principals were foreign private entities
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11. info govtct: the count of lobbying incidents where agents distributed and/or retrieved
information on behalf of foreign governmental principals
12. info prict: the count of lobbying incidents where agents distributed and/or retrieved
information on behalf of foreign private principals
13. nuclear govtct: the count of lobbying incidents related to nuclear issues, where the prin-
cipals were foreign governmental entities
14. nuclear prict: the count of lobbying incidents related to nuclear issues, where the prin-
cipals were foreign private entities
15. policy govtct: the count of lobbying incidents where agents provided consultation/analysis
on U.S. policies/legal issues, where the lobbying principals were foreign governmental en-
tities
16. policy prict: the count of lobbying incidents where agents provided consultation/analysis
on U.S. policies/legal issues, where the lobbying principals were foreign private entities
17. public govtct: the count of lobbying incidents related to public relations, where the
lobbying principals were foreign governmental entities
18. public prict: the count of lobbying incidents related to private relations, where the lob-
bying principals were foreign private entities
19. research govtct: the count of lobbying incidents where agents researched, monitored,
and/or analyzed general or particular issues on behalf of foreign governmental principals
20. research prict: the count of lobbying incidents where agents researched, monitored,
and/or analyzed general or particular issues on behalf of foreign private principals
21. secession govtct: the count of lobbying incidents related to secession issues, where the
principals were foreign governmental entities
22. secession prict: the count of lobbying incidents related to secession issues, where the
principals were foreign private entities
23. security govtct:the count of lobbying incidents related to security issues, where the prin-
cipals were foreign governmental entities
24. security prict: the count of lobbying incidents related to security issues, where the prin-
cipals were foreign private entities
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25. target govtct: the count of lobbying incidents where agents targeted U.S. Members of
Congress, the officials of the executive and legislative branches, or their staff on behalf
of foreign governmental principals
26. target prict: the count of lobbying incidents where agents targeted U.S. Members of
Congress, the officials of the executives and legislative branches, or their staff on behalf
of foreign private principals
27. tour govtct: the count of lobbying incidents related to tourism issues, where lobbying
principals were foreign governmental entities
28. tour prict: the count of lobbying incidents related to private issues, where lobbying
principals were foreign private entities
29. trade govtct: the count of lobbying incidents related to trade issues, where lobbying
principals were foreign governmental entities
30. trade prict: the count of lobbying incidents related to trade issues, where lobbying prin-
cipals were foreign private entities
31. visa govtct: the count of lobbying incidents related to visa issues, where the principals
were foreign governmental entities
32. visa prict: the count of lobbying incidents related to visa issues, where the principals
were foreign private entities
33. relation govtct: the count of lobbying incidents relevant to foreign governmental princi-
pal’s diplomatic/bilateral relations with the United States
34. relation prict: the count of lobbying incidents relevant to foreign private principal’s diplo-
matic/bilateral relations with the United States
D.5.3 Expenses for Foreign Lobbying
For variables related to foreign lobbying expenses, all values are in the natural log.
0 is coded for units that did not participate in foreign lobbying or that did not disclose
financial information despite participation in lobbying activities. The amount is reported in
U.S. dollars. When lobbying expenses were reported in the currency of foreign principal, I
converted the value into U.S. dollars of the corresponding year using World Bank’s official
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exchange rate data (WorldBank, N.d.). When the expenses were non-monetary gifts, those
are coded as missing values. Except for trade-related lobbying activities, I do not code
lobbying expenses by topic and tactic.
1. lnfinances: the amount of expenses used for lobbying incidents by all types of foreign
principals, from a country in a given year
2. lnfinances govt: the amount of expenses for lobbying incidents where the principals were
foreign public (governmental) entities
3. lnfinances pri: the amount of expenses for lobbying incidents where the principals were
foreign private (non-governmental) entities
4. lnfinances trade: the amount of expenses for lobbying incidents, conducted by all type
of foreign principals, related to trade issues
5. lnfinances tradegovt: the amount of expenses for lobbying incidents, conducted by foreign
government actors, related to trade issues
6. lnfinances tradepri: the amount of expenses for lobbying incidents, conducted by foreign
private actors, related to trade issues
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